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Abstract
Database systems maintain integrity of the stored information by ensuring that modi-
fications to the database comply with constraints designed by the administrators. As
the number of users and applications sharing a common database increases, so does the
complexity of the set of constraints that originate from higher level business processes.
The lack of a systematic mechanism for integrating and reasoning about a diverse set of
evolving and potentially interfering policies manifested as database level constraints makes
corporate policy management within relational systems a chaotic process.
In this thesis we present a systematic method of mapping a broad set of process cen-
tric business policies onto database level constraints. We exploit the observation that the
state of a database represents the union of all the states of every ongoing business pro-
cess and thus establish a bijective relationship between progression in individual business
processes and changes in the database state space. We propose graphical notations that
are equivalent to integrity constraints specified in linear temporal logic of the past. Fur-
thermore we demonstrate how this notation can accommodate a wide array of workflow
patterns, can allow for multiple policy makers to implement their own process centric con-
straints independently using their own logical policy models, and can model check these
constraints within the database system to detect potential conflicting constraints across
several different business processes.
A major contribution of this thesis is that it bridges several different areas of research
including database systems, temporal logics, model checking, and business workflow/policy
management to propose an accessible method of integrating, enforcing, and reasoning
about the consequences of process-centric constraints embedded in database systems. As
a result, the task of ensuring that a database continuously complies with evolving business
rules governed by hundreds of processes, which is traditionally handled by an army of
database programmers regularly updating triggers and batch procedures, is made easier,
more manageable, and more predictable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
For many businesses, relational database systems (RDBMs) store most of the transactional
data involved in day to day operations. An instance of a corporate database can often
contain the historic outcome of the activities in which an organization engaged in the past,
as well as the current state of individual ongoing business processes. This availability of
the entire ‘business state’ has traditionally made database systems the focal point at which
operational business policies are monitored and enforced, and RDBMs have accomplished
this by maintaining the integrity of the stored information to ensure that modifications to
the database comply with constraints designed by the administrators.
However the ever decreasing cost of storage and the widespread proliferation of database
systems led to a situation where information pertaining to even the smallest (but not
necessarily insignificant) of business events, such as a user clicking on a URL on a web-page
or a user checking his/her account balance, is often recorded as a unique row in a database.
Although the persistence and availability of ever greater information in a database has
significant advantages from a business perspective, it can also lead to significant costs
when a business is required to enforce policies relevant to the information being stored. As
the number of users and applications sharing this common information increases, so does
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the need to make the database system aware of the business logic that governs how data can
be accessed and allowed to change over time. In situations such as health-care, government,
and finance, the continuous enforcement of complex business rules within database systems
is unavoidable because of mandated legislation. It is also in these situations that the
requirements of policies are vague and change often. Even within a particular business
sector, standardized database deployments or schemas rarely exist, and there are no sets
of database level constraints to which every business can adhere. Since each situation is
different, the interpretations of policy requirements that manifest themselves as database
level constraints are also different for every business.
As a result, database administrators and programmers are left with the manual task
to write triggers, check conditions, schedule tasks, and audit procedures that ensure com-
pliance with a given set of rules. In the absence of a systematic method of implementing
business policies within a database system, the end result can often be an unmanageable
and intricate web of integrity constraints as well as hand written procedures derived from
requirements imposed by various operational areas of the business. Implementing database
level constraints that enforce complex situation specific rules is non-trivial, and there is a
visible shortage of research that attempts to automate this process. This task is largely
left to the administrators and consultants specializing in a particular business domain,
and the sheer complexity of this problem has spawned several sub-industries of business
consultancy that revolve around regulatory compliance in domains such as health-care and
finance.
1.2 State of the art
Figure 1.1 presents a generic simplified view of policies pertaining to database systems
and how they move from policy text to implementation. The higher levels (policy layer)
involve interpreting and bringing together the policies that apply to a business. For large
businesses these policies can originate from a multitude of sources, such as taxation au-
thorities, compliance regimes and standards, industry specific consortia, law-enforcement
authorities, and private contractual obligations. These policies are typically specified in
2
Figure 1.1: High level overview of how business policies are eventually implemented as
database level constraints
natural language form for businesses to interpret according to their situation. In this
phase questions that need to be addressed by policy administrators almost always pertain
to the application rules for the specific business situation: “Does this policy apply to our
business? How, where and when is it applicable?”
The intermediate specification layer represents the creation of a formalized (actionable
and implementable) interpretation of a policy. At this level, policy rules (when-to-do-
what) are made explicit in order to cover the entire space of business situations that an
organization can encounter. Policy design and reasoning tools are often used to map out
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an easy to understand version of the natural language policies scattered in various source
documents. Database administrators may work closely with the policy administrators to
decide how best to interpret policies and avoid undesirable consequences when they are
eventually programmed as constraints in a DBMS. Note that specifications may not always
be well elaborated and developed in all business situations. In fact, it is likely that for
small organizations this specification layer is fuzzy (or non-existent) and policies are directly
ported into database systems as constraints, without expressing them in an intermediate
specifications layer. However for complex businesses, for example situations involving large
database deployments with many policy administrators, there is inevitably a need for an
intermediate layer, where managers can reason about their proposed policies and examine
them in the context of the larger scale business processes. While some organizations may
use workflows or flow-charts to describe the sequence of steps to be followed throughout a
business and exceptional situations therein, other organizations may prefer to write policies
as Event-Condition-Action (ECA) rules. In other words, there are organization specific
guidelines governing how specifications are created and exchanged between managers for a
particular class of business policies. There is also no universal tool or modelling language
that can adequately address the needs of all classes of policies and the preferences of
different policy makers. Consequently, there is no standardized technique of communicating
specifications to database programmers for implementation.
The lowest level of the diagram (constraint layer) is where the rules contained in the
specifications are implemented. This is done by database programmers who write SQL
triggers, check-constraints, and batch tasks that accomplish the goals of the policy. At
this layer the events, conditions, and actions on business objects contained in a database
system are all translated into source code and can be tested against the specifications.
For a concrete example of the above process, let us consider a hypothetical large re-
tail business in Canada implementing the Eco-tax initiative launched by the Government
of Ontario [117]. The business must comply with the provincial rules that require end-
customers to pay additional fees based on the type of product being purchased. Policy
text in this scenario would include not only the actual legislation, but also any supporting
material, brochures, press releases, etc. released by the Government of Ontario. Corporate
product managers, DBAs, and perhaps even tax lawyers would jointly have to interpret
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the word of the law, looking not only at the legislation but also at the product catalog
in the database, in order to define the types of products and additional fees that need to
be applied. An ambiguity such as “does the eco-tax for tires also apply to bicycle tires,”
which is a rule that possibly goes against the spirit of an eco-tax, would need to be resolved
before specifications in the form of lists of products, types, and sub-categories subject to
the additional fees is derived. Finally the specification will be handed down to the pro-
grammers to implement as explicit program code or sets of constraints and dependencies
on the types of tax/surcharge rules that can be applied to specific types of products.
1.3 The Policy Lifecycle: Inception to Obsolescence
In order to appreciate the contributions of this thesis, it is important to develop a deeper
understanding of the sources of inefficiency in the process of implementing and maintaining
an evolving set of policies within a database system (Figure 1.2). We provide a brief
overview of the major reasons why the current state of the art of database centric policy
management, from the moment it emerges as a business requirement to when it is deemed
unnecessary, is costly and can be significantly improved. At each stage in the policy
lifecycle, we describe the limits of what automation can accomplish and what aspects of
the problem space this thesis aims to address.
1.3.1 Identification and Interpretation
Once a business recognizes that a certain policy needs to be enforced, it needs to identify
(or create) sources of information that offer more details and clarifications on the objectives
of the policy. This can simply be described as the requirements gathering/analysis part
of the policy lifecycle. Policies are interpreted from one or more sources that are often
physical documents. Whether it is an internal memo that discusses the needs to have a
new check condition in a business process or the enactment of legislation that requires
changes to be made in a tax rule in a database, the source (documents, emails, memos,
etc.) forms the core on which the implementation will be based.
5
Figure 1.2: A detailed view of the policy-to-constraint translation process. The lifecycle of
policies and business rules in database systems very closely resembles the waterfall model
of software development
Identifying and interpreting natural language policies and then determining their appli-
cability on specific business operations is a significant challenge within the policy lifecycle.
The section of this thesis covering related work (Chapter 2) provides a discussion of auto-
mated methods of deriving formal representations of business rules using natural language
processing (NLP). The lack of reliability and precision in these automated methods makes
them inapplicable in most cases where the implications of misinterpreting policies can be
disastrous. Similarly the domain of policy sources is vast and most NLP solutions to in-
terpreting text containing rules remain as research prototypes designed for certain specific
sources of policy.
There are many ways in which businesses can adapt to this challenge and reduce the
overall cost of policy management. Foremost, an organization can be internally semanti-
cally consistent. For example all members of the sales department could have one interpre-
tation of the customer entity. Similarly, the organization could have semantic mappings
between the common terms used in various functional areas of a business to eliminate
ambiguity among different policy makers. Second, an organization can aim to describe its
policies within a common policy modelling framework. That is to say that an organiza-
tion should try as much as possible to use a single common layer for reasoning about a
given class of policies, so that all policy makers can reason with each other’s policies in
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a consistent manner. For example at an organizational level the decision to use a single
type of process modelling technique to describe its business functions would accomplish
this. If multiple workflow or process modelling techniques are employed within an organi-
zation, then a mapping between the constructs in each should be established so that cross
framework reasoning can be performed at this level before errors are propagated to the
implementation layer. Similarly, consistency in the mechanisms for enforcement should
also be emphasized at the enforcement level for the same reasons.
Observe that these are merely good practices within the context of policy management,
aimed at making interpretation of rules by various policy makers across an organization
easier. These are guidelines for interpreters to follow when translating policies from nat-
ural language into implementable specifications. The overall problem of extraction of
policies from natural language in an automated fashion is intractable. Unsurprisingly this
is because of the same reason many of the classical problems in NLP (such as ontology
extraction, sense disambiguation, entity resolution, context determination, and topic de-
tection) are intractable: the inherent ambiguity in natural languages. As a consequence,
human expertise has always been, and in the foreseeable future will be, required when in-
terpreting policies, rules and laws when applying them to specific situations. Furthermore
it is unreasonable to expect that all policies (external to a business) will one day be written
under one particular semantic interpretation of the world without any ambiguity and will
lead to a single universal interpretation.
The research presented in this thesis is complementary to the problem of automatic
rule extraction and interpretation. It focuses on the implementation of rules derived from
policy within a database system and assumes that the interpretation, regardless of how
it is derived, will be correct. Ideally we see the techniques presented in this thesis to be
adopted by policy administrators at all levels, regardless of the methodology they use to
interpret policies.
1.3.2 Formalizing Policies
Although not a significant issue for small businesses, it is inevitable that an organization
with a complex policy set will have to create an intermediate model for policy rules being
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introduced and assess their impact on the overall operations. For example a workflow or a
process model could be created by a user to describe the rules by which a specific business
process should progress to its conclusion. The task of creating formal models of policy
can often be the most costly phase of the policy-to-constraint translation process, and it
is important to characterize it precisely. Observe that during interpretation, the objective
is largely to identify the scope and sources of policy and data that an organization must
examine in further detail to derive a workable specification. However, during this phase
the rules are interpreted for a particular system and an actionable set of specifications is
generated such that they can be implemented easily. Thus we use the term “formalization”
to mean the conversion of policies into actionable specification from relatively informal
descriptions.
Consider, for example, the introduction of new data retention legislation with which
all businesses must comply. After reading the legislation, a corporate lawyer interprets
it to mean that the organization should delete all personally identifiable information of
customers with whom the organization has had no dealings in the past three years. Note
that the interpretation provides a guideline, but it is not precise enough to be treated as
a specification. For example the words, ‘delete’ and ‘dealings’ are vague terms, and many
such terms may not be directly related to concepts within a database system. Consequently
at this stage (formalization) it is important for managers, DBAs, and corporate lawyers to
examine the given interpretation (perhaps all possible interpretations) and to come up with
actual actions and safeguards (specifications) that, when eventually implemented, comply
with the law.
Mediation and negotiation is often an integral part of achieving a consistent and work-
able specification for a given policy. Proceeding with the aforementioned example, the
simplest implementation of the data retention policy would be to delete all customer enti-
ties that are related to transactions that are more than three years old. However this may
conflict with requirements from other areas of the business. For example, the marketing
department might require that postal codes along with dates and times of customer inter-
actions be preserved indefinitely for research purposes. Similarly, the finance department
might need to store and retain purchase records (amounts, taxes, and shipping address
of customers) for at least six years in case of a tax audit. Clearly in situations where
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shared data is being used by multiple policy makers, there emerges a need to mediate a
formal definition of how a new policy should be converted into a specification such that it
satisfies all policy makers. There are many reasons why the overall process of arriving at
a workable specification is difficult, however the focus of this thesis is on the following two
specific problems:
Business Object and Relational Object Mismatch
When business users and policy makers look at policies, rarely do they have a complete
understanding of how the objects (nouns and verbs) contained in the policy text corre-
spond to rows in tables that are physically stored in a database system and the intricate
relationships that exist between these rows. Even simple tangible concepts, such as an
invoice, can be difficult to describe within a database. The contents of an invoice might be
spread across multiple tables. An invoice could also be broken down into sub-objects such
as line items. In large schemas, complex objects may be scattered across many tables mak-
ing it much more difficult to pinpoint the relationships between its sub-parts. Eliminating
this mismatch between objects referred to in policies and the specific parts of a database
that represent those objects becomes extremely difficult when policies refer to aggregate
data. For example a health care policy may refer to a medical history in several contexts
containing various amounts of information, and each interpretation of this phrase needs to
be properly identified within a database system. Quite often DBAs have to work closely
with policy makers in order to help them narrow down their definition of a policy-relevant
object to what actually exists in a database.
This mismatch between a policy maker’s world view of objects and the database cen-
tric definition of a business object extends to policy actions as well. Policy objectives of
seemingly simple business requirements can be accomplished in various ways. For exam-
ple, instead of ‘deleting’ a record of customer interactions, parts of that information can
be nullified. Equivalently the information can be anonymized; for example, the customer’s
name and address can be changed to that of a fictitious John Doe in the database. The
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that there is no shortage of tools, techniques,
and features available in a modern RDBMs that can be used in conjunction to satisfy
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the requirements of a given interpretation of a policy. When we couple the mismatch
between a single policy maker’s definition of a policy object and an object in a database
system with similar object-relational mismatches across an organization, we can see that
policy formalization and mediation can be a large scale management problem. This is
even more so when policy makers use vastly different logical models to express their policy
sets. This complexity induced by the sheer number of possible implementations of a policy
interpretation makes the DBA a critical part of the policy mediation process.
Conflict Detection and Resolution
Integrating many policies over shared data naturally brings about the possibility of conflict-
ing requirements. Delete-protect conflicts, where one policy maker requires preservation of
data and another requires the destruction of the same data, serve as ideal examples of this
problem. Quite often these conflicts will slip through the modelling and reasoning phase,
either because of a lack of meticulous oversight or the inability to reason across multiple
logical policy models.
1.3.3 Implementation
Once a specification of policies is sufficiently well-defined, it is handed over to database
application programmers for implementation. Their role is to translate the specifications
using the database framework of an organization into actions and safeguards that accom-
plish the goals of the policy being introduced. Database administrators and programmers
need to be aware of the best possible tools and techniques that are available within their
corporate RDBMs to accomplish this translation. In a situation where numerous policy
changes are being introduced at the same time in a database system, it may be beneficial
to chalk out a plan for implementing the new policy requirements. For example, if the
physical schema of the database needs to be modified, then the implications of the change
(such as the impact on logical views) need to be examined carefully. In complex systems
this planning phase will certainly be a costly and time consuming process. The core im-
plementation cost (programming time) associated with writing triggers, check constraints,
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and stored procedure that need to be executed periodically to audit the policy can also
be significant. Since the upper layers of interpreting and formalizing the policy are largely
manual processes, there is little scope for automating the implementation phase.
The lifecycle of a database specific policy (Figure 1.2) has the property that at any
particular phase a policy can be pushed back to the upper layers for re-examination. Con-
sider a policy from a corporate security officer that requires access requests issued to a
database server to be logged for privacy audits. During implementation it is discovered
by programmers that the continuous logging of queries greatly slows down the database
server, which impedes day to day operations. A management decision at this point could
possibly be to re-interpret the policy requirement instead of dedicating more resources for
the database server. For example, the auditor may accept a less data intensive record of
login and logout times as sufficient information for his/her purposes rather than requir-
ing a full log of queries issued by each user. Consequently, the security officer may be
asked to modify the specifications by possibly re-examining and re-interpreting the source
documents pertaining to the policy.
1.3.4 Testing, Deploying, and Monitoring
Systematic testing and deployment of new database level rules is very similar to deploying
a typical software update. Since some policy conflicts within a database system can only
be detected at runtime, the purpose of testing is to detect specific conditions under which
the new policy rules will adversely impact the system. As part of deploying resilient
policies, it is often the case that routines that audit the policies are written independently
thereby increasing the cost of a policy implementation. For example, while one programmer
may implement a mechanism to purge complex records containing private information, a
different programmer may be given the task to write the auditing procedure that verifies
the non-existence of such private information after the original procedure is executed.
Once a policy set is activated, its associated rules and obligations pose a long term
ongoing cost in terms of monitoring. Conflicts and warnings generated by policy rules
may need to be reported, and, depending on the larger business process, various actions
may need to be taken. Automation among these actions, although difficult to verify, is
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relatively easy to implement. Typical examples of these long term monitoring actions
include emailing relevant parties with the details and the findings of the execution of the
policy rule.
1.3.5 Evolution
There are two main aspects to changes in a stable policy set that every business must
consider. Foremost an organization may encounter scenarios where amendments to a policy
may manifest themselves over time. An implementation that is complex invariably requires
more time to modify and thus costs more to maintain. Since the scope of the change in
policies cannot usually be anticipated, even with well-implemented policy sets there is
always the risk of running into a simple change in requirements that can be costly to
implement. Second, we note that corporate databases, like businesses themselves, are
also constantly evolving and subject to new constraints that originate from operational
requirements. For example, a database schema may change as a result of a new application
being developed to support other business requirements. Similarly, new sources of data
that get integrated within a database system may enhance the scope of older policies,
and thus they may require the entire policy lifecycle to be repeated for specific policies.
Again the bottom line is that reducing the ongoing cost of maintaining a complex policy
set, using a systematic way of managing policies within database systems, represents a
significant opportunity for businesses.
1.4 Problem Statement
The envelope of business level policies implemented today within database systems has
vastly expanded from classical integrity and access control constraints to include audit-
ing, usage control, privacy management, and records retention. Traditional integrity con-
straints, for example, asserting that account balances cannot be negative or that ZIP codes,
email addresses, and phone numbers are in a certain format, are essentially static invari-
ants, and their governing rules rarely change. On the other hand, process centric policies
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change continually with business requirements. Temporary changes in business processes,
for example a policy that requires that “for the next two months Jane can only pay an
invoice if it has been approved by John in the Accounting Department,” typically pose
more significant and ongoing costs. Similarly complex temporal constraints, for example,
one that requires that “an employee’s salary cannot increase by over 20% in any two in-
crements,” are much harder for business users to formalize and equally hard to enforce in
a traditional database system that may require changes to the database schema to sup-
port such policies. As users become more aware of the social and business implications
of database technology, the amount, type, and complexity of policies being implemented
within database systems is likely to increase. However, little research has been done in
the database community to address the absence of a systematic methodology for reasoning
about database specific policies, and it remains a substantial area where improvement is
required.
There are major shortcomings in the current state of the art in converting business rules
into database level constraints. Foremost, it is impractical for different classes of users in-
cluding legal experts, business managers and policy makers, database administrators, and
database programmers to communicate and reason over the same policy constructs. Con-
sequently, policy interpretation, formalization (conversion into specifications) and imple-
mentation has to be done by three very different user groups. Conflicts across these three
layers are difficult to detect and costly to isolate, and repairs involving re-interpretation
and mediation can take a long time. The process to convert policy rules to database level
constraints is labour intensive, thus making total compliance at the database level a costly
proposition. Finally, because of the ad-hoc way in which policies and constraints bubble
down to the database from different areas of a business, verification of these constraints
and producing compliance guarantees is infeasible.
A major avenue of improvement that prior work has not examined is that of empowering
business level users and policy makers to develop database level constraints themselves. A
significant hurdle in doing so is that policy makers specializing in various business domains
are not database programmers and thus not capable of writing complex queries and event-
condition-action rules that implement their envisioned policies. Consequently, they have
to rely on database programmers to convert specifications into implementation.
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1.5 Solution Overview
This thesis presents a method of translating informal operational specifications of busi-
ness processes, such as those contained in workflows and process models, into database
level integrity constraints. The fundamental observation exploited in this work is that
databases and business are essentially equivalent state machines and policies can be re-
duced to directives on how these state machines should behave. Just as a sequence of
database transactions can lead it to an inconsistent state with regards to a policy, cer-
tain paths that a business traverses are invalid with regards to compliance with the same
policy. It is argued that a mapping between equivalent paths in these state machines is
easy to establish, even by business users who are not familiar with database terminology.
Furthermore, there exist many ways to create, examine, and reason about these mappings
under different policy scenarios, such as those encountered in business process modelling,
access control, obligations management, records retention and disclosure control. Most
importantly, in each of the above scenarios a policy maker can use his or her favorite visual
model and modelling tool to engineer and create these state space restrictions without
worrying about the ramifications of models created by other policy makers. In essence, the
need to have a DBA acting as a central mediator of policy is virtually eliminated, because
policies can be directly created by the responsible parties in a distributed fashion.
This thesis also demonstrates that once this formal mapping between paths in the
business state space and database state space has been established, automatic translation
of policies into database enforcement actions can be done effortlessly. For a large class of
policies in the aforementioned policy domains, conflicts can also be detected statically, and
proofs of compliance (showing that inter-policy conflicts will never occur) can be generated
by reasoning over the path constraints specified in the policy model. As a consequence, the
middle stages of the policy lifecycle are greatly simplified and the overall cost associated
with managing a large policy set over a database system is significantly reduced.
The above description of the solution can be summarized in the following thesis state-
ment:
14
Thesis Statement: Businesses and databases can both be viewed as cor-
responding state machines, and it is feasible to translate the behaviour of a
business, as specified in individual high-level business process specifications,
into database level integrity constraints. Furthermore, the correspondence be-
tween specific parts of a database and a business process can be established
by non-database experts, used to generate the relevant integrity constraints,
and exploited to formally reason about the behaviour of several processes in-
teracting over shared data.
1.6 Contributions of the Thesis
The thesis has two major contributions. First it presents a modeling language for imple-
menting a large class of business level rules as database level temporal integrity constraints.
The specific properties of the language that make it a significant improvement over existing
techniques are as follows:
1. It is highly customizable and applicable in a broad range of scenarios for which
traditional process modeling techniques are inadequate (e.g. temporal access control).
The language extends the state of the art in workflows and business process modeling
and provides much richer constructs for constraint specification over business objects
contained in database systems.
2. The language resembles business workflows and process models, and thus it is easy
to use for business policy makers. It can also serve as a coherent, unified policy
specification layer for a broad class of business objects contained in database systems.
3. The modeling language serves as a specification language and can be automatically
translated into database level temporal integrity constraints. Consequently, con-
straints specified by users can be directly implemented without any DBA assistance
or manual programming.
Second, the thesis introduces and examines the notion of model checking business pro-
cesses within relational database systems. The thesis is the first to attempt to verify the
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behaviour of the contents of a database in order to make claims about the process that the
changing database represents. Connections between the modelling language presented and
how model interactions can be examined are discussed in thesis. Limits of verification, such
as enforceability of constraints, formulating properties for verification, and issues pertain-
ing to efficiency in verification, are examined. Lastly the role of the DBA in formulating
properties that need verification is discussed, and the implications of conflicting policies
over shared data is examined.
1.7 Terminology and Definitions
The following is a list of terms along with their meaning that are used throughout this
thesis. Every effort is made in this thesis to use these words and phrases in a consistent
manner as specified below:
Policies and Constraints : This thesis uses the word policy in a informal fashion to
mean a set of rules applicable to a business. Policies in the most general sense are
guidelines established to achieve a specified outcome. For example, “access to data
should be restricted to ensure confidentiality and privacy” is a broad policy statement.
Policies are also implementation agnostic. In contrast, the term constraint is used
in this thesis in the classical database theoretic sense, as an integrity constraint or
a data validation check condition within a database system. The notion that these
two can be related (via a correspondence) is examined in Chapter 3.
Workflow or (Business) Process Model : Although from a business perspective these
two terms are differentiated by the granularity in which they specify a repeatable task
(a process often being a more specific notion than a workflow), the reader can consider
them to be interchangeable for the purpose of this thesis. With regards to the work
presented, a workflow or a process model is simply a sequence of steps requiring that
a particular class of objects complies with the mandated business level policies during
its lifecycle.
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Auditing : The term auditing with regards to database systems is used to assert that
a log or a trace of events/actions/updates is being maintained. Consequently, in
the database theoretic sense the term auditing and logging are used interchangeably.
The thesis differentiates this meaning of auditing in databases from its meaning in
business and finance, which is interpreted as ensuring a business complies with some
published policy.
1.8 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines the related work
pertaining to policy management (interpretation, specification, and implementation). In
Chapter 3 we introduce the Database Constraint Modeling Language (DCML), our visual
notation for denoting process-centric constraints in database systems. We present the
semantics and demonstrate, using examples, how informally specified business process
descriptions (such workflows and process models) can be translated into DCML models
over business artifacts contained in a relational database. In Chapter 4 we examine how
DCML models can be implemented as active constraints that monitor and maintain the
integrity of a database with regards to the constraints embedded in them. Issues pertaining
to efficient monitoring of constraints derived from DCML models are examined therein.
Chapter 5 introduces the notion of model checking individual and sets of related DCML
models. A mechanism for identifying conflicting constraints across models is presented,
and the role of the DBA in formulating properties about DCML models that need formal
verification is introduced. In Chapter 6 we critically examine the usability of DCML
in practical situations. We also discuss how DCML could be extended and tailored for
specific applications (types of policies and policy makers) and the limitations imposed by
the design choices available to policy makers. The capabilities of DCML are compared
against traditional workflow modeling languages in this chapter as well. Finally, Chapter
7 concludes this thesis by presenting a case study detailing how DCML could be used to
constrain a database for a real world business process. It discusses avenues of future work
and presents our proposed methodology with which a business can measure and benchmark
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the efficacy of DCML and the associated verification infrastructure against the state of the
art.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Outline
The contents of this thesis relate to a large amount of research literature in several ar-
eas of policy management and computer science. Consequently this chapter provides a
brief review of the related research throughout the phases of the policy lifecycle. We in-
troduce terminology used in prior work that is also employed in subsequent chapters and
develop the groundwork for appreciating the research presented in this thesis. First, issues
pertaining to the translation, interpretation, modeling, and reasoning of policies in the ab-
stract are discussed. Then research related to the conversion of policies into database level
constraints is presented. Finally, prominent auxiliary problems such as the testing, verifi-
cation, evolution, maintenance, and obsolescence of constraints embedded within database
systems are presented.
In addition, each subsequent chapter in this thesis is followed by a smaller more precise
related works section that compares and contrasts the specific contributions of this thesis
to prior research. The objective in doing so is to avoid overwhelming the reader with a
large amount of research at different levels of policy management that is complementary
to the contributions of this thesis yet essential to appreciate the avenues of future research
opened by it (Chapter 7). At the same time this organization presents our contributions
19
in such a way that they can be easily compared and contrasted with the specific aspects
of prior work.
As mentioned earlier, policies in their broader meaning are simply guidelines estab-
lished to achieve specified business objectives. However, within the context of constraints
embedded in database systems, this thesis classifies constraints according to how they ac-
complish one or both the objectives of (i) a security policy or (ii) a process-centric policy.
Access control, privacy management, and data retention are classical examples of security
policies, whereas integrity constraints on data, for instance the requirement that the cus-
tomer account balance attribute must always be positive, are manifestations of operational,
process-centric policies. The remainder of this chapter is organized around examining past
research on policy management (different aspects of the policy lifecycle) across these two
broad policy objectives. As we go from the start of the policy lifecycle to the end, we
examine research contributions that address the challenges associated with the particular
stage of the policy lifecycle across several subclasses of security and operational business
policies.
2.2 Reasoning with Policies
2.2.1 Policy Identification
Identifying sources of policy is primarily not a computer science problem and is most
closely related to the study of corporate governance, risk management, and compliance
(GRC). Even though GRC encompasses issues related to the management of corporate
information systems, the specific problem of identifying policies is more a legal art than a
technical challenge [128]. Several recent papers [11, 20, 32, 81] and books [151, 96, 143,
78] on GRC have examined the implications of changes in the legal landscape (such as
the introduction of HIPAA [1] and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [2]) for corporate information
systems. There is indeed growing concern among businesses to be proactive when it comes
to legal compliance and ensuring that risks associated with the ownership and safekeeping
of personal information are minimized. However, policy identification and topics addressing
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how, when and, where policies (and associated non-compliance risks) emerge are clearly
beyond the scope of this thesis. The reader is directed to the above sources for further
reading on these matters. For the remainder of this chapter, we will not question the sources
of policies. Instead we will focus on the way these pre-identified policies are specified and
interpreted for implementation.
Policy specifications, much like software specifications, can be categorized into three
types based on how closely they resemble their implementation. At one extreme we have
policies in natural language, which are usually written in free form text for human con-
sumption. At the other extreme is the implementation, which, in a manner of speaking,
can be considered a policy specification albeit only readable and interpretable by a knowl-
edgeable programmer. In the middle lie a slew of modeling languages for rule analysis
that attempt to bridge the gap between expressivity and actionability for specific situ-
ations. As an example in the domain of security policies, consider a privacy statement
of practices that will be typically written and edited by an administrator or a manager.
This document may also be available on a website for clients and other stakeholders to
view. Since such a document will be broad ranging and govern the overall behaviour of
an organization, other more specific documents may be derived from it to cater to specific
corporate systems such as the email server, corporate document management system, and
corporate database system. Then, these specific documents are converted into rules for
different computer systems, possibly via an intermediate language such as P3P (Platform
for Privacy Preferences). The specifications in these intermediate documents are eventu-
ally handed down as constraints for programmers to implement in their specific systems
across the organization.
2.2.2 Natural Language Processing of Policies
Since interpreting legal documents is an inherently ambiguous and error prone process
that most software engineers are unable to do well [104], one can be misled into believing
that this task can be better accomplished using automated methods. However NLP based
systems that can independently generate perfect models of rule systems from policy text
are currently far from being a reality [27].
21
There are several noteworthy papers that have attempted to create structured models
of rules contained in text. For example, Moulin and Rousseau [106, 105] present a syntactic
parser that attempts to extract deontic rules from legal text. Their approach is specially
geared towards prescriptive text, which either explicitly allows or disallows actions to
occur. A similar prolog based rule parser and a proof-of-concept was discussed in the work
of Michael, Ong and Rowe [103] and in Ong’s thesis [116]. The results of both these works
were encouraging; however the lack of broad and rigorous testing across different types of
text leaves much work to be done in these parsing approaches. In contrast, the research
of Xiao et al. [174] takes a much more focused approach. It is largely motivated by the
fact that access control requirements are typically not presented as a separate document to
software developers. Instead access control restrictions are often embedded and scattered
across hundreds of pages of software specifications, making it very difficult to capture
the security specifications of a system during software development. Their approach uses
linguistic analysis in order to identify sentences that relate to access control requirements
contained in a specification document. The claimed accuracy of their proposed sentence
level classification technique ranges between 80% and 90%. Since their goal was to only
identify sentences that relate to access control requirements, the task of building a model
for these requirements is unresolved.
It is generally accepted that a hybrid or human assisted approach to extracting various
policy models is perhaps a much more realistic and effective way to convert natural language
policies into formal models. The most prominent such approaches are those of Kiyavitskaya
et al. [92, 91] and Breaux et al. [28, 27]. Kiyavitskaya and Breaux, together with several
other collaborators, have developed a system that allows for user-guided construction of a
policy model through annotation and identification of subjects, roles, and obligations. The
user is expected to guide the system through the policy corpus interactively as it builds a
formal model of the rules contained therein. Arguably this technique significantly reduces
the chances of misinterpretation and missing policies within text, as human oversight is
ever present.
While user-assisted systems may perform better than either statistical or syntactic
approaches, their adoption has been lackluster. This is most likely because of the inappli-
cability of the proposed research prototypes to real life situations, as well as incompatibility
22
with access control mechanisms deployed in existing systems. One such project that not
only embraces the need for human interaction in policy interpretation, but also attempts
to make it a useful exercise for the user, is SPARCLE [29] (not to be confused with the
SPARQL query language). The objective of SPARCLE is to allow user-assisted parsing
of policy documents with the objective of mapping them to existing (or soon to be im-
plemented) constraints. In the future, developers of SPARCLE hope to allow policies
authored within the system to be plugged into existing policy oriented software. However
the currently published research associated with this project [29, 131, 90, 165] has focused
on HCI and evaluating the usability of semi-automated policy parsing/authoring tools.
Other work that has examined problems associated with policy authoring with little or
no assisted policy parsing include that of Shi and Chadwick, who presented a system for
authoring restricted class of access control policies [141], and De Coi et al., who examined
the authoring of privacy policies for social networks [39]. The former approach is especially
interesting, since it offers an insight into how a controlled natural language, a subset
of a natural language limited in expressivity so that it is easier for formal reasoning,
can offer an ideal compromise in this problem area. Our work acknowledges this overall
compromise in expressivity and usability when it comes to automated policy systems, and
a significant portion of Chapter 6 is dedicated to this discussion. The complementary
(perhaps the logical inverse) problem of generating human readable policies from a set
of formal rules has been examined in the context of network security policies [40]. NLP
techniques have also been employed in examining process-centric policies. For example,
the work of Friedrich et al. [66] looks at the problem of constructing business process
models from their natural language descriptions. Although the technique presented relies
on sentence level parsing, it attempts to capture the links between the sentences in order to
establish continuity for identifying sequential and conditional actions in a business process.
After testing their technique on 47 text-model pairs from industry and texbooks, Friedrich
et al. claim accuracy of 77% for their proposed technique. Similar approaches to extract
and construct UML and use-case diagrams from text have also been studied [145, 146].
It is important that we acknowledge the vast amount of literature pertaining to NLP
in general (i.e., not specific to text containing natural language policies). Several problems
in this area, such as ontology extraction, entity recognition, and sense disambiguation, are
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directly applicable to parsing of business policies. Common themes in the prior work on
processing business policies for rule extraction include the use of a shallow parser or weak
grammars in a template based syntactic/linguistic technique to identify business rules in
policy text. Such techniques take a very simplified view of the corpus and therefore lack
the ability to offer a comprehensive policy interpretation framework for complex rules such
as those governed by temporal operators or a deeper understanding of the problem space.
2.2.3 Policy Modeling Languages
Modeling of policies and processes has two well accepted objectives [46, 148]: (a) Summa-
rization or simplification of policy text into a set of requirements that is easier to consume
than the source documents and (b) formalization, through which it becomes possible to
reason about policies and eventually implement them within various systems of an or-
ganization. Consequently, the most well cited surveys in the areas of policy modeling
[100, 3, 148] have attempted to differentiate modeling languages across these two dimen-
sions. Modeling techniques that are graphical in nature, such as workflows and Petri nets,
often emphasize clarity and simplicity, whereas models that are logic or rule based such as
event-condition-action lists focus on achieving the benefits of formalization. In many cases
a graphical model can have an equivalent logical interpretation and vice versa, offering
a compromise between formalization and simplification. Many modeling techniques have
been proposed in the prior literature, and in this section we provide a brief overview of the
most popular and prevalent ones.
Privacy
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [44, 130, 4] is W3C’s privacy preference spec-
ification language, which allows web based exchange of privacy specifications among users
(agents) and different web services. Using P3P, end users can limit the type of information
they wish to communicate with web sites and only do so if the web site promises to use it
for specific purposes. Several popular browsers today, such as Microsoft Internet Explorer,
have built in support for exchanging P3P policies with web servers [41]. According to
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surveys, roughly 15% of the top 5000 visited web sites implement a mechanism for accom-
modating end user P3P policies [156]. Unfortunately since P3P policies are not considered
legal contracts [132], businesses have a very high incentive in over promising or not keeping
promises at all when it comes to acknowledged user privacy preferences.
Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) [13, 134] was a similar attempt
at specifying and exchanging privacy preferences, at a much finer granularity than P3P.
However EPAL was never formally adopted as an OASIS (Organization for the Advance-
ment of Structured Information Standards) standard. EPAL was eventually superseded by
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), which, like its predecessor, is a
declarative specification language for access control policies accompanied by a processing
model that specifies how policies are interpreted.
Security and Access Control
Today XACML has been widely accepted as the only comprehensive standard that accom-
plishes the objectives of EPAL, P3P, and several other access control specification languages
that were proposed alongside these. In fact, due to its flexible, XML-like syntax, several
extensions of XACML are now themselves standardized languages for exchanging specifi-
cations. For a comprehensive comparison of XACML with prior languages, the reader is
directed to the work of Anderson [10].
Even though XACML accomplished goals well beyond those for which it was initially
proposed and represents the state of the art in access control policy specification, it has sev-
eral shortcomings. Foremost, XACML is purely a specification language and compromises
heavily on formalization for simplifity (see Listing 2.1 on page 27 for a simple example of a
policy in XACML). Furthermore, XACML does not go far beyond providing an easy to use
specifications framework for attribute based decision making. A typical XACML policy
will specify subjects, actions, objects, and conditions under which actions should be al-
lowed or not allowed, but the interpretation and implementation of these policies in various
systems remains an open problem for the developers of policy vocabulary and developers
of the specific systems. This is perhaps why the database research community has been
impacted very little by the increasing popularity of XACML. The fact that the subjects,
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actions, and objects mentioned in an XACML policy still need to be explicitly mapped
and translated onto individual pieces of data and constraints (at the database level using
traditional grant/deny statements) makes XACML relatively ineffective for conveying any
useful information to a database programmer. Recently there have been attempts made
within the database community, more specifically by Jahid et. al [82, 83], encouraging
database security administrators to encode database level constraints using XACML in
order to exchange and recompile them efficiently across various systems. However they do
not address the question of how to derive database constraints from specifications in the
first place.
There are, of course, several other policy modeling paradigms, such as Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) [64, 63, 138] and its temporal extension [25, 88], Label-Based
Access Control (also known as Lattice-Based Access Control or Rule-Based Access Control)
[137, 54], and the classical ACL-Based Discretionary Access Control [139, 58]. A major
shortcoming of the policy modeling techniques in each these paradigms is that they limit
modeling to a few core attributes, such as subject, target, condition, and action. As we
shall see shortly, very few access control policy modeling techniques focus on the set of
business processes and specific situations under which a policy decision is to be made. The
classical motivating example for such flexibility in modeling access control comes from the
domain of health care, where a process (such as handling a medical emergency) may require
that general access control restrictions need to be ignored for specific cases in order to best
serve a patient. Recent proposals, such as Usage-Based Access Control [136, 175], and
Task-Based Access Control [110] have attempted to address this divide by integrating roles
and situation specific attributes together. Unfortunately these proposals only marginally
extend prior approaches with additional attributes and modes of reasoning over situation
specific attributes. The general problems of (a) conveying access control constraints as part
of a business process and (b) mapping these modelled constraints into various systems that
implement them are not addressed in these works.
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12 <Pol i cy Po l i cy Id=”p1” RuleCombiningAlgId=” u r n : o a s i s : n a m e s : t c : x a c m l : 1 . 0 :permit−o v e r r i d e s ”>
3 <Target>
4 <Subjec t s><AnySubject/></ Sub jec t s>
5 <Resources><AnyResource/></ Resources>
6 <Actions><AnyAction/></ Act ions>
7 </ Target>
8 <Rule RuleId=”Rule1” E f f e c t=”Permit”>
9 <Target>
10 <Subjec t s>
11 <AnySubject/>
12 </ Sub jec t s>
13 <Resources>
14 <Resource>
15 <ResourceMatch MatchId=” u r n : o a s i s : n a m e s : t c : x a c m l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
16 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” h t t p : //www. w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>
17 StudentLi s t
18 </ Attr ibuteValue>
19 <ResourceAttr ibuteDes ignator
20 Att r ibute Id=” u r n : o a s i s : n a m e s : t c : x a c m l : 1 . 0 : r e s o u r c e : r e s o u r c e−id ”
21 DataType=” h t t p : //www. w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”/>
22 </ResourceMatch>
23 </ Resource>
24 </ Resources>
25 <Actions>
26 <Action>
27 <ActionMatch MatchId=” u r n : o a s i s : n a m e s : t c : x a c m l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g −equal ”>
28 <Attr ibuteValue
29 DataType=” ht tp : //www. w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”>read</ Attr ibuteValue>
30 <Act ionAttr ibuteDes ignator
31 Att r ibute Id=” u r n : o a s i s : n a m e s : t c : x a c m l : 1 . 0 : a c t i o n : a c t i o n−id ”
32 DataType=” ht tp : //www. w3 . org /2001/XMLSchema#s t r i n g ”/>
33 </ActionMatch>
34 </ Action>
35 </ Act ions>
36 </ Target>
37 </Rule>
38 </ Po l i cy>
Listing 2.1: An example of a simple XACML Policy, taken from the Master’s thesis of Jin
[86], explicitly allows anyone to read (action) the Student List (object)
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Data Retention
Data retention is a subfield of records management that deals with the proper safekeeping
and destruction of data according to a scheduled and pre-determined lifecycle [60, 61].
Most businesses today have legal requirements to safeguard their operational records, such
as those used for tax purposes, for a specified number of years. Furthermore many orga-
nizations, such as health care providers, are required by law to remove records from their
system after a certain period of time has elapsed in order to protect the privacy of patients.
Similar legal requirements, when combined with the facts that maintaining a large amount
of sensitive information can be a liability and that possession of certain information such
as incriminating emails can lead to severe losses, has led to a situation where businesses
have started to take a keen interest in formulating and enforcing data retention policies.
The state of the art in specifying retention requirements is essentially attribute-based
retention constraints on classes of business objects. For example, in the domain of docu-
ment management, each document in a corporate enterprise content management system
(ECM) could have a set retention period based on its sensitivity label. Systems such as
OpenText’s LiveLink ECM can use these labels and conditions such as “a document not
being accessed for 7 years” to automatically remove them from the system [43]. Similarly,
policies on emails, such as those present in typical corporate email storage servers (e.g. Mi-
crsoft Exchange Server [42]), are often enforced transparently without users being aware of
them. An example of such as policy could be that emails that are processed/accessed today
will be deleted in 365 days unless labelled as important. We have extensively examined the
notion of what is a record in a database and the implications of protecting and deleting
different types of records stored within relational database systems [15].
2.2.4 Operational Policy Modelling and Management
The term process modelling refers to the holistic study of everyday repeatable business
functions. The hundreds of process modelling techniques, ranging from classical work-
flows and flowcharts to current day extensions of UML diagrams, offer a varying degree
of compromise between ease of comprehension and ease of implementation. The process
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modelling languages that are purely abstract do not contain sufficient detail to delineate
exactly how a process should (or should not) progress further towards its conclusion. In
most cases, the objective of these higher level modeling techniques is to provide a clear,
concise, and simplified graphical (or pictorial) snapshot of a complex multi-stage process
so that managers can analyze it and make improvements. Traditional wisdom suggests
that models created by these techniques are valuable because a non-specialist (such as ad-
ministrative staff or an external consultant) can in a few seconds gather a large amount of
high level information about processes. Moving to the other side of the spectrum, one can
observe that the more concrete process modelling techniques are often workflow oriented,
and they may even specify pre and post conditions for individual business objects that
need to be met as a means of restricting control flow of objects and processes. The aim
of many of these flow oriented languages is to provide deeper insight into processes and
their sub-stages, so that these models can be provided to system developers. However,
the details of the implementation, for example, how each pre/post condition is mapped
onto the implementation level (for example, the specific pre-condition on business objects
stored in a database system), are often not specified. As we move ever closer to implemen-
tation, there can exist implementation specific modeling techniques. Common examples of
modeling techniques that can accomplish automatic model-to-code translation include the
large number of widely used CASE (Computer Aided Software Engineering Tools), ER-
modelling, and UML-to-code extensions for common IDEs, such as IBM Eclipse. These
tools have traditionally generated method stubs for programming languages (including
SQL) based on business level models but can even go as far as generating specific branches
and assertions in program control flow to ensure that the code that is eventually written is
true to the model. The focus of these techniques has remained at source code generation
for programs, rather than database level constraint generation and maintenance.
There is no shortage of process modelling languages and workflow diagram semantics
available today. Several books and surveys have been published, examining the myriad of
very similar techniques for workflow modeling. The interested reader is directed towards
the work of Fischer [65] and van der Aalst et al. [164, 162] as comprehensive sources
that examine workflows and towards the work of Ko et al. [93] for a more recent survey
that attempts to categorize and differentiate many of the proposed workflow modeling
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techniques. In the process modelling community there are also numerous surveys and
books that provide insight not only on the wide array of notation and techniques [76, 7,
69, 99], but also on best practices in the industry [21, 180, 85, 102]. Because of the sheer
number of modeling languages available, the usability and popularity of each one is hard
to gauge. However, the most well cited ones in the literature are invariably graphical and
also have logical interpretations to them. It is very likely because of the lack of a easy-
to-visualize graphical representation that pure logic/functional descriptions of business
processes are not popular among business users. The seemingly simple idea of van der Aalst
et al. to characterize different workflow techniques based on a set of common workflow
patterns [163] has had a prolific impact in this field. Workflow patterns are basically design
patterns that attempt to classify various types of control flow dependencies in workflows.
Examples of these dependencies include sequence (a task must happen before the other),
parallel split (execute multiple tasks in parallel in any order), and synchronize (wait for all
tasks to complete). Although there are other classifications, the seminal work of van der
Aalst proposed 20 such patterns, which are now the gold standard against which different
workflow languages are compared.
In this section we examine only classical approaches to process modelling that have
had impact on the database community when it comes to implementing database level
constraints and assertions. This examination of well understood approaches will lay down
the groundwork for examining specific properties of our proposed method of modelling
database level constraints. To concretize and differentiate the contributions of this thesis
further, at the end of Chapters 3 and 4 we will take a closer look at more recent approaches
in database specific policy modeling and those that more closely share specific characteris-
tics with our proposed technique. In Chapter 6, in order to show that the expressive power
of our proposed modeling technique is broad enough to capture most workflow situations,
we will also revisit the notion of common workflow patterns as introduced by van der Aalst
et al. and examine how our modeling technique provides facilities for implementing these
patterns.
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Entity Relationship Modeling and its extensions
By far the most prolific database modeling technique of today is entity-relationship (ER)
modeling [140]. Although traditional ER diagrams do not capture the deeper procedural
interactions within a business process, they do capture data-centric definitions of business
objects and their relationships to each other. In addition to fleshing out exactly how
business objects will be stored within relational database, ER diagrams provide some very
limited support for the designer to enforce some basic schematic constraint on the logical
structure of the database. These constraints include cardinality and referential integrity
which, for example, can be used to specify that a business object can/should be related to
at most/least some number of other business objects through a certain relationship.
By the late 90s the overwhelming popularity of ER modeling had prompted researchers
to develop a myraid of temporal extensions to ER modeling. Because the original ER model
and its extension (Enhanced Entity Relationship Model [153]) described in practically all
modern database textbooks leave time as an implicit attribute of entities and relationships,
it becomes impossible to reason about time sensitive relationship and temporal constraints
in ER modeling. This represents a significant problem when designing databases that store
historical or time-annotated data, where the valid time of a fact (the time periods in the
past, present, or future where a fact remains true) are fundamentally different from its
transaction time (the time at which the fact was recorded in a database). An example of
this complexity arising from different transaction and valid times can be given in the context
of a seemingly simple data item, namely marital status. Depending on the interpretation,
this attribute can have complex temporal intricacies and constraints associated with it.
For example, every individual must start off as “single” and after their expected date of
marriage is known in a database system, their status from that point in the future will
change to married. If the individual files papers for a divorce with a future effective date
in the application, only from that point onwards will his/her status change to “divorced.”
Similarly there can be inter-related rules and constraints between concepts. For example
once married, a person can never revert to single and must become either divorced or
widowed. In the case a person marries twice but the second spouse subsequently passes
away, precedence rules based on temporality may be applicable to determine which status
31
(widowed or divorced) is implied by the sequence of events.
The most recent and well cited survey in the general field of temporal data management
was published in 1999 by Jensen and Snodgrass [84]. It concluded that the dozen or so
temporal entity relationship modeling techniques that had been proposed by 1999 had
seen little to no industrial adoption. In the same year, Gregersen and Jensen published a
much more comprehensive survey comparing various temporal entity relationship modeling
techniques [70]. The following paragraph taken directly from that survey, still holds true
today, and eloquently summarizes the shortcomings of temporal ER modeling techniques:
“In the research community, as well as in industry, it has been recognized
that temporal aspects of database schemas are both prominent and difficult to
capture using the ER model. Put simply, when modeling fully the temporal
aspects, the temporal aspects tend to obscure and clutter otherwise intuitive
and easy-to-comprehend diagrams. As a result, some industrial users simply
choose to ignore all temporal aspects in their ER diagrams and supplement
the diagrams with phrases such as “full temporal support.”The result is that
the mapping of ER diagrams to relational tables must be performed by hand;
and the ER diagrams do not document well the temporally extended relational
database schemas used by the application programmers.” [70]
Bridging the two worlds: Perspective of this thesis
Before going further into process modelling, it is important that we digress a little from our
ongoing discussion of prior work and highlight our perspective on several issues discussed
so far. One of the fundamental shortcomings of prior work in our area has been to consider
data modeling and business process modeling as two separate problems. However this
thesis claims that when it comes to management of constraints within a database system,
these two areas are intricately linked together. This assertion is central to this thesis and
we revisit it in Chapter 3.
Observe that ER diagrams only tell us how data is logically structured in a database,
which attributes to store for different entities, and some basic information about how these
entities relate to each other. Similarly if we are to examine a business process model, we
32
will learn how data will be generated and what sequence of conditions need to be met before
a business process concludes. However since the “status” of the process in question is itself
inferrable from data contained in a database, there is automatically an implicit mapping
between the data model and how a business process uses it. Furthermore the notion of time
very elegantly connects the data model and the business process model in the context of
constraints. Even though time is explicit in the data model (storing transaction and valid
times) and implicit in the business process model (by observing that if a process “moves
forward” then some time has elapsed), data itself is constrained by constraints possibly
originating from both these sources (data model or the process model).
This subtle interplay between data modeling, temporality, and progression in business
processes is why a critical examination of both data modeling and process modeling tech-
niques is directly relevant to our work. Furthermore, this relationship gives significant
credence to some form of temporal logic being an ideal tool for specifying process centric
constraints over relational database systems.
BPMN and BPEL
BPMN (Business Process Model and Notation, see Figure 2.1 for an example) currently
represents the state of the art in process modeling and has lately received significant
attention from researchers and the business community alike. At its core BPMN is simply
a process modeling notation very similar to flowcharts and UML activity diagrams. As
of March 2011, the second iteratively improved version of BPMN is an official Object
Management Group (OMG) standard [113]. Wohed et al., have exhaustively analyzed
the capabilities of BPMN under the workflow patterns framework [172], and the book of
White and Miers serves as a comprehensive reference guide for BPMN notation and usage
[170]. Although BPMN may seem to be yet another process modeling language, there are
several reasons why BPMN has revitalized the process modeling community. Foremost
it addressed the criticism that UML activity diagrams (discussed shortly hereafter) have
traditionally focused more on serving the needs of the software engineering community.
The similarities between BPMN and traditional flowcharts gives this argument significant
credibility. In fact, the case has been made that business process diagrams in BPMN are
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Figure 2.1: BPMN diagram for a vending machine. The diamond with a + sign represents
a parallel split. See [112] for a detailed usage guide and many more examples.
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much more amenable for human consumption [179]. Second, BPMN represents a unification
of several notational languages that had been developed by various vendors to serve the
needs of the process modeling community. The solidification of the BPMN specifications
by the members of the OMG brought together many influential organizations and vendors
of process modeling software to agree on a notational standard.
A parallel effort undertaken by the OASIS group has been to develop, standardize, and
promote the Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) (BPEL) [71, 89]. BPEL can be
best described as an XML based description of the control flow of a business process. The
motivation for an XML based extensible language comes from the fact that many business
processes today revolve around numerous independent web-services working together and
passing information back and forth. Consequently a language for orchestrating (monitor-
ing, managing, and enforcing) control flow of information between these services provides
a platform for quickly building applications that support complex business processes. Van
der Aalst et al. in their paper titled “Life after BPEL” [160], have made the criticism that
on the surface BPEL looks like a simple messaging language that connects several web
services (modules in the classical sense) together. However the authors do acknowledge
there are specific features (albeit mostly syntactic) that make BPEL particularly appealing
for mashing together web-services.
Because of the overwhelming support of the process modeling community that these two
standards have received, there has been significant research conducted in mapping BPMN
constructs into BPEL semantics. The objective of such research initiatives is to convert
a business process diagram to its execution language specification and then perhaps to
generate control flow constructs in various programming languages automatically so that a
message passing/orchestration service can be easily built to monitor and enforce a business
process. However these mappings are typically not complete and not sufficiently expressive
to accomodate a wide range of control-flow situations. Furthermore, the mappings can
often come with their own set of problems, including generating BPEL code that is either
too complex and/or too unreadable by humans or that is not easy to trace back to the
original control flow constructs. Nonetheless this is a research area that has the attention
of the business process modeling community. The thesis of Jeroen Blox (2009) provides
a comprehensive review of such techniques, their positive aspects, and shortcomings, and
35
Figure 2.2: A simple UML activity diagram for a vending machine
it also proposes Blox’s own BPMN2BPEL translation mechanism [26]. It serves as an
excellent starting point for those interested in research in this direction.
UML and OCL
Graphical modeling of data and processes has also seen significant interest from the software
engineering community. UML (Unified Modeling Language) is commonly used for modeling
objects as well as relational databases. It has recently been extended to include the Object
Constraint Language (OCL) [114], which allows simple invariants on objects to be specified.
OCL can be considered to be a textual addendum to several types of UML diagrams.
The motivation for OCL comes from the fact that objects, relationships, and activities
specified within UML diagrams can be constrained, but neither is it feasible to forcibly
integrate these constraints in one diagram nor can some of them be expressed visually.
Consequently it is often better to express these constraints in plain text that accompanies
a UML diagram. As an example let us say we have two types of objects in a specific
UML diagram namely vehicles and owners (see Figure 2.3), and numerous data (attribute)
specific constraints revolving around different types of licenses for different types of vehicles
as well as different age requirements for different types of licenses. Instead of trying to
express all this information, we can start listing object level invariants one by one, e.g., “if
vehicle.type = “Motorcycle” then IsTrue(LicenseClass(vehicle.owner.license), ≥, ‘M1’).”
A brief explanation of what this constraint means (i.e., a vehicle’s owner must have the
relevant license) can also be provided alongside. It is easy to see how a set of constraints
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Figure 2.3: A simple UML class diagram. Note that the diagram is much richer than
traditional ER diagrams and contains descriptions of functions. Other extensions can
greatly enhances the usability of such modeling for software developers/engineers
written in text provides a much better way of conveying constraints than modeling them
graphically.
Note that simple object level invariants, such as the one discussed above, can be easily
converted into enforceable constraints in many target languages. With regard to SQL
and database systems, Demuth et al. have proposed an extension to OCL for automatic
translation of object level constraints in the modeling language to database level triggers,
provided “object-to-table mappings”1 are available [51, 52]. Badaway and Richta [16] and
Zimbra˜o et al. [178] have also presented similar mechanisms to translate OCL constraints
to SQL assertions. Although such approaches to constraint generation may seem new in
the context of the recently proposed OCL, in Section 2.3 we observe that template based
constraint generation techniques for database systems were exhaustively studied in the
mid 90s in the context of active database management systems. The very similar research
conducted in the database community more than a decade earlier is perhaps not only more
comprehensive and relevant, but also provides the foundations on which today’s object
level constraints can be embedded in database systems.
A note on Object Relational (OR) Mapping
As alluded to previously, there are major differences between the way system developers
working in the object oriented programming (OOP) paradigm view objects and the way
database programmers view relational structures that store the details of those objects. In
1more appropriately known as object-relational-mapping in the database community
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practice the more we go beyond simple objects and tables, the more convoluted the map-
pings become, and the difference between these two world views become more and more
irreconcilable. The view taken by database developers primarily focuses on efficient stor-
age, management, and optimized retrieval/update of interrelated objects and the complex
processes in which they partake. Furthermore relationships between objects are considered
first class citizens in database design theory, complicating the matter further of how sub-
objects of various classes may be related to each other. Database developers thus often
disregard the notion of derived and sub-class oriented inheritance hierarchies and focus on
normalization and separation of data based on actions and nouns. This in turn requires
a complex web of wrappers to be written (and forever maintained) by a few programmers
who are familiar with both the database schema and the object level view of data, so
that objects and sub-objects can be properly maintained in the database by mapping their
attributes properly at the storage level.
This mismatch has been well recognized as an irreconcilable difference by many promi-
nent researchers in both the database and programming languages communities. The use
of object-relational mapping tools to address these differences is a contentious issue as
well. Having an object-relational mapping layer can often introduce its own set of com-
plications: as a business and its database evolve, these mappings become more and more
complex and time consuming to maintain. Some have even called this ongoing battle to
bridge the two worlds as the “Vietnam of Computer Science” [108]. In this thesis we refrain
from taking sides or even expressing an opinion on this matter. However we do point out
that if an elegant and easy to use method of mapping complex objects and their behav-
ior (processes) to storage level constructs in database systems is ever discovered, then a
“policy-to-relational” mapping would be near trivial to support on top of that framework
as the next logical step. For a deeper look at the problem of object to relational mapping
and the general problem of arbitrary schema-to-schema mappings, the reader is directed
to the works of Bernstein and Sergey [23], Adya et al. [5], Stajano [149] and O’Neil [115]
as comprehensive surveys and excellent starting points for further research in this areas.
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2.3 Logic, Constraints, and Active Database Systems
At this juncture we move from modeling of policies to enforcement of constraints in a
database system. Note that there are several ancillary issues across the policy lifecycle
that we have not yet addressed directly. Conflict detection and resolution are examples
of problems that can either be addressed during the policy modeling phase or left for the
execution engine as a run-time enforcement issue. More often than not, one of the funda-
mental objectives of having a logical policy model in the first place is to detect (or prevent)
as many conflicts as possible before implementation. The role of the implementation en-
gine in such cases is to cater to the exceptional situations where the model is not able to
provide conclusive answers.
A more concrete example is that of a file on disk for which an operating system is
managing permissions. A user and group based policy model may allow the group called
“Administrators” access to an object and deny access to a particular user “John” for the
same object. A trivial conflict could occur if John ever becomes part of the Administrators
group, and consequently a logical policy model often comes with resolution mechanisms,
such as giving preference to negative authorizations. We will examine several such issues
throughout this thesis (conflict detection specifically in Chapter 5). In this section we
present a broader examination of logics behind policy modelling, constraints, and method
of enforcement in database systems.
Active Database Systems
An active database system is a DBMS with support for event detection (monitoring) com-
bined with the facility to execute transactions autonomously [119]. Such a system is
fundamental to the continuous monitoring of business rules and their enforcement. Dur-
ing the 1990s, active databases received significant attention from the database research
community, and many prototypes such as Ariel [73], Starburst [171], SAMOS [68], HiPAC
[47] and ODE [98] were used to demonstrate the applicability and practicality of triggers
as a means for offering event-driven transaction processing. As a result of that research,
most modern relational database systems today support the notion of triggers. A trigger
39
is a pre-programmed transaction that can be invoked when a particular condition in the
database is met. User programmed triggers can also be executed based on temporal and
periodic conditions as well as when certain failure conditions are met. Research related to
trigger termination and confluence that emerged during the 90s forms the basis of reason-
ing over a set of event-condition-access (ECA) rules in a database. Since the solidification
of the SQL3/SQL:1999 standard, triggers have become the de-facto means of supporting
user programmed ECA rules within a database system [30].
Automatic generation of triggers to enforce rules in a database system is not a novel
concept. Many of the fundamental constraints pertaining to data integrity, such as primary
key, foreign key, uniqueness, and domain constraints, are, in fact, no different than triggers
on top of relational tables [38]. Even if not explicitly employed by users, triggers are often
transparently defined by a database system to monitor integrity constraints [31] and for
the incremental maintenance of materialized views [72]. The use of triggers as a means
to implement business level policies has also seen widespread adoption [30, 144, 95], and
today most commercial database system have extensive support for user programmable
triggers. In addition to supporting business rule enforcement, the most common uses of
database triggers include alerting, replication (copying modified data to other locations),
auditing (keeping a secure history of updates), and even logging access control events [30].
Although the research in this thesis does not directly concern itself with implementation
of an active database system, it relies heavily on the fundamental framework for event-
condition-action based rule checking provided by database systems. We believe that for a
policy modeling framework to be useful, it must in some way have a direct (and prefer-
ably fully automatable) implementation path to be written as enforceable rules (triggers)
within a database system. Furthermore we will rely on prior literature to propose opti-
mizations with business policy, discover conflicts, and propagate knowledge about policies
(as manifested as triggers/rules) back up to the business level modeling layer.
Since the proposed policy modeling language of choice in this thesis is first order tem-
poral logic of the past and its metric extensions, the work of Chomicki [33] and Toman and
Chomicki [154, 34] is of significant importance, as it lays down the foundations of efficiently
implementing first order linear temporal integrity constraints within relational database
systems. It is worth acknowledging that the aforementioned works still remain state of the
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art in describing the limits of the types of database level constraints that can be efficiently
enforced and the compromise between auxiliary space and efficiency that needs to be made
during implementation. The performance results presented in this thesis (Chapter 4) serve
as yet another practical validation of the above works.
Temporal Logic and Policy Models
Research pertaining to the use of temporal logics in computer science has spanned a pe-
riod of over five decades. However among the various fragments, the linear propositional
fragment of temporal logic (LTL) has received significantly more attention than others.
The popularity of LTL is attributable not only to the fact that computer aided verification
and model checking have their theoretical underpinnings in LTL, but also perhaps to the
simplicity and elegance of LTL. The decidability of propositional LTL was first shown to
be P-SPACE complete by Sistla and Clarke [147]. Recent results have identified several
broader classes of first order metric monodic variants of temporal logic as being decidable
[118, 79]. This thesis directly uses these results to make claims about several problems,
such as conflict detection within a constraint system. A reader who appreciates topics
such as satisfiability and decidability of logics will consequently appreciate the reduction
of several problems in constraint management to these well studied problems. A large
body of work in the area of policy specification using temporal logic, including this thesis,
is motivated by the classical work of Lamport (Temporal Logic of Actions [97]) and by the
seminal work of Pnueli [123, 122].
Using LTL as a policy level tool for specifying temporal access control restrictions [88]
and determining regulatory compliance using historical audit logs [57] have received varying
degrees of attention from researchers. More recently, there has been a push to use metric
first order temporal logic as a unifying layer of policy that is able to support obligation
modeling, Chinese Wall policies, and even data retention policies [19]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, no prior approaches have looked at the problem of integrating data
models and process models to enforce process centric temporal integrity constraints within
database systems. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, there are many challenges faced
when porting a logical policy model into its implementation, which prior works have failed
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to address.
Several researchers have examined the stark resemblance between the problems of
model checking, satisfiability, and variants of the constraint satisfaction problem (CSP)
[24, 169, 62]. The types of constraints examined in the work of Demri and D’Souza [50]
are very similar to those that we examine in our work and that we expect to encounter in
business situations. Their primary result shows that solving constraints specified in linear
temporal logic over certain decidable SMT theories (more specifically the constraint sys-
tems (N, <,=) and (Z, <,=)) is equivalent in computational complexity to that of classic
LTL satisfiability. The link between several problems in database systems and the con-
straint satisfaction problem is also well known to researchers. Many classical problems,
such as containment for conjunctive queries and query answering using views, can be di-
rectly reduced to that of constraint satisfaction [166, 94]. Once again, we will rely on these
classical results to answer several important questions about what class of process-centric
constraints can be accommodated in our proposed model.
If we step further back, we can see that there is also a significant link between busi-
ness process modeling techniques, such as workflows, and state machine oriented analytical
techniques such as Markov Modeling and Petri-Nets. Pesic and van der Aalst have exam-
ined this very resemblance between finite state machines and business process models [121].
However, because of its sheer complexity, these automata-theoretic models have had little
or no impact on the process modeling community. With that being said, analysis of state
oriented systems does relate directly to several problems in policy verification and must be
considered when proposing and analyzing policy models.
Finally, in the context of our own work, we note that the notion of modeling a business
situation as a state machine and then expressing (and checking) path constraints is very
closely associated with formal verification and model checking [36, 22]. There is, in fact, a
direct correspondence between traditional model checking of software systems (specifying
invariants in linear temporal logic, checking for liveness and safety, etc.) and our proposed
model for ensuring business process integrity. In the context of formal verification, the
objective is to verify properties of a system over all possible runs. Although in our work
the lines between a model and its properties (constraints) are blurred, there is a significant
overlap in the context of identifying potential conflicts in the business lifecycle where a
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constraint may be violated.
43

Chapter 3
Policy Modelling for Relational
Objects
3.1 Outline
In this chapter we propose a novel way of bringing together business processes and database
constraints using first order temporal logic. In Section 3.2 we discuss the assumptions we
are making about the business situations and databases that must hold for our policy
modeling framework to function. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 we present a formal description
of our policy model and relate it to integrity constraints specified in linear temporal logic
(LTL) over the history of business objects contained in a database.
Section 3.5 introduces our proposed state-oriented, graphical policy/process modeling
technique for relational database systems (which we call the database constraint modelling
language, or DCML). It is shown that the language is able to represnt constraints specified
in the past-only fragment of linear first order temporal logic. Section 3.6 discusses several
novel aspects of the language and demonstrates, using micro-examples, that a broad class
of process-oriented description of business processes can be easily translated into DCML
models. In Section 3.7 we revisit prior research that is most closely related to the language
presented in this chapter and contrast its features with those of prior approaches. Finally,
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Figure 3.1: A database is a reflection of the complete picture of a business
Section 3.8 concludes this chapter by summarizing its contents and discussing the next
logical step of converting constraint models into actual implementable constraints.
3.2 Premise
Before describing our underlying model for policy enforcement in a relational database, it
is important to draw out a distinction between business policies at the conceptual level
and their equivalents at the database level (Figure 3.1). In most cases the contents of a
database represent the record keeping aspect of compliance with a given set of policies.
To explain this further, let us consider an example where “client consent” is required by a
business for a particular situation, and it is recorded in a database as a binary field (yes
or no). Recording the fact that consent has been received in a database usually serves as
an audit or perhaps an internal check for business applications/processes that require the
client’s consent. If the client requests a service for which his/her private information needs
to be disclosed to third parties, automated systems can check whether the client’s consent
to disclose personal information has been received or not, by simply querying the database.
Thus, the contents of the database reflect the ground truth on which policy decisions are
taken.
The duality between what is recorded in a database and the current state of a business
is critical in our framework. We assume that both the database and a business are, in
a manner of speaking, equivalent state machines that move in lock-step with each other.
In our proposed framework, the following two assertions must hold true in all situations
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where policy-centric mappings to a database rule system need to be established.
Assertion 1: A database state corresponds to a business state and there must always
exist a describable relationship between a change in the business state and the associated
change in the database state.
We define a database state as the contents of a database containing historical and cur-
rent operational records of a business at a specific point in time. Similarly, we define a
business state as an abstract union of the states of all business objects, processes, and
situations that are ongoing and encountered in the past. We use the notion of “correspon-
dence” informally to assert that the changes to a database and changes at the business
level (for example progression in a particular business process) must always be related to
each other. For example, if the contents of a database are impacted by a transaction, then
we must have (in some way) changed the state/reality of the business as it exists. Simi-
larly, if the business state has changed, then that change is immediately made persistent
by updating the contents of the database. In other words, the state of a business and the
state of a database not only relate to each other but also change in sync with each other.
To further formalize the duality, we require that there must exist a correspondence
(“describable relationship”) or a mapping between state changes at the business level and
state changes at the database level. This correspondence may be informal and does not need
to be explicitly documented in natural language, as long as it can be provided by a business
level user or a database administrator. Intuitively this requirement is intended to ensure
that there must exist a sound explanation or a systematic method of explaining business
level concepts and how those concepts behave over time as stored in a database. This is
a critical requirement in actualizing a business policy within a database and conversely
storing and monitoring associated rules within a database system. In our example of client
consent, the relationship may be described by a database administrator or a corporate
privacy expert by interpreting a binary attribute (0 for no consent received and 1 for
consent given). It can perhaps further be elaborated by those experts that changes to
consent (business level state changes of giving or taking away consent) are equivalent to
changes in this binary value associated with each client in the database.
Assertion 2: A policy rule is a path restriction specified in the business state space and
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corresponds to a database constraint which is a path restriction specified on the database
state space.
Once we have established that state changes at both levels (the business concept and
database levels) are essentially the same and a reasonable explanation is available for any
and all such changes, a policy can then be described as a sequence of required (or instead
undesirable) state changes in the business level. For example, a policy could require that
a business state in which a customer’s information is disclosed to a third party without
prior consent should never be reached. Since business rules can be described as legal (or
illegal) state changes at the business concept level, we can now work towards translating
these rules as legal (or illegal) database state changes.
We believe that there are two main advantages of a state-based mapping between logical
policy models and relational database systems. First, we note that databases are by design
complex state machines and typical policy-centric decision making (access control, integrity
checking, etc.) occurs when transactions attempt to access the database in a particular
state or move the database from one state to another. This reasoning applies to the
business world as well, since most traditional business processes progress towards their
conclusion in discrete steps. Second, reasoning over state transitions is a well understood
problem in the context of model checking. Formal properties of state system models, for
example, safety (something bad should never happen) and liveness (something good should
eventually happen) can be easily specified in linear temporal logic and tested against a
formal model of the policy. As we explain in Chapter 4, these temporal properties can also
be automatically translated into database constraints, thereby making implementation
of the originally modeled business policies a seamless process. Thus, this state system
formalism is ideal to capture (make formal) the semantics of a business process.
3.3 Enforcement Model: Moving from Process Mod-
els to Constraint Models
So far, we have used the term “business state” in a very abstract sense to mean the entire
business, and the term “database state” has been used to describe the contents of the
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entire database. However, as pointed out in the introduction of this thesis, we rely on
individual, pre-existing, visual, state-oriented descriptions of business processes (such as
workflows, process models, state charts, etc.) to map out fragments of the business state
space onto fragments of the database state space and then constrain the database state
space appropriately. In other words, instead of attempting to relate the entire business to
the entire database, we restrict ourselves to specific well-understood functions of a business
(and the governing policies associated with those business functions).
The reason for doing so is straightforward. A typical business user can understand the
broad-ranging assertion that a “business is equal to its database.” However, in practice,
the possibly hundreds and thousands of correspondences between various business pro-
cesses and individual tables and rows is likely to be beyond the scope of a single user to
comprehend. In a typical commercial database deployment, no single user can describe
completely and accurately all the complexities in all activities of a business. Similarly, it is
equally likely that a single DBA may not be aware of (or be able to explain) the behaviour
of all parts of a database as it changes over time. Therefore, instead of attempting to map
out two very large and abstract state spaces and then translate rules from one to the other,
we reduce these state spaces so that they are more manageable.
Reducing the state space to smaller and easier to understand fragments has several
advantages. Foremost, visual descriptions of processes are typically readily available, as
they are widely used tools in the businesses and software engineering communities. And
even if processes are not fully documented, business users can provide pictorial descriptions
of business processes (stages, progression through the use of arrows, branches for various
exceptions, termination conditions, etc.) at a very high level, which can then be used as
a basis for database constraints. Thus, such descriptions play the role of providing the
“business state space” for individual business processes in our model. Furthermore, these
process diagrams resemble state machines (see Figure 3.2) and provide significant insight
into the valid (required) behaviour of the associated parts of the database. Finally, we
note that at the level of individual process/workflow/activity, these descriptions are easy
to understand. At the individual process level, the correspondence between changes in the
business level objects and database constructs is much easier to capture. Consequently the
overall process of translating business rules into database constraints is made much easier
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when using one process diagram at a time to guide implementation.
3.3.1 Terminology and Setup
Figure 3.2: A hypothetical process model for expense claim processing describing the stages
(states), actors (users) and actions (transactions) related to an expense claim.
Our overall goal is that of translating constraints from the business world to the
database world. Our approach, as described above, is to do this one process (business
function) at a time. To make our notation consistent, from this point onwards we will use
the term artifact type or (business) object type to refer to a concept about which various
processes are specified. For example, Figure 3.2 is a simplistic example of a “payment
process” on the “expense claim” artifact type. Such process diagrams often embed within
them interpretations of the business policy for the process being outlined. For example, a
policy rule embedded in the above diagram could be that “only a member of the finance
department can issue a payment for an expense claim that is awaiting payment.” Con-
sequently, all individual artifacts of that type (all expense claims) must follow the rules
embedded in the depicted process. Note that we are using the term artifact as it has been
used in prior work1 to mean, broadly, an object of interest to a policy maker.
Similarly, we are using the term process model to represent the large category of visual
state-oriented descriptions of operational business specifications, as discussed in Chapter
2. Although these specifications can include a broad range of diagrams, it is best that
1This is examined in greater detail in Section 3.7. The reader unfamiliar with this term can consider
an artifact to be a holistic view of data relevant to a business activity or process.
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the reader consider these descriptions to be informally specified workflows or flowcharts
(such as the example in Figure 3.2). A more rigorous examination of issues and features of
process description languages that make them more amenable to conversion into database
constraints is presented in Chapter 7. However, for now, the reader should consider them
to be informal state oriented diagrams that have to be given formal meaning as database
constraints. Therefore, we use the term “policy makers” to refer to users who will convert
these informally specified business into database constraints.2
Finally, recall that having these process diagrams is not a strict requirement for con-
straining a database system, as long as a detailed explanation of the behaviour of the
business processes is available. It is of course helpful if this description is available in
visual notation (state oriented and depicting valid progression), as this makes the task of
converting process models into database constraint models significantly easier. Clearly, if
the business states can be easily identified in the database (e.g., the notion of being in the
unpaid business level state maps onto a binary paid flag being zero in the database), then
we can begin to reason about paths an artifact can (should) take across the business state
and how they map onto restrictions on the database state space. However, we point out
that a proficient enough policy maker (who is knowledgeable about a process on an artifact
type) may not need to rely on business level process diagrams to embed constraints on a
database.
3.4 Artifacts in Relational Databases
The first step in converting business rules into database constraints is that a user must
identify artifacts within a database system. The most natural way to do this is to use the
abstraction provided by database views.
Definition 1. An artifact type is a user-defined view over a database schema that captures
all the data required to enforce a business policy.
Definition 2. An artifact is a uniquely identifiable row in an artifact type.
2as opposed to a corporate level policy developers that interpret legislation to develop high level policy
statements
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Figure 3.3: Artifact types (views) essentially serve as a mapping between business concepts
and the physical contents of a database system
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In relational database systems, views are a flexible concept that are able to encapsulate
an arbitrary business object or any collection of individual pieces of information that relate
to a higher level business function. Consequently, a view will define an artifact type, and
all individual artifacts will therefore be elements in the view. To elaborate this concept,
let us consider an e-commerce database that stores transactional information regarding
customer sales and purchases. The Orders, Customers, and Shipments tables in such a
database are assumed as follows:
Customers: (int CST ID, varchar NAME, varchar ADDRESS, . . ., varchar
ADDRESS COUNTRY, varchar TYPE)
Orders: (int ORD ID, int CST ID, int SHIP REF, datetime DATE TIME,
float AMOUNT, bool PAID, bool APPROVED, . . ., varchar NOTES)
Shipments: (int SHIP REF, bool SHIPPED, varchar SHIP METHOD, . . .,
datetime SHIP DATE)
The intent of the Orders table is to store the details of all sales that the business handles.
Each row in this table is uniquely identified by its ORD ID attribute, and the remaining
attributes represent detailed information about the particular order. The Customers table
simply stores the name and address for customers in the database that can place one
or more orders, and the Shipment table is intended to store the logistical information
associated with the orders and customers in the database system.
Within the above schema the user may define several artifact types as views. For
example, the views defined by the following SQL queries are all valid definitions for an
artifact type SalesOrder:
(a) SELECT ∗ FROM Orders NATURAL JOIN Customers NATURAL JOIN Shipments
(b) SELECT ∗ FROM Orders NATURAL JOIN Customers
WHERE AMOUNT >= 100 AND AMOUNT <= 1000
(c) SELECT ∗ FROM
Orders NATURAL JOIN Customers NATURAL JOIN Shipments
WHERE ADDRESS COUNTRY = ‘‘CANADA’’ AND SHIP METHOD = ‘‘UPS’’
Note that from a business perspective each row in the above views may be uniquely
identified as a sales order artifact that was (or is currently) being processed by the business.
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Views (b) and (c) impose criteria on the artifact types being defined and therefore will only
contain SalesOrder artifacts that match their respective predicates. Although all of the
above are valid definitions of business artifacts, there may be scenarios where each of these
definitions may serve a special purpose for an individual policy maker. For example, view
(a) may be used to enact policies that apply to all sales orders, but view (c) may be of
specific interest to a regional sales manager for Canada, who may want to impose specific
policies on orders that are shipped to Canada via UPS. Also note that since artifact types
are view definitions over the schema, individual artifacts are not necessarily physically
stored in a database. Consider a more complex artifact type, SalesTotals, defined by the
following view generating query:
SELECT
YEAR(DATE TIME), ADDRESS COUNTRY, SUM(AMOUNT) TOTAL
FROM Orders NATURAL JOIN Customers
WHERE PAID = true
GROUP BY YEAR(DATE TIME), ADDRESS COUNTRY
Observe that each artifact in the above view will represent the yearly sales for a par-
ticular country that may be derived from many individual rows that contribute towards
the total. Such artifacts may be relevant to marketing and advertising policies that target
customers in regions where sales are low.
3.4.1 State of an Artifact
For each object/artifact type contained in a database, policy makers (or their delegates)
may define arbitrarily many boolean functions that group individual artifacts together for
policy purposes. This implicitly defines a state space in which states correspond to subsets
of the functions that evaluate to true (when applied to individual artifacts). However,
rather than considering all functions simultaneously, we propose the following definition:
Definition 3. For any boolean function F defined over the attributes of the artifact type,
an artifact is in state F, or is in the F state, if F evaluates to true.
Note that an individual artifact can be in many different states at the same time,
provided it satisfies the functions associated with each of the states. For example, consider
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the view definition (a) from the example presented earlier. A function on the attributes of
this view could be defined as follows:
DEFINE STATE Unpaid (SalesOrder)
WHERE (PAID = false AND REVIEWED = false AND SHIPPED = false)
Implicitly, the meaning of this functional state definition is that a sales order artifact
is in the Unpaid state if all three of its paid, reviewed, and shipped attributes are false.
Similarly, we can define states Paid and Shipped as follows, where an artifact may be in
neither, one, or both of these states:
DEFINE STATE Paid (SalesOrder)
WHERE (PAID = true AND REVIEWED = true)
DEFINE STATE Shipped (SalesOrder)
WHERE (shipped = true)
States for more complex and derived artifact types can be defined in precisely the same
way. The following defines the state LowSalesVolume for the SalesTotal artifact type as
one where the total sales volume is less than 10,000:
DEFINE STATE LowSalesVolume(SalesTotal)
WHERE (TOTAL <= 10000)
We can summarize the notions of artifact types and states as follows. Views are used
to define artifact types or object types. A single artifact or object is an element in the
view. A named boolean function defined on the attributes of the artifact type is used to
determine whether a particular artifact belongs to that named state, and the states of an
artifacts are dependent on the particular assignment of its attributes. For example, if x
is an artifact of type V , or equivalently x = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ V , where V is a view over
a database schema, then for a labeled state S with its appropriate conditional function, x
is said to belong in state S if and only if S(a1, a2, . . . , an) evaluates to true. To further
simplify our notation, we will write x ∈ S if and only if S(x).
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3.4.2 Restricting the Database State Space
Once policy makers have identified business artifact types and further defined states of
interest that individual artifacts can be in, all that is required is to establish the associated
restrictions in the state space. Note that under this setup we have reduced a potentially
very large database state space to a compact, user-defined state space specific to a business
artifact type being examined. Moreover, since this state space at the database level was
quite possibly derived from a workflow or process model, it should be similar in size (number
of stages in the workflow) and behaviour (legal/illegal paths in the business level workflow).
The only task left is that of establishing path restrictions within the database artifact state
space that mimic policies and legal paths in the business process model.
To accomplish this we rely on classical first order temporal logic [122]. An example of
a temporal constraint on the Sales Order artifact type defined earlier could be that “an
artifact can only reach the paid state if it was previously in the approved state,” where
both paid and approved are boolean functions defined on the artifact type. The motivation
for restricting state transitions for specific artifact types comes from the fact that these
restrictions are embedded in process models such as the one presented in Figure 3.2 on page
50, and it is these flow oriented constraints when fully captured that delineate a business
process.
3.4.3 Formal Model
Using terminology that is consistent with prior work [122, 97, 19, 123, 24, 79, 147], we
provide a formal interpretation of our policy model that employs temporal integrity con-
straints over uniquely identifiable tuples in database views. Since we are considering con-
straint enforcement over a temporal database (and temporal objects therein), we assume
the presence of the infrastructure to track changes to the attributes of individual artifacts.
In our model we consider the domain of time to be isomorphic to a finite set of ordered
natural numbers (0, 1, 2, . . . , c), where c represents the current or most recent transaction
time. Each artifact has its own finite history that can be considered as a temporally ordered
sequence of changes made to the attributes of the artifact since its inception:
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Definition 4 (Artifact History). The history of an artifact is a mapping from natural
numbers representing time to ordered tuples of the form {(t, a1t, a2t, . . . , ant)}, where each
ait is the value of the attribute ai at time t.
Therefore, the history of an individual artifact with n attributes can be considered
an ordered sequence of tuples starting at t = 0 (artifact inception) and ending at t = c
(current or most recent time). Note that artifact histories are not combined or intertwined
in anyway. That is, each individual artifact history (timeline) is retained independent of
other histories in the database. We use the shorthand notation of depicting the history
of an artifact A as: A0, A1, A2, . . . , Ac. The same can be viewed in its expanded form as
follows:
A0 : (0, a10, a20, . . . , an0)
A1 : (1, a11, a21, . . . , an1)
A2 : (2, a12, a22, . . . , an2)
. . .
Ac : (c, a1c, a2c, . . . , anc)
(3.1)
Approaches to maintain individual artifact histories (e.g., auxiliary tables and delta-encoding)
are examined in detail in Chapter 4. However, for now we assume that a database is capable
of tracking changes to individual artifacts and utilize the above abstraction for constraint
enforcement.
As is the case in implemented database systems, the number of attributes of the artifact
type, n, is finite and the domains of each of the ai are assumed to be finite as well. Thus,
there is always a finite amount of history that is contained in a database for every artifact.
Definition 5 (Constraint). A constraint in our model is a Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
formula defined using the attributes of an artifact type but interpreted (enforced) over the
history of all artifacts of that type.
All artifact histories must comply with all the constraints defined on their respective
artifact types and a constraint on an artifact type cannot be selectively enforced on a few
artifact histories only. To specify constraints we use LTL formulas with past connectives
57
only (Past-LTL). This is a natural choice in database systems, since enforcement decisions
can be made with certainty by looking at the past history of an artifact only. The interpre-
tation of these constraints (i.e., the enforcement model discussed in detail in Chapter 4) can
be summarized as follows: Given an update to an artifact A, we consider the history entry
that would be committed to disk if this update were allowed to happen. That is, we check
for each artifact being impacted that its anticipated history A0, A1, . . . , Acurrent, Anext is a
valid trace for all the constraints specified over A’s artifact type. If the resulting trace is
valid, then the transaction is allowed, i.e., Anext is accepted as the new history entry for
the artifact, otherwise the artifact stays unchanged as Acurrent.
To accommodate restrictions over different domains, constraints are specified using
Constraint Linear Temporal Logic (CLTL) [173, 17, 24, 49, 48, 50]. CLTL extends LTL
and adds a spatio-temporal aspect to the logic by allowing constraints to be specified over
domains with well-defined operators as propositions in the logic. For example •(x < y) is
a CLTL formula interpreted over the domains of x and y and a definition of the operator
<. We use traditional operators (<, ≤, =, 6=, ≥,>) for well known (finite fragments
of) domains {N,Z,R,Q} to specify constraints. Operators on complex domains, such as
(=) on the domain of Strings (varchars in SQL), are used in their intuitive programmatic
interpretation (i.e., string comparison). Note that we can adopt this interpretation because
our domains are assumed to be finite. Consequently, we can treat database level attribute
types (e.g., varchars/strings, floating point) as finite subsets of a well ordered domain, such
as Z, and then define operators such as equality to mimic the behaviour of the appropriate
database functions.
The definitions of the past LTL operators utilized to constrain the history of artifacts
are consistent with prior literature and are as follows:
1. CLTL formulas SA, ¬SA, SS ∧ SB and SA ∨ SB evaluate as true iff the conditions,
specified as constraints over the appropriate domains, hold true
2. •SA (previously SA) is true at instant t iff t > 0 and SA is true at instant t− 1
3. SA since SB is true at instant t iff for some s, 0 ≤ s < t, SB is true at instant s, and
for every u, s < u ≤ t, A is true at instant u.
58
4. SA (sometime in the past) is true at instant t iff true since SA at instant t
5. SA (always in the past) is true at instant tiff ¬¬SA at instant t
Thus, constraints specified using CLTL are extended LTL constructs and are inter-
preted in the same manner as classical LTL constraints. It is important to recognize that
constraints are specified over an artifact type but enforced on all individual artifacts’ his-
tories of that type. For example, consider the following constraint defined on the sales
order artifact type defined earlier:
paid⇒ •(¬paid ∧ amount > 0)
It forms a temporal constraint using two attributes from different domains (boolean and
floating point, as derived from the view specifications). It specifies that if an artifact’s
paid attribute is currently true, then it must be the case that previously the same boolean
attribute was false and the amount attribute was greater than zero. Note that this con-
straint is specified using the attributes of the artifact type and then enforced on all artifact
histories.
It is important to recognize that the CLTL constraints are always interpreted over the
history that would result as a consequence of the “next” entry being added. That is, a given
constraint is always checked over (A0, A1, . . . , Acurrent, Anext). In the above example, if a
new entry in the artifact history is being appended (Anext) in which the boolean attribute
paid is true, then condition ¬paid ∧ amount > 0 must hold on Acurrent before Anext is
allowed into the history. In other words, enforcement is done by continuously monitoring
the impact of the next (to-be-written) entry in the artifact history and ensuring that the
resulting history is compliant with the constraint specified.
As is common in database systems, we adopt a strict model of compliance, where all
the user-specified CLTL constraints on all artifact types must independently hold for all
individual artifacts. This is especially relevant to situations where a database transaction
modifies several different artifacts at the same time. In such cases we require that each of
the individual histories being appended remains compliant with all the constraints defined
over their respective artifact types.
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3.4.4 Starting and Ending Artifact Lifecycles
Time in our model is finite and isomorphic to the natural numbers (including t=0), and
the temporal operators in LTL refer to time implicitly. Within this model we require a
mechanism to constrain the way artifacts can be created to start their lifecycles. More
formally, we need a mechanism outside traditional LTL to restrict the values of the artifact
explicitly at t=0, the time at which the artifact is created. To do so, we define a special
non-temporal constraint φS(A) that is interpreted for the artifact at t=0 only. Users can
define φS(A) as the function that represents the starting state of an object. For example,
consider the following definition of φS(A):
φS(SalesOrder) : ¬reviewed ∧ ¬paid ∧ ¬shipped ∧ amount > 0
Note that since φS(A) is required to be non-temporal, it cannot (and in the above
example, does not) contain any temporal operators. This is because the definition of
φS(A) is a constraint only on the artifact at time zero (A0) and can be interpreted as
an initialization requirement for all artifacts of a given type. In the above example, the
initialization requires that all Sales Order artifacts when logically created (at t=0) must
not be reviewed, not be paid, not be shipped, and must have a non-negative amount. Also
note that defining φS(A) is optional, as policy makers may not want to restrict the way
artifacts begin their lifecycles. Consequently, in such cases φS(A) is defined as the true
function, and therefore all artifact histories trivially comply with φS(A) allowing artifact
attributes to take any values at t=0.
Conversely, policy makers may want to consider the logical deletion of artifacts and
therefore constrain that special time in the history in some way. To denote the “end of
an artifact’s lifecycle,” we transparently augment the definition of an artifact to include a
termination attribute/marker denoted as φ. The history of the artifact is thus now defined
as the following sequence:
{(t, a1t, a2t, . . . , ant, φ)}
where each ait still denotes the value of the attribute ai at time t, but a new boolean
attribute φ denotes whether the history of the artifact, at t, has been terminated or not.
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At any history entry, if φ is false, then the object has (at that point in time) not been
logically erased from the database, and therefore its history can be appended further.
If, however, φ is true, then the object is considered to have concluded its lifecycle and
“actions” or “changes” to it (i.e., an Anext different from Acurrent) should be rejected. In
other words, once an object reaches its “dead” or termination state, signified by φ being
set to true, it should forever be preserved in that “dead” state. To accomplish, this we
transparently add two CLTL constraints for every artifact:
(1) : •φ⇒ φ
(2) : φ⇒
∧
ai∈A
•ai = ai
The net result of these two constraints is that (1) if previously the φ marker was set,
then it must remain set and (2) all attributes retain their previous values when φ is set
to true. As a consequence of these constraints, we eliminate the possibility of changes
to the attributes of the artifact from the moment it logically ended its lifecycle. Note
carefully that constraint (2) is also applicable at the first time instance φ is set true, and
thus it ensures that if an artifact’s lifecycle is being terminated, then that is the only event
happening. In other words, constraint (2) implies that an artifact can not change attribute
values and set its lifecycle termination marker at the same time.
Also note that since φ is introduced transparently, it is not directly available to policy
makers and therefore cannot be used to define additional constraints. In subsequent sec-
tions we will provide an interface through which rules about lifecycle termination can be
implemented by allowing the use of φ indirectly and in limited circumstances. The mech-
anism we have adopted (end of lifecycle marker) is similar to prior work where history
during the “logical existence” of an artifact is forever preserved. Other approaches, such
as deleting the entire history of the object at lifecycle termination, are also possible (i.e.,
we could remove all traces of the artifact ever existing in the first place). However, we do
not explore such alternatives in this thesis.
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3.5 State Transitions and Database Level Workflows
In this section we introduce a visual constraint modeling language for artifact lifecycles
represented in a database. Note that in an unrestricted database, one with no rules or poli-
cies, individual artifacts can change freely, and therefore their attributes and membership
in each of the pre-defined states can change freely from one point in time to another. We
repeat once again that the purpose of using a mechanism such as CLTL is essentially to
specify a particular sequence of artifact attribute value changes as being valid or invalid,
which in turn will reflect how individual artifacts can change state. Our proposed visual
notation mimics statecharts and sequential workflows but also establishes a one-to-one link
between restrictions in first order logic and restrictions in the visual notation for database
centric artifact lifecycle management.
3.5.1 Visual Constraint Notation
Figure 3.4: Simple Exit Restriction between the Paid and Unpaid States
Our diagrammatic convention for specifying database level CLTL constraints resembles
traditional workflow and process modelling techniques in that the notion of a ‘state’ re-
sembles that of a stage in a business process. One such state is represented by a labelled
box or rectangle on a constraint diagram. As described earlier, an artifact (representing
an individual instance of a business process) is in a given state if it satisfies the func-
tion defined on the attributes of the artifact type to be in that state. We use lines with
varying arrows (connectors at different ends) as connections between the states to imply
some path restrictions associated with two states. For all such connections there is formal
interpretation as a CLTL constraint on the artifact history.
Consider the diagram in Figure 3.4 involving two states on SalesOrders that we had
defined earlier. For brevity we have omitted the actual function definitions associated with
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the states and instead referred to them via their state name/label. There is a connector
with a three pronged arrow at the Unpaid side and a direct connection to the Paid state.
The logical interpretation derived by this arrow in the diagram can be read from Table 3.1:
If a SalesOrder artifact is in the Unpaid state at time t, and does not satisfy the condition
to be in the Unpaid state at time t+ 1, then it must satisfy the condition to be in the Paid
state at time t+ 1. The LTL equivalent can also be specified by simply reading Table 3.1
as follows:
(•Unpaid(SalesOrder) ∧ ¬Unpaid(SalesOrder))⇒ Paid(SalesOrder)
If we unwrap the states using their definitions, we can write the temporal constraint as
the following implication on the boolean attributes of the view:
(•(¬paid ∧ ¬reviewed ∧ ¬shipped) ∧ ¬(¬paid ∧ ¬reviewed ∧ ¬shipped))
⇒ (paid ∧ reviewed)
The notation presented below represents the basic constructs of our proposed graphical
database constraint modeling language (DCML):
Visual Notation and LTL Interpretation
Multi-Way Exit Restriction
•A(x) ∧ ¬A(x)
⇒
B(x) ∨ C(x)
If an artifact was in state A at time t and does not
satisfy the condition to be in state A at time t+ 1, then
it must satisfy the condition to be in state B or state
C at time t + 1. Note that the graphical notation only
depicts a 2-way exit restriction leading to states B or
C, but the notation can be extended and used to specify
exit restrictions in which the OR conditional arrows end
towards n different states where n ≥ 1. In such cases
the artifact must satisfy the condition to be in at least
one state on the right hand side at time t+ 1.
Continued on next page
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Visual Notation and LTL Interpretation
Entry Restriction
(B(x) ∧ ¬ •B(x))⇒ •A(x)
If an artifact is in state B at time t, and does not satisfy
the condition to be in state B at time t − 1, then it
must satisfy the condition to be in state A at time t−1.
Note that this constraint can be considered the dual
of the exit restriction. A multi-way entry restriction
can be created by specifying several entry restrictions
originating from one state and ending in many others.
Never Eventually Reach
A(x)⇒ ¬B(x)
If an artifact was ever in state A, it should never satisfy
the condition to be in state B.
Disallow Exit
A(x)⇒ A(x)
If an artifact was ever in state A, it should still be in
state A
Guard Attribute:
A(x)
⇒
•attribute = attribute
While the artifact is in state A, the value of the specified
attribute(s) should remain unchanged. In other words,
whenever the artifact satisfies A(x), it should also satisfy
•ai = ai for the specified attribute i
Continued on next page
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Visual Notation and LTL Interpretation
Invariant Attribute:
•attribute = attribute
since
A(x)
Once the artifact is in state A, the value of the specified
attribute(s) should forever remain unchanged. In other
words, if the artifact ever satisfies A(x), it should from
that point onwards, make the specified attribute invari-
ant, i.e., the attribute does not change its then assigned
value in subsequent history entries.
Table 3.1: Basic path restrictions and their equivalent temporal assertions. Note
that each state has an associated boolean function specified over the attributes of
the artifact type. In our notation we use shorthand notation S(x) to denote the
application of the function of the state S to the attributes of the artifact x.
The notation presented above gives a formal meaning in CLTL to each of the diagrammatic
conventions used in specifying a DCML diagram. For example, the following augmented
version of the two state DCML diagram presented in Figure 3.4 embeds two additional
constraints using the notation presented in Table 3.1:
Figure 3.5: A more complex set of restrictions between the Paid and Unpaid States
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In addition to the constraint present in the original DCML diagram (Figure 3.4), three
other constraints are embedded in Figure 3.5. First, let us examine the double headed
arrow ending in the Paid state, which imposes an entry restriction that can be interpreted
from Table 3.1 as follows:
(Paid(SalesOrder) ∧ ¬ • Paid(SalesOrder))⇒ •Unpaid(SalesOrder)
The above implication can be expanded using the definitions of Paid and Unpaid functions
and is very similar to the one presented earlier for Figure 3.4. The net result is that now
there is both an entry and an exit restriction between the Unpaid and Paid states, and these
constraints must now independently hold true for all SalesOrder artifacts. Informally (in
the business sense), we can describe the interplay of both these constraints simultaneously
as follows: An artifact can only move from the Unpaid state to the Paid state and if an
artifact arrives in the Paid state it must have come there from the Unpaid state. Having
both an entry and an exit restriction between the two states makes the transition system
much more rigid in its flow/direction.
In addition to the above discussed two constraints, there are two invariant constraints in
Figure 3.5 that make the reviewed and paid attributes immutable when the artifact reaches
the Paid state. The invariant constraint for the reviewed attribute can be interpreted using
Table 3.1 as follows:
(•reviewed = reviewed) since Paid(SalesOrder)
or equivalently by expanding the definition of the Paid function as:
(•reviewed = reviewed) since (paid ∧ reviewed)
Similarly, the diagram also requires that the paid attribute also is invariant (unchange-
able) when an artifact reaches the Paid state. Note that because embedded in the state
definition is the requirement that paid = true (i.e., if an artifact is in the Paid state its
attribute paid will be true), a natural consequence of the above constraint diagram is that
if an artifact ever reaches the Paid state its paid attribute will remain true from that point
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onwards in all history entries.
We summarize this section by emphasizing that our proposed database constraint mod-
eling language tries to mimic the notion of states and path constraints as they exist in
classical workflow and process modelling languages. However, because the language is
formally related to CLTL, it can produce complex visual models that may be difficult to
understand for the reader not familiar with temporal logic. Furthermore, we do not make
the claim that the visual-CLTL notation that we have presented covers all possible LTL
style flow constructs. However, it will serve as the basis on which generic visual-CLTL
mappings can be established by policy makers specializing in various domains. We shall
discuss improvements and extensions to this notation in subsequent chapters and propose
various fragments of DCML for specific situations. However, the above proposed DCML
notation should suffice for now in explaining and highlighting the benefits of database level
visual constraint modeling in general.
3.5.2 Artifact Lifecycle Constraints
Initialization Constraints
To support the notion of constraining the start of artifact lifecycles in a database visually,
we denote the non-instantiation of an artifact using a special state φS. Transitions from
the state φS into any other state are considered as initializations, and therefore they are
used in our framework to define the function φS(A) which, as mentioned in Section 3.4.4,
needs to be interpreted at t=0. Furthermore, we only allow multi-way exit restrictions
originating from φS in our diagrammatic convention and interpret them slightly differently
than the visual-LTL semantics of exit restrictions presented in Table 3.1.
Consider the two exit restrictions from φS presented in Figure 3.6. From the diagram
we see that there are two exit constraints as follows: (1) if an object exits φS, it must
enter state D, and (2) if an object exits φS it must enter either state B or state C (or
both). Both these constraints must independently hold true. Since φS(A) is interpreted
non-temporally at t=0, in our notation we simply combine these two constraints to define
the initialization function φS(A) as the conjunction of all the individual exit restrictions
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Figure 3.6: Two different exit restrictions originating from φS.
on φS. Consequently in the above example, φS(A) := D(A) ∧ (B(A) ∨ C(A)). In case the
policy maker does not wish to restrict the instantiation of artifacts, s/he can choose not
to use φS in the DCML diagram at all, in which case φS(A) will be implicitly defined as:
φS(A) := true
and thus place no restrictions on the attributes of the artifact.
We can thus summarize the discussion of φS by pointing out that it is essentially the
“uninitialized state” from which only exit restrictions are possible. Each of these individual
restrictions must concurrently hold true, and we interpret them at t=0 only by using them
to define the function φS(A).
Going off-diagram
In cases where an artifact can begin its lifecycle (A0) in an unrestrained fashion, it is
important to recognize that the notion of an artifact “existing” is different from an artifact
being in a user defined state. In general, it is possible that the attribute values of an
artifact at time i (i.e., Ai) do not satisfy the requirements of being in any user defined
states (i.e., all state functions defined on the artifact type are false for the assignment of
attribute values of A at time i). In such cases, provided that φ is false as well at time i,
the artifact logically exists but is considered to be “off-diagram” (i.e., not present in any
of the states defined on a DCML diagram).
Similarly, as artifacts can change values arbitrarily throughout their existence, they can
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also go off-diagram at various points in time to possibly reappear back in DCML diagrams
in a different set of states. Consequently the reader should consider the notion of a “user
defined state space” as the set of values an artifact can take such that the particular
assignment of attributes ensures existence of the object in at least one state. In many
situations it may be important to constrain the behaviour of artifacts (i.e., their attribute
values) such that they do not go off-diagram but conform to well established paths in their
respective user defined state spaces.
Lifecycle termination
Figure 3.7: An entry restriction specifying that an artifact entering φE (the “dead state”)
must previously have been in state A. The visual constraint can be interpreted by using
DCML (Table 3.1) and the definition of the state φE as: (φ ∧ ¬ • φ)⇒ A(x)
The notion of the “end state” for an artifact’s lifecycle is much simpler to describe.
Such a state labelled φE (Figure 3.7) can simply be defined by the function φ. In other
words, φE is a special state in which the lifecycle termination marker is set to true. Because
the attribute φ can not be referenced by policy makers and we had implicitly required all
attributes to become guarded invariants as a consequence of φ being true (Section 3.4.4),
no special interpretation is required for this state for any CLTL constructs introduced in
Table 3.1. In other words, not withstanding the definition of the state function associated
with φE, it can be treated as a regular state for constraint modeling purposes.
Policy makers can add entry restrictions towards φE as constraints by which an artifact’s
lifecycle can terminate (i.e., delineate situations in which an artifact can enter the end
state). Figure 3.7 is one such example where an object’s lifecycle can only be terminated
provided that it was previously in state A. Because of the implicit constraints on φE
introduced in Section 3.4.4, any other DCML constructs applied on this state will be
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trivially always true, as the implicit constraints will never allow those constraints to be
relevant. For example, exit is not possible from φE because (a) the termination marker
cannot be unset, and (ii) the artifact can not change in any way. Thus, an exit constraint
from φE is never relevant because the left hand side of the CLTL assertion/implication for
such a constraint is never true.
3.5.3 Example
A more complete state space diagram that mirrors the lifecycle of a SalesOrder could be
created by a policy maker as depicted in Figure 3.8. The standard method of implementing
such a constraint diagram is quite simply to reject database transactions that violate any
one of the five constraints (labelled 1 through 5 in Figure 3.8) for any artifact history.
Figure 3.8: A set of restrictions relating and stitching together multiple states of the Sales
Order artifact type.
Note the idea of stitching together states to define the proper flow in a process carries
from the graphical/visual descriptions of business processes into DCML diagrams. How-
ever, there are many differences that arise when protecting illegal database state space
traversals. For example, “going back” to previous states is implicity not allowed in process
models and business workflows (see constraint (5) in Figure 3.8). However, such implicit
restrictions need to be made explicit in DCML. The next subsection examines various such
issues and challenges posed by employing DCML to construct database level constraints.
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3.5.4 Workflow Modelling in RDBMs
One of the benefits of looking at constraints as restrictions on the state space of database
views is that there is often a very obvious and direct mapping from the business state
space to the database state space available to be exploited. Database programmers and
administrators do not need to spend countless hours modeling and examining constraint
systems on their own, but can very well look directly at workflows and process models on
which business managers rely. In fact, when using pre-existing workflows as the drivers for
embedding constraints in database systems, there are two tasks of significance that need
to be done: (a) establish a view oriented definition of the artifact being examined, and (b)
identify how the attributes of an object in the view change as a business process progresses
forward.
Figure 3.9: A hypothetical process model / workflow for expense claim processing. There
are several similarities between a business oriented diagram and its equivilant for database
systems presented in Figure 3.10.
The problem of identifying policy-centric views whose state space matters to policy
makers is essentially the same problem as object relational modeling. Figures 3.9 and 3.10
provide an example of this naturally occurring correlation between workflows as envisioned
by business users and DCML diagrams. The fact that in the context of business work-
flows the two diagrams are similar is no coincidence, because they should have the same
states and aspects of flow (progress) among them. Since the DCML notation is relatively
straightforward for many users to comprehend, we believe that once a definition of the ar-
tifact is agreed upon, business users themselves can visually create and edit these database
constraint diagrams without the need for input from the database administrator.
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Figure 3.10: A database centric policy model with LTL constraints defined between the
state of an expense claim view. The diagram corresponds to the workflow presented in
Figure 3.9. Each labelled transition (1,2,3,4) represents a unique constraint specified in LTL
that all objects in the view must adhere to. In a typical implementation, any transaction
that violates any constraint for any artifact will immediately be rejected or rolled back.
3.6 Complex Workflow Construction
3.6.1 Multi-state Flow Constraints
Figure 3.11: Two constraints on an object implying that if an artifact/object reaches state
A, it must have previously been in states B and C (simultaneously)
One of the advantages, as well as a source of analytical complexity, of our modeling
language arises from the fact that objects can enter and exit multiple states asynchronously.
Figure 3.11 gives an example of a constraint diagram in which an object is required to
trace multi-state paths. Note that the two temporal assertions derived from the model,
A(x) ∧ ¬ • A(x) ⇒ •B(x) and A(x) ∧ ¬ • A(x) ⇒ •C(x), both must independently
hold true. Also note that these two constraints indirectly apply an interesting subset
relationship/constraint between states B and C requiring that objects reaching state A
must previously be part of the implicitly defined state B ∩ C. Although there may be
situations where such implicit constraints can be difficult to comprehend, we will shortly
show that this independent enforcement of each temporal assertion has significant benefits
in policy management.
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3.6.2 Multiple Paths and Progression
Figure 3.12: Multiple models of how an object can behave during different phases in its
lifecycle can be independently created and temporal assertions across them can be enforced
independently of other models.
Another benefit of allowing objects to be in multiple states at the same time is that
different stakeholders’ in an organization can freely describe their own relevant portions
of the object lifecycles. Furthermore, they can do so without concerning themselves with
the definitions of states used by other policy makers. For example, let us consider Figure
3.12 and observe that based on the constraints present, given a single update operation,
an object can fail (or begin) to satisfy conditions to be in different states across both
path 1 and path 2. More specifically, an object that is initially in states A1 and B1, can
after an update, not change state configuration at all or make progress according to the
constraints in either or both paths. Each of these paths could have been created on a fresh
clean canvas by a different policy maker, without the knowledge of the other. Since each
constraint on each canvas is independently enforced on the history, many different DCML
diagrams specifying constraints on a single artifact type can either be viewed together or
independently.
3.6.3 Decentralized Workflow Modeling
The ability of objects to traverse multiple paths at the same time allows us to give a much
broader meaning to the notion of an object lifecycle. Figure 3.13 presents an extended
version of our running example of an expense claim. The diagram illustrates how three
different departments of a business might have specified three different constraint diagrams
on the same object. The figure shows that (1) the data entry staff must ensure that newly
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Figure 3.13: Individual constraint diagrams do not necessarily need to model all aspect of
an objects lifecycle. The figure shows three separate constraint diagrams each accomplish-
ing different objectives.
created expense claims are always in the Awaiting Approval state, (2) all claims that are
deleted must previously have been in existence for seven years or never paid, and (3)
financial integrity of the document (i.e., approval before payment and not marking a claim
as unpaid after payment) is maintained. In short, Figure 3.13 represents the situation
where three different DCML canvases on a single artifact type are viewed together on the
same diagram. The different components of a broader state system show that we can
model various intermediate phases in an object lifecycle without (necessarily) attempting
to combine them in a single diagram. Thus, different policy makers can start constraining
the same artifact in the context of different policies without having to consider all possible
constraints imposed by other policy makers.
The flexibility of drawing out these constraint diagrams in a distributed fashion allows
different policy makers to take charge of different aspects of constraints. Their roles can, of
course, certainly overlap; for example, it may very well be the case that the states labeled
“Awaiting Approval” and “Under Review” are logically equivalent or that the sub-process
associated with advancing the expense claims from Awaiting Approval to Under Review
states is handled elsewhere by another department of the business.
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Single universal DCML diagram
In our formal model we have defined an artifact lifecycle as the sequence of values taken by
an artifact (from t=0 to when the attribute φ becomes true). Each artifact of a given type
has one such lifecycle, and various policy makers can arbitrarily define their own states
for an artifact type and then enact restrictions between these states so that all artifact
lifecycles will comply with these restrictions. However, we must emphasize that the notion
of each policy maker having their own DCML canvas/diagram is merely a helpful illusion.
This is because all constraints specified on an artifact type are equally applicable on all
individual artifact histories. The fact that constraints are separately imposed on states
defined on two different DCML canvases has no bearing on their logical meaning over the
history.
Consequently, there is no difference between bringing the individual disconnected com-
ponents/canvases onto one diagram (as done in Figure 3.13) or viewing them separately. In
a manner of speaking, one can argue that there always exists only one unified (integrated)
DCML diagram for every artifact type defined in a database of which different segments
or “components” can be created/viewed by different policy makers responsible for that
portion. This unified DCML diagram is essentially the union of all the different canvases
used by various policy makers to define states and constraints on a given artifact type.
There are many benefits to this kind of flexibility, and foremost among them is that of
simplification and reduction of the state space into a more component oriented view. Just
because each policy maker can define their own states does not mean they always have to.
Several policy makers can share states and their definitions, so that they can branch from
one point in their lifecycle to a point in the others’ lifecycles. There are, of course, diffi-
culties that can manifest in this situation, and much of Chapter 4 is devoted to discussing
problems such as state overlap, state (un)reachability, and conflicting constraints.
Unified Instantiation and Termination
Finally a point that should become apparent by now is that, since an artifact lifecycle is
instantiated (t=0) and terminated only once, the special states φS and φE have the same
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definition regardless of their presence in various graphical sub-components of the unified
DCML diagram for an artifact type. In other words, every policy maker who wishes to
use either of these states to constrain artifact lifecycle instantiation and termination uses
(shares) the same universal interpretation and definition of these states.
3.6.4 Generalized Path Constraints and Sub-formulas
Figure 3.14: Constraint 1 being used as a state or a condition that needs to have happened
in the past.
A common requirement in enforcing workflow policies is that of specifying conditional
paths that require reasoning about a sequence of events. For example, consider the con-
straint that an object should never reach state C if it has sometime in the past reached
state B directly from state A. Since this is a constraint involving three different states, it
is impossible to draw it out as a ‘direct link’ between two states.
Graphically we propose that such constraints be modeled as reifying a path as a state.
Observe that these “transitions,” as introduced in Table 3.1 on page 65, are all rules spec-
ified between two states, however we can also consider these rules as general requirements
that must have happened in the past to invoke other rules. Consider constraint 2 (C2) in
Figure 3.14 as an example. It uses constraint 1 (C1), B(x) ∧ ¬ •B(x)⇒ •A(x), as a sub-
formula to specify a conditional constraint that essentially requires that if the transition
from A to B took place for an object in the past, then that object should never reach state
C. More formally, (C2) specifies the following temporal assertion:
(C1)⇒ ¬C(x)
and since (C1) is defined as B(x) ∧ ¬ •B(x)⇒ •A(x), we get:
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(B(x) ∧ ¬ •B(x)⇒ •A(x))⇒ ¬C(x)
This elegance of linear temporal logic allows the use of a conditional assertion as a sub-
condition to create larger, more complex assertions and to repeat the process by chaining
it as many times as necessary to create conditional paths in policy-centric workflows. Fur-
thermore, it allows us to easily go back and forth between complex assertions in temporal
logic and equivalent graphical representations (constraint diagrams) without losing any
information.
3.6.5 Link between Graphical Constraints and LTL
Assertion 3: A constraint diagram can be converted into a set of assertions in first order
constraint linear temporal logic.
Because each aspect of our proposed DCML notation has a formal meaning in CLTL
over the artifact history, policy makers can also see their constraint diagrams as a sim-
ple list of their temporal assertions of the form pre–condition(x) =⇒ post–condition(x)
specified over the state configuration of the object. The choice of viewing all state oriented
restrictions and detailed state conditions on an object definition in a single diagram, as
separate graph components, or as a list of logical assertions in first order temporal logic is
left to the user, and the ability to change from one to the other is a strength of the model.
From an operational perspective, we believe that not only will policy makers benefit
from a company-wide unified definition of business objects in a relational database, but
also that such definitions already exist within high level corporate workflows. Business
users are generally aware of the necessary conditions for objects to be in particular states
and can independently translate complex business workflows that are pertinent to their
business functions into portions (fragments) of DCML diagrams. Whether a single policy
maker chooses to focus on a particular path in the corporate level object workflow to model
or the association between two arbitrary states depends largely on what policy objectives
are to be accomplished. In the next few chapters we exploit the above close association
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between CLTL and constraint diagrams and examine in detail the framework for reasoning
and implementation that it provides.
3.7 Related Work
In this chapter we presented a method of translating business process-centric workflows
onto a state space defined by a set of functions over a database view. The use of a
state space to describe possible outcomes (runs of a system) is a well known technique
in computer science (e.g. Finite State Machines, Kripke Structures, etc.). The relation-
ship between database state changes and changes in real world business situations has
been acknowledged by researchers in various communities. For example, several prominent
database textbooks have referred to the correspondence between reality and the database
when discussing the closed world assumption. Similarly, much of the work done in the
context of ECA and workflows is fundamentally grounded in the notion that events hap-
pening at discrete times move the system from various start states to some end states.
The relative novelty of our approach lies in defining such a state space for elements of
a database view. Relational views provide a very flexible abstraction for examining the
contents of a database and thus can be tailored to accommodate reasoning over a wide
variety of business processes.
3.7.1 Declare Workflow System
As discussed earlier, many researchers have proposed the use of LTL based modeling lan-
guages for constraints. However, the most similar modeling approach to ours is that taken
by the Declare Project [59, 101, 161, 120]. Declare is a workflow modeling environment
that also proposes a visual LTL notation for restrictions between different stages (tasks) in
a workflow. The most significant differences between Declare and our proposed notation
arise primarily because of the differences in target audiences between generic workflow
modeling and monitoring systems and relational database systems.
Declare takes a broad, but simplistic, view of LTL constraints in workflows. States in
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Declare do not necessarily represent the data contained in artifacts but can mean ‘tasks’
that may have restrictions among them. An example of a feature that our approach does
not explicitly support3 is that tasks A and B could have a “not co-existence constraint”
in Declare, meaning that they should never both be done. Being a general workflow
modeling system, Declare does not restrict itself to specifying constraints using the past
behavior of system and users can specify constraints about the future that resemble liveness
properties (“something must eventually happen”). This is in contrast with constraints
within database system that must always be enforceable on finite traces of a state space
history.
There are several other differences arising from a database centered approach to visually
depicting LTL constraints that, in general, business oriented workflow diagrams cannot
accommodate. One such feature not present in Declare is that, in addition to an artifact
being in multiple states in multiple lifecycles, it can actually go “off-diagram.” If an artifact
does not satisfy the condition to be in any user defined state, then it still exists but is not
part of any state on any specific diagram. Note carefully that the notion of going “off-
diagram,” i.e., not being part of any user defined states, is different from object deletion
or lifecycle termination. In DCML, artifacts can “disappear” and “reappear” at different
states that are unconstrained, thereby defying traditional notions of workflows. Similarly,
the states φS and φE are interesting anomalies that do not comply with the classical notion
of an initializer or a start/end state in workflows that Declare attempts to model. Finally,
we note that our proposed modeling language achieves significantly more extensibility than
Declare through generalized (conditional) path constraints, as discussed in Section 3.6.4.
3.7.2 Integrated Data and Constraint Model
One of the major differences between our work and prior attempts is that we have essentially
made the data model and constraint model inseparable. In order to circumvent the problem
of establishing object-to-table mappings [52, 51], our model requires policy level objects and
3Yet. By the end of Chapter 6 the reader will hopefully be convinced that it is easy to come up with
visual/graphical semantics such that our proposed technique of mapping LTL constraints can go beyond
state oriented constraints.
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artifacts to be declaratively defined on the underlying database schema. In fact, policy
relevant business objects can only be defined as a logical mapping: that is, a business
artifact in our model is defined as a tuple in a relational view over a database with a
fixed schema. Our motivation for this is that complex business records, such as invoices
and sales reports, are often viewed as objects by policy makers, but the data contained
therein may reflect the execution of a complex set of queries involving temporal parameters
[14]. Consequently, any reasonably powerful policy modeling system that is able to express
constraints over complex business artifacts stored in a database needs to accommodate not
only the underlying database schema (mapping), but also the actual data definitions and
the queries used to generate these records.
3.7.3 Artifact Centric Process Modeling
Even in a mature field such as process modeling, we continue to see significant activity
and major contributions. In recent years, increasingly many researchers have accepted that
workflow style (process-centric) models for processes should be only a part of a much larger
artifact-centric or data process modeling paradigm [109, 56]. Whereas traditional process
modeling techniques focused on a process, such as online-ordering, and attempted to define
its properties and lifecycle, the artifact centric process modeling paradigm attempts to
aggregate many of these processes under a single umbrella denoted as an artifact. Although
there does not exist a formal definition of an artifact, it can be considered as a collection
of any and all data related to a particular entity or goal of an organization. For example, a
customer, patient-visit, or Fedex delivery could be artifacts within some enterprise. From
a business modeling perspective, the strict definition of an artifact is rather irrelevant, as
any information that is needed as part of the tasks associated with the artifact can be
included in it, and the segregation of data among artifacts is a business level decision left
for the managers [135, 109]
Our research adopts a similar view of the world when looking at database systems.
We consider everything relevant to a business (or a set of business policies) as a business
artifact. Furthermore, we believe the best interpretation of an “artifact” in a database
system is as a logical view defined over a database schema. Depending on users’ needs,
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this view can be tailored to the task at hand: it may strictly define a single tuple used
for policy-centric decision making or define several policy relevant objects concurrently.
Observe that just as artifacts have no real boundaries, multiple views can also overlap
(partially contain) each other. Similarly, we find it convenient to denote a single business
artifact as one particular logical view in a database system, even though we could argue
that an artifact could be the intersection, union, or cross product of many different and
even unrelated views. We believe that our work largely complements the modeling efforts
of the BPM community and offers a path to implementation of business constraints related
to artifacts and their specific lifecycle components within database systems.
3.8 Summary
There is clearly a tradeoff between low level specifications and higher level models: the
closer a rule model is to lower level database constructs, such as queries, integrity con-
straints, and triggers, the more straightforward it is to deploy; and a model that is more
abstract will generally be ambiguous but easier for policy makers to create, exchange, and
comprehend. In this chapter we proposed a modeling language that strikes a balance in
this spectrum, with its goal being seamless automatic generation of ECA constraints in a
database as well as ease of use for policy administrators.
Our contribution is not simply to offer yet another business level rule modeling language.
The existing process modeling techniques, such as state transition diagrams, flowcharts,
data flow modeling, and workflow modeling, are sufficiently adequate in their own con-
text. However because of the lack of a modeling language specifically for database systems
(i.e., one that restricts the database state space or manages flow/progression of artifact
behaviour), we present our own visual-to-CLTL notation called DCML. The most signifi-
cant benefit of using this intermediate language is that, instead of directly constraining the
database in SQL, policy experts (i.e., those who are not DBAs) familiar with a minimal
degree of temporal logic can now convert high level workflows into artifact level constraint
systems in the database.
In subsequent chapters we make the case for our modeling language being sufficiently
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expressive to encapsulate most business process modelling techniques. Chapter 4 will dis-
cuss how these visual-CLTL models can be directly implemented as temporal integrity
constraints in practical database management systems. We will also present a much more
complex case study that exemplifies how a real life process can be converted into a coher-
ent DCML diagram. Most importantly, we will also demonstrate how common workflow
patterns can be accommodated in our database-centric policy modeling technique so that
business users can easily convert their pre-existing workflows into database level workflows.
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Chapter 4
From Specification to
Implementation
In this chapter, we examine how constraints specified in DCML can be implemented in an
off-the-shelf relational database system. The work presented builds on the comprehensive
examination of issues pertaining to the efficient implementation of LTL constraints done
by Chomicki [33] and Toman and Chomicki [154, 34]. Our analysis shows that in most
SQL-99 compliant commercially available RDBMSs, an efficient implementation of LTL
constraints requires no changes (source code modifications) to the database engine.
We present synthetic benchmarks and results of our implementation of CLTL con-
straints, showing very little compromise in transaction processing efficiency and minimal
storage overhead. Characteristics of real world DCML diagrams that impact how efficiently
certain constraints can be monitored in database system are also examined.
Our results support the prior research in this area and show that, even when business
artifacts are part of an exorbitantly large number of concurrent workflows (making them
subject to an extraordinary amount of constraints), a modern RDBMS can handle heavy
transaction loads over such artifacts without a noticeable performance penalty in trans-
action processing. We conclude this chapter with suggestions for optimization of DCML
constraint systems, including guidelines that can help system administrators create and
monitor an efficiently implementable set of constraints.
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4.1 Framework for Monitoring State Changes
4.1.1 Terminology
Before discussing implementation and efficiency concerns, we introduce terminology that
will allow us to measure and benchmark the types of constraint systems generated by
DCML. For a particular artifact type V , we denote SV = {S1, S2, . . . , SN} as the finite
set of all user-defined states for artifacts of type V . Recall that each of S1 through SN
represents a function that returns true or false for an assignment of an artifact’s attribute
values at any given point in time. We also know that at any given point in time, an artifact
may belong to multiple labeled states if it satisfies more than one of these state conditions.
In order to determine which states an artifact x is in, we will denote the state configuration
of x, SC(x) to be an ordered binary string (or bit vector) of length |SV |. A zero at position
i in the state configuration of an object x implies that Si(x) is false and that the object
does not belong to state Si. Similarly a one at position i in the state configuration of an
object x implies that Si(x) is true and that the object belongs to state Si.
This abstraction allows us to reason about the policy-relevant conditions that an object
meets at a particular point in time, without being concerned with the actual attribute
values of the object. Note that the set of possible state configurations for any artifact
is always finite (2|SV |). We can better observe this in an example, where S1, S2, and S3
are the only states defined system-wide for policy modeling on an artifact type. For this
three-state scenario, the state space is denoted by a set of binary triples: {(000), (001), . . . ,
(111)}. Recall that a state configuration of all zeros does not imply that the object does
not exist but rather that it is in none of the user specified states in SV (i.e., “off-diagram,”
as discussed in Section 3.5.2).
It stands to reason that the more complex a description of a process model is, the
more stages/states it will have. As a consequence “longer” and more complex business
process models, when translated into DCML diagrams, will also have a higher number of
states and possible state configurations (|SV | and 2|SV | respectively). Thus, this abstraction
allows us to capture a dimension (i.e., number of states) across which we can benchmark
the implementation of DCML models in database systems, and relate it more generally to
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workflow length and complexity.
In order to reason over various state configurations of an artifact during its lifecy-
cle, we define an artifact’s state configuration history (SCH) as the time-stamped se-
quence of state configurations in which it existed. If we denote the state configuration
of an artifact at time t as SC(xt), then the state configuration history is the ordered set
{(t0, SC(x1)), (t1, SC(x2)), . . . , (tc, SC(xc))}, where c is the most recent (current) time-
stamp.
The state configuration history is similar to the history of attribute values of an artifact.
However, it comprises a single binary field whose length is equal to the number of user-
defined states, and therefore it is very likely to be much more compact than the artifact
definition itself. Given the semantics defined for DCML diagrams in Table 3.1 on page 65,
a complete history of artifact values is never explicitly required for constraint enforcement.
This is because constraints specified in DCML do not concern themselves with the actual
attribute values an artifact took in the past but instead look at the consequences (resulting
state configuration) of changes to those attribute values. Attribute values, when temporally
referenced in DCML constructs (as guards and invariants), are only interpreted on the
current and next time steps in the history. Therefore, maintaining a detailed history of
attribute values that an artifact took in the past does not provide any benefits. Instead
it is sufficient to store only whether a state condition was met or not at a given point
in time in the past to enforce constraints. In other words, instead of physically storing
the entire artifact history, which can contain large and complex attributes (strings and
integers), we only need to store a compact bit-vector like representation of the policy
relevant conditions (states) that an artifact satisfied at each time step. This space savings
has significant consequences, which will be examined shortly.
4.1.2 Maintaining Artifact Histories
Since artifact types are defined as views, the constituent values of a single artifact can be
stored in multiple base tables in a database. In this section we describe how a history that
is spread across multiple source tables can be captured and maintained. We do so with
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INV ID LASTUPDATE CST ID AMOUNT SHIPPED PAID APPROVED ... NOTES
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
19846 13/05/12 14:27:04.244 764 59.95 NO YES YES ... Shipping Delay
19847 29/05/12 22:18:05.263 589 129.97 YES YES YES ... N/A
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
19986 17/05/12 01:25:35.849 798 299.97 NO NO NO ... Awaiting Payment
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
19995 19/05/12 07:58:05.119 798 299.97 NO YES NO ... Pending Approval
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Table 4.1: A fragment of a typical invoice table: Each row uniquely represents the current
status of an invoice. In this particular example we can see the contents of four invoices
(19846, 19847, 19986, and 19995), all of which were last updated in May of 2012.
the following example, where a database has two tables, Invoice and Customer, and an
artifact type as a natural join between the two tables defined as follows:
CUSTOMER: (int CST ID, varchar NAME, varchar ADDRESS, . . ., varchar
ADDRESS COUNTRY, varchar CST TYPE)
INVOICE: (int INV ID, datetime LASTUPDATE, int CST ID, float AMOUNT,
bool SHIPPED, bool PAID, bool APPROVED, . . ., varchar NOTES)
InvoiceProcessing ARTIFACT:
SELECT INV ID, CST ID, ADDRESS COUNTRY, CST TYPE,
SHIPPED, PAID, APPROVED
FROM CUSTOMER JOIN INVOICE
ON INVOICE.CST ID = CUSTOMER.CST ID
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 depict what an audit trail of invoices would look like and present
an example of an auxiliary relation used for auditing purposes. For illustrative purposes
we depict the full attribute level history of InvoiceProcessing artifacts. All new invoices
(without any prior history) are directly inserted into the invoice table (Table 4.1). An
auxiliary relation called InvoiceAudit is implicitly defined in the database to keep a log of
changes to invoices (Table 4.2). If an existing invoice is modified (i.e., a row in the invoice
table is updated) the original values of that row are inserted as-is into the audit table before
the modifications to that row are persisted with the current time as the LASTUPDATE
86
INV ID LASTUPDATE CST ID AMOUNT SHIPPED PAID APPROVED ... NOTES
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
19846 11/05/12 23:34:15.077 764 59.95 NO NO NO ... Awaiting Payment
19847 12/05/12 08:34:05.235 589 129.97 NO NO NO ... Awaiting Payment
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
19846 12/05/12 14:19:37.665 764 59.95 NO YES NO ... Pending Approval
19847 12/05/12 16:57:03.187 589 129.97 NO YES NO ... Pending Approval
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
19995 19/05/12 07:58:05.119 798 299.97 NO NO NO ... Awaiting Payment
19847 21/05/12 16:57:03.187 589 129.97 NO YES YES ... Shipping Delay
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Table 4.2: A fragment of the “audit table” for the base invoice table (See Table 4.1). The
rows represent older rows from the original table, therefore requiring an extended primary
key. Such tables are append-only and only accessible to highly privileged users.
field. This mechanism ensures that the valid time of facts can be preserved by recording
successive transaction times. A similar audit table for the customer table could also be
introduced if changes to a customer’s data were significant in a business policy or there
was some business need to audit past customer addresses. For example, it is conceivable
that a customer changes address multiple times while his/her invoice is being processed,
thus requiring special steps in the invoice processing workflow.
In many regulated businesses the continuous auditing and logging of row level database
modifications is commonplace. The business applications, their users, and even program-
mers are often not aware of the database storing a history of changes through auxiliary
relations, nor even the fact that such tables exist. Procedures to create these auxiliary
relations and the relevant auditing triggers on base data automatically are widely adopted
in the commercial use of databases [107]. It is also important to point out that the audit
information may not be exclusively used for compliance but could also be used for ana-
lyzing and improving the performance of a business. For example, in this scenario audit
information could be mined to determine the most significant causes for delays in invoice
processing or the average wait time between payment and shipping. There are also space
optimized ways of maintaining an audit trail, such as delta-encoding, which only stores
the attributes that were modified in a given update. We defer their discussion to Section
4.3. However, we can summarize the key points of this subsection by noting that auditing
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(keeping a history) of a complex artifact that is spread across in multiple tables is simply
a matter of auditing its respective constituent tables and that data logging triggers are the
method of choice to maintain audit trails.
4.1.3 Lifecycle Management
Since the InvoiceProcessing artifact is defined as an inner join between the Customer and
Invoice tables, an audit-table for the InvoiceProcessing artifact is conceptually no different
than an inner join of the two individual audit tables. In fact, even when an artifact is
defined as a multi-way join among many tables, the requirement of uniqueness of individual
rows therein provides us the ability to recreate the history of the artifact by combining
the relevant underlying audit tables. The only caveat is that we now have to consider the
latest of all LASTUPDATE timestamps in each constituent base table history as the last
time at which the entire artifact was updated.
Separating histories of constituent tables brings about an interesting consequence in
interpreting certain changes in artifact history. To elaborate on one such problem, let us
consider the case where we have an invoice currently being processed and it is associated
with a customer named Alice. Let us also say that Alice has changed her address several
times, so she has a customer history and so does the given invoice. Now imagine that
midway through processing this particular invoice, for some reason, it has to be assigned
to a different customer (Bob). Figure 4.1 depicts this change happening at timestamp 4.
If we consider the invoice alone, there is nothing extraordinarily special going on in its
history, as only one attribute of the invoice (CST ID) was changed. Similarly both the
customers have their own relevant histories, which are completely unaffected. However,
note that an artifact is uniquely identified by a pair of invoice and customer identifiers,
which means that at time 4 the history of the particular invoice as it was associated with
Alice (facts A, B, and C) is terminated. At the same time our model ensures that φ is
set to true and the same unique artifact will forever remain in the dead state never to
reappear. Also, at the very same time, a new invoice-customer pair is added, starting a
new artifact history for the invoice as it is associated with Bob and thus beginning a new
artifact lifecycle (D, E, F). In other words, an artifact in this scenario is an invoice as it
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Figure 4.1: An invoice can be associated with one customer at any given point in time.
Changing the associated customer has no significant consequence on the complete history
of an invoice (A,B,C,D,E,F) but the old history of the artifact (A,B,C) terminates and a
new one starts (D,E,F) at time 4.
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relates to single customer, and one such artifact lifecycle terminates while a new one is
instantiated at timestamp 4 (provided φS(A) for that artifact holds as well).
The key point in the scenario depicted in Figure 4.1 is that, even though there is
only one invoice, it can interact in multiple artifact level lifecycles. Thus, business policy
makers and DBAs catering for all possible exceptions in a business workflow should be
aware of the intricacies of modifying data and its implications on the history of not only
individual objects but the collective processes they participate in. In order to keep our
example simple and straightforward, we shall assume that invoice numbers and customer
numbers are assigned only once and cannot change over time. This assumption of unique
object/artifact identifier is embedded as a requirement in the model as described in Section
3.4.3 and, when combined with the fact that each artifact has only one lifecycle significantly
simplifies enforcement related issues. Finally, we point out that a state configuration
history is only a layer of simplification on top of traditional auditing, and it too can be
derived from the underlying audit-tables by simply evaluating the boolean state conditions
over the recorded facts.
4.1.4 Materialization of State Configuration Histories
An alternative to continuously (re)creating the entire artifact state configuration history
from the underlying base tables (at every update) is to materialize and maintain it. In
other words, we can forgo keeping a physical audit trail of artifact values if we only store
the audit trail of states that an artifact was present in. Database systems, such as IBM’s
DB2 and Oracle’s 11g, offer direct support for triggers over views using the infrastructure
developed for the incremental maintenance of materialized views, and these triggers can
be used to log and determine the validity of all updates to an artifact’s state configuration
history automatically.
There are several major advantages to such oﬄoading of the task of monitoring changes
to artifacts (views) to the database engine and use the capability to trap (examine) and
reject those changes. Foremost, we can exploit the facilities provided by the database engine
to monitor views instead of writing complex triggers on the base tables to do so (this task
is essentially made redundant). It can be argued that user-programmed triggers would be
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far less efficient than those implemented and executed by a database engine to monitor
materialized views, especially in a scenario where a large number of these overlapping
artifacts (views) are defined for enforcing business rules. Since the database engine is
well aware of the entire schema, it can better isolate irrelevant updates and therefore
minimize the transaction processing overhead caused by the monitoring of artifacts. In
fact, given a certain workload, modern database systems can provide guidance into whether
materialization will have a positive impact on transaction processing [177], and they can
even automatically materialize specific portions of base relations in anticipation of peak
workload conditions [176].
Second and more importantly, we can choose to materialize the state configuration
history instead of “recalculating” it at every decision point regarding Anext. That is, instead
of continuously logging changes to base tables, we can (i) only log the changes relevant to
specific artifacts and (ii) only log all changes relevant to the state configuration history of
those artifacts. With regards to point (i), note that, since the state configuration history is
itself a type of mini audit-log for artifacts, we can avoid auditing complete tables and only
maintain history entries for specific artifacts subject to constraints. With regards to point
(ii), materialization of the state configuration history only also avoids change tracking for
irrelevant changes to artifacts. For example, an invoice may be physically updated, but
not in a way that impacts any of the business states that it is in. Thus, from a workflow
and constraint perspective, there may be no need to audit changes that do not impact the
states an artifact is in.
Between these two options (materialization and derivation), there is of course a trade-
off between extra storage space (involved in storing the state configuration history) and
processing time (evaluating the boolean conditions to re-derive it). We will examine this
tradeoff between methods of maintaining a state configuration history in Section 4.2, when
we present our benchmarks for monitoring and maintenance of such histories. For now,
we assume that a logically correct history for all artifacts is available for policy-centric
decision making, and we note that mechanisms to monitor changes to database systems
are commonly available to do so.
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4.1.5 Checking Individual Constraints
Given the availability of a state configuration history for artifacts, the final piece of the
puzzle lies in continuously examining it for policy violations. The key to enforcement lies
in the observation that a temporal formula in CLTL can also be treated as a validation
query over a finite history. Compliance of a database with a constraint in CLTL is thus
equivalent to trapping transactions that change the state configuration of artifacts and
checking whether the resulting change will lead to a sequence in which the negation of
the constraint is satisfied. Transactions that do not violate any constraint are allowed to
commit, and those that violate one or more constraints are aborted.
The method (algorithm) to verify and validate histories is straightforward. It relies
on directly interpreting temporal operators (as described in Section 3.4.3) in first order
logic and then issuing SQL queries (recursively) over the history to evaluate them. If the
query returns true for a constraint / CLTL formula, then the constraint is valid on the
history. Algorithms and detailed descriptions of their implementations (including opera-
tors to accommodate metric-temporal constraints) have been repeatedly presented in prior
literature, (see [154, 34, 33, 75, 18]) and we omit their discussion from this thesis.
4.2 Measuring Policy Overhead
The most widely cited implementation of first order temporal integrity constraints im-
plemented as SQL triggers, which reject (roll-back) transactions if a first order temporal
integrity constraint is not met, was presented by Toman and Chomicki [34]. The work in-
troduced the use of result memoization to check past temporal integrity without examining
the entire history of an object. A simple example of memoization can be demonstrated with
the condition SA. Determining whether sometime in the past a complex event happened
can require us to trace the entire history of an artifact. Moreover, re-determining whether
the same complex event has already happened at every update can slow down the process
of constraint checking. In many cases it may be easier to store details about complex events
in the past alongside the artifact. In other words, we can make the fact that “something
has happened in the past (or not happened in the past)” an inseparable part of the object
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in question, instead of rediscovering this fact by traversing the history every time an object
is updated. Toman and Chomicki demonstrated that such a technique allows us to check
constraints much more efficiently with at most a polynomial (in terms of formula length)
amount of extra space. The performance results we now present augment the work done
by Toman and Chomicki, and our work distinguishes itself by focusing on issues specific to
the problem of implementing LTL constraints that originate from DCML diagrams. Fur-
thermore we provide actual benchmark test results in the context of a modern database
system.
There are two sources of overhead on which we focus in our tests. Foremost is the
trade-off between space and time, that is, the design decision to store the state configura-
tion history or to re-create it from the audit logs whenever needed. Second is the actual
processing time for verification of constraints, including the time spent to check if an object
is in a particular state or not. Our tests show that, in typical transactional databases in
which real-time constraints need to be enforced, the space overhead incurred by material-
izing a state configuration history alongside the audit trail of an object will be negligible.
In addition the processing penalty of checking typical business conditions on objects (state
conditions) is almost non-existent, as the information needed to make policy-centric deci-
sions is available in memory and relative to the actual cost of writing results onto disk, the
cost of in- memory processing/checking of constraints is almost immeasurable.
For our tests we considered the business definition of a typical invoice or purchase order
artifact as specified in the TPC-H benchmark to guide us. The Transaction Processing
Council (TPC) publishes several open schemas and benchmarks that are well known in the
database community. We used the TPC-H benchmark schema and tested against business
scenarios of varying complexity by considering corporate workflow (pertaining to a single
artifact) of size 128 states, 512 states and 1024 states. Since TPC-H does not describe
specific business processes, these states were synthetically created. For our tests we used
TPC-H databases of sizes 1GB and 10GB on an Intel Core 2 Duo based machine with 4GB
RAM running Microsoft SQL Server 2008.
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4.2.1 Storage Overhead
Motivation
Although having as many as 1024 states in a corporate workflow pertaining to a single
object is very unlikely, it does represent a plausible upper bound on the number of bits
required by the state configuration history. Observe that the state configuration history
is a compact representation of an object’s membership in all user defined states. Even
in our extreme case, 1024 true/false results are essentially 1024 bits of information (128
bytes), and this is still less space than a single text-based comment field associated with
a typical object such as a purchase order (144 character/byte comment field in the TPC-
H specifications). Furthermore, we believe that since TPC-H is a synthetic performance
benchmark, the size of an invoice or line item row in the TPC-H benchmark is an extremely
conservative representation of real life business objects and their storage requirements,
especially in the presence of large text fields used, for example, for notes and comments.
Consequently even when considering a corporate workflow of 1024 independent states with
no exploitable similarities (i.e., the truth/falsehood of one state condition has no bearing
on the truth/falsehood of any other), an extraordinarily large relative storage burden (the
ratio of the size of the state configuration to the size of the actual object) will perhaps
never be encountered in real life situations. More surprisingly, our test results showed that
even when this ratio is taken to extremes by considering the consequence of having tens of
thousands of states, a database under typical transactional loads will not suffer significant
performance degradation.
Test Setup
To measure the impact of additional storage on the day to day operations of a transac-
tional database system, we conducted several tests by adding variable length bit vectors
alongside artifacts and measuring the time taken to complete typical database transactions
(inserts, deletes, and updates). These bit vectors essentially represented different length
state configurations, which in turn represented the number of states that were defined on
an artifact, which in turn were a proxy for the complexity of workflows defined over such
94
artifacts.
Results
Our tests showed that, in general, appending additional binary fields to relations causes
no performance degradation for random updates. In fact we were able to go well beyond
our extreme case and reached 10,000 states before noticing any significantly measurable
difference. The rationale behind there being no additional cost to tacking on a large bit-
vector is clear in hindsight. A random update to a row in the invoice or line item table
in the database causes only one page to be physically accessed and committed to disk.
Thus, as long as the state configuration can be accommodated within the same page as
the object being updated, the cost of writing/flushing this page to disk will not increase.
Since the cost of fetching and writing a page is consistent in both conditions and also the
most significant component of a transaction, there is no observable difference in time taken
to complete a transaction. In most database deployments a page size of 4KB (32,768 bits)
is common. We believe that even for the most complex workflows, this limit will never
be reached, and the actual storage of the state configuration does not pose significant
transactional costs.
Note that our objective was solely to test whether a system under a transactional load
(high-update situation where a random invoice or line-item is impacted) is stressed by the
additional overhead of writing the state configuration alongside the object. There are,
however, situations where it might be preferable (for example, a non-random workload,
sequential scans, etc.) to store the history in a completely separate database (i.e., an
extension of the independent audit-trail option discussed in Section 4.1.4). This would
provide the additional benefit of securely isolating the audit trail from the operational data.
Furthermore, if the audit-database is on a separate disk then the performance penalty
incurred for different types of workloads (mix between various types of read and write
queries) can be better managed.
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4.2.2 Computational Overhead
Motivation
For each transaction that modifies an artifact, we require that the new state configuration
be calculated and then compared against the old state configuration(s) to ensure that all
specified constraints are being met. We anticipate that in many situations where states for
business level policy conditions share common variables, we will not have to incur the cost
of checking every state conditional independently. For example, consider a workflow for
invoices with two states called, paid and unpaid, with the conditions, “paid = true” and
“paid = false” respectively. Observe that we need to check only one of these conditions to
conclude the state configuration for both states.
In business situations where a large number of states exist in the policy model, it is
very likely that many of them will share the same variables, and thus checking whether an
object belongs to several states may be accomplished much more quickly than performing
the test for each condition independently. Similarly, while the state configuration is being
computed, we can simultaneously check whether a particular constraint is violated or not
and prune the space of possible constraint violations dynamically. These optimizations
aside (discussed further in Section 4.3), in our tests we took a pessimistic stance by as-
suming that there are no avenues of optimization available for the database engine/query
compiler to exploit.
Test Setup
We conducted tests to measure the computational overhead of dealing with varying num-
bers of constraints in a policy model. We noted earlier that there are many mechanisms
present in database systems that can be used to monitor the implications of an update
such as check constraints, triggers, and constraints on materialized views. Our tests were
designed to explore the costs associated with repeatedly calculating the state configura-
tion, and our objective in this section is to provide a reference for comparing the practical
computational costs of two of these possible techniques in light of a varying number of
assertions specified in first order temporal logic.
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Figure 4.2: Time taken by a SQL server trigger to complete simple in-memory if-then
styled checks grows linearly with an extremely high overhead per check. Very quickly
these checks become the bulk/bottleneck in trigger processing. A C++ procedure however
responds in a very predictable fashion where performing the exact same in-memory checks
has no bearing on the total cost of the transaction.
Once again we used the number of states (one condition per state) as a proxy for the
amount and degree of workflow complexity: 0 states (to represent no computational over-
head as a measure of baseline costs), 128 states, 512 states, and 1024 states. Under this test
setup, adding an extra state essentially means incurring the cost of an additional synthet-
ically designed check to see whether an object belongs to that state or not. These checks
were designed to simulate traditional business level string and arithmetic comparisons (such
as “status = paid”, “shipcode = M”, “amount ≥ 250”, and “shipinstruct=overnight”) that
a system will be expected to do to determine an object’s presence in each state. These
tests were performed sequentially and the results of being present in one state provided
no information to determine whether the object will (or will not) be present in any other
state. Thus, there was no scope for optimization.
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Results
Our hope was that we would be quickly able to demonstrate a very obvious fact about
calculating the state configuration history. That is, determining whether an object belongs
to a particular state through a simple check (SQL if-condition), where all the necessary
data to do so is already in memory, would pose no transactional cost. After all, simple one
line statements (“status=paid” or “amount ≥ 5”) on data that is already memory-resident,
even when repeated thousands of times, should not be comparable to disk writes (which are
several orders of magnitude slower than memory/CPU operations and dominate database
transaction costs).
Our results (depicted in Figure 4.2) show that, contrary to what was expected, SQL
based triggers, as implemented in Microsoft SQL Server 2008, are extremely inefficient at
performing even the most basic operations on primitive data types. We observed a linear
correlation between time taken to execute and the number of synthetically designed checks
(essentially IF-statements in SQL to compare attributes against static values). At 1024
states Microsoft SQL Server took upwards of ten seconds to complete one invocation of
such a sequence of checks. Our attempts to identify the cause of this significant slow down
caused by increasing the number of in-memory operations was hampered by the lack of
instrumentation provided by SQL Server to analyze the execution of triggers. Note that
at 1024 checks our source code for a typical trigger was around 100KB, and we were able
to verify that SQL Server was not re-compiling the trigger at every invocation. We were
also able to confirm that the delay was purely in the execution of the compiled code (i.e.,
not waiting on disk or other resources). Our conclusion here is that for some reason the
compiled code being generated for trigger processing was far more inefficient than expected.
These results were not unique to Microsoft SQL Server and similar results demonstrating
poor execution performance of SQL code were found when using IBM’s DB2 database
server.
Fortunately, most database systems (including Microsoft SQL Server) allow the ex-
ecution of externally written procedures, that is, executing a memory-resident program
outside the database engine, and exchanging relevant parameters for analysis. Programs
in a language such as C++ can be called upon to do any form of work if the database/SQL
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execution engine is not adequate1. Such techniques are commonly used in scientific appli-
cations, where external programs such as MatLab and R are used to perform data analysis
and store the results back in a database. When such an approach is adopted (moving the
if-conditions into an external C++ program), there is no discernable increase in the time
to test 1024 state conditions than to perform no tests at all.
We conclude that although methods for automatic generation of SQL level triggers have
been well examined in prior literature, implementing them efficiently (i.e., in a manner that
does not immensely slow down the system) is anything but straightforward. Because of
the vast differences in SQL execution behavior and how different database engines handle
trigger code, an LTL constraint to SQL trigger generator will need to be optimized for
each individual database product. That being said, this customization will require little
effort but a lot of familiarity with the performance quirks of a given database engine.
4.3 Optimizations
During the course of this Chapter, we briefly discussed several sources of optimization and
cost savings. In this section we provide more details on how they can be practically used
and discuss their overall benefit.
4.3.1 State Space Reduction
Using LTL constraints as the logical representation for enforcement of business level policies
allows us to reduce policy verification and validation to well known problems related to
static (query) analysis. The most obvious optimization through static analysis comes
from eliminating unsatisfiable states. An unsatisfiable state is one which an object can
never attain by virtue of the definition of the state alone (that is, no assignment of the
attributes of an artifact can satisfy the condition of the state). The problem of determining
satisfiability of a state is equivalent to solving the underlying SMT/SAT problem on the
1either using a call to pre-compiled memory resident DLL (extended stored procedures) or the interface
provided by the xp cmdshell call in SQL Server: see [150, 87] for reference and usage
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Figure 4.3: Different users may be interested in different paths of complex workflows
(shown in different colours). States where these paths intersect may need to be negotiated
together, jointly defined, or at the very least collapsed together to make enforcement more
efficient.
attributes of the artifact. Note that the cost of determining whether each state is satisfiable
has to be incurred only once during static analysis of the constraints and can save significant
time in repetitive checking of an unsatisfiable state condition during run time.
Furthermore, an unsatisfiable state most likely represents an error on the part of the
users of the system, as they have no use in constraint modeling and thus should not be
defined. It is perhaps wise to report such states to the policy maker so that s/he can
resolve any errors associated with the incorrect assumption that the state under question
is meaningful for policy purposes.
Similarly, merging states that are “equivalent” across different models (sub-components
of a unified DCML diagram) created by different policy makers can also be a significant
cost saving measure (see Figure 4.3), where states are equivalent if and only if the same
set of attribute values cause their respective functions to be true and false. In other words,
the associated state functions of two equivalent functions are rewrites of each other. Once
again, demonstrating the equivalence of two arbitrary constraints specified on a set of (non-
boolean) attributes is not trivial but can under many circumstances (e.g., finite domains)
be reduced to the problem of classical boolean/propositional equivalence.
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Figure 4.4: Temporal inconsistency (dead end).
Figure 4.5: An indirectly specified containment restriction.
4.3.2 Constraint Analysis and Sanity Checking
Since the graphical model and its logical representation have a strict one-to-one corre-
spondence, any reasoning that can be applied to first order temporal formulas can also be
reflected in the graphical model and vice versa. Consider the graphical constraint model
presented in Figure 4.4. Constraint (1) mandates that all objects exiting state A must
reach state B, •A(x) ⇒ B(x), and (2) specifies that after reaching state A, an object
should never reach state B, B(x) ⇒ ¬A(x). By transitivity we get, •A(x) ⇒ ¬A(x),
interpreted as, previously A implies never in the past A, which is an inconsistent (unsatis-
fiable) temporal formula. What this means is that the transition to B simply cannot take
place and neither can the object leave state A. Thus state A could potentially represent
an unintentional dead end in the workflow for the object. We hypothesize that such in-
consistencies will emerge as the result of human error, poor policy planning, or conflicting
policies.
Note that the problem demonstrated in Figure 4.4 (dead end) has no bearing on the
actual definition of the states A and B. More specifically we did not have to look at the
definitions of A(x) and B(x) to come to the conclusion that A cannot be exited. It is merely
the way two constraints interact that an interesting result about a workflow emerged.
Furthermore, the fact that •A(x)⇒ ¬A(x) is unsatisfiable is trivial to see visually in this
diagram. However, as large diagrams with hundreds of state and constraints are integrated,
the detection of these abnormalities becomes challenging. In subsequent chapters we will
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demonstrate that LTL satisfiability solvers, armed with guidance on what to detect, can
play a role in significantly reducing policy and reachability errors by considering hundreds
of temporal implications concurrently. The appropriate results in many cases can help
simplify constraint diagrams.
In fact, additional reasoning about constraint-oriented workflows can play a significant
role in simplification of constraint systems. The overall objective of analyzing constraint
interplay is primarily to identify “interesting” facts about logically correct constraint sys-
tems that can lead to avenues of optimization in constraint-oriented workflows. An example
of such analysis is presented in Figure 4.5, where constraint (1) specifies the assertion that
B(x)∧¬•B(x)⇒ •A(x), while constraint (2) specifies the assertion •C(x)∧¬C(x)⇒ B(x).
If we interpret these implications, we come to the conclusion that an object that leaves
state C must arrive in state B and any object that arrives in state B must have previously
been in state A. Therefore, objects in state B must have previously been in both state A
and state C at the same time. This of course raises several questions related to containment
of states, that is how closely is being in state A related to being in state C? Are either
of those states fully contained in the other? Furthermore if the analysis of the conditions
of A and C shows a contradiction (for example A ∩ C being empty) then we may have a
problem in the form of a logical inconsistency, that makes state B unreachable.
Two important observations about logical reasoning that concerns business level policy
modeling need to be made here. First, we note that it is unlikely that any single policy
maker will make egregious modeling errors such as the ones described above. This is
because each individual constraint diagram will most likely be a mapping of a business
process that does not suffer from these problems. However, as constraint diagrams from
various policy makers are merged together to create a final implementation model (set of
logical assertions), the need to resolve such conflicts by automated reasoning is ever present.
Furthermore, during this constraint integration phase, there are significant avenues of
optimization through eliminating and combining constraints derived by different policy
makers in a business to ensure the resulting set of assertions being continually checked in
a database system is minimal.
Second, we note that our ability to reason over these logical constraints is restricted
by many factors, including the view (object) definitions, domains of the attributes, func-
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tions used to define states, etc. For arbitrary queries, domains, and state conditions, the
problems of determining containment, closure, and intersection are well known to be un-
decidable. However, we believe that a significant number of business object definitions will
involve the use of simple conjunctive queries and operators that are relatively simple to
reason with. Logical analysis of assertions in these situations will not only be a tractable
problem but will also lead to significant optimization and reduction of the number of con-
straints that need to be checked per transaction. A more comprehensive discussion of the
computational cost and tools available to optimize/model check a given set of assertions
in first order logic is presented in Chapter 5.
We conclude this section by pointing out that these optimizations are one-time costs
and in typical operations need to be incurred only when a new constraint is introduced in
the system. Furthermore, we argue that it is unlikely that new individual constraints will
impact all known properties about a complete system, and thus the scope of analysis with
new constraints will require minimal incremental analysis for optimization.
4.4 Summary and Related Work
4.4.1 Active Database Systems
There are many aspects associated with the development and use of active database sys-
tems that have over time been encapsulated and abstracted by modern database engines.
The event monitoring and view maintenance facilities provided in a modern DBMS, for
the most part, hide the complexity associated with building an efficient event detection
infrastructure. Cochrane et al. [38] have provided a very detailed description of how trig-
gers and events are implemented in relational database systems. Their work summarizes
the trigger related features offered by most commercial DBMSs and provides an overview
of their implementation. It is interesting to note that, even if not explicitly employed by
administrators, triggers are still widely used constructs, often transparently placed by a
database system to monitor integrity violations and for the incremental maintenance of
materialized views. Many active database prototype systems have been discussed in the
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research community, and many lessons from this research have been adopted in commercial
database systems. The most well cited academic prototypes include Ariel [73], Starburst
[171], SAMOS [68], HiPAC [47] and ODE [98]. A comprehensive survey of the above,
including their specific termination, confluence, and determinism properties, is available
[119] and serves as an excellent starting point for further research in this area.
4.4.2 Constraint Systems
In the context of enforcement of a large number of constraints, it is plausible that there are
avenues for exploiting the interference between constraints. We briefly alluded to the fact
that quite often, for example if two states are disjoint, checking for presence in one or the
other is adequate to make a conclusion for both. There is in fact a large body of work in
the area of analysis of predicates to optimize for precisely these types of situations, where
re-writing and re-organizing conditions can lead to significant savings during runtime. In
databases systems analysis of predicates is a well understood problem in the context of
query optimization [77] and event detection [74]. For a detailed overview of how analysis
of predicates and optimal rewriting of predicates is exploited in a commercial DBMS, the
reader is directed to a white paper published by SAP/SYBASE [152]. Most importantly,
the notion of predicate analysis is inseparably linked with compilers and instruction set
execution within modern microprocessors [142]. Although a comprehensive discussion of
optimizations through constraint analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, we believe that
advances in compiler technology, which transparently optimizes checking of constraints,
will eliminate any need for users to analyze constraints manually and re-organize them for
efficient processing during run-time.
We also briefly touched upon the need to analyze properties about the constraint sys-
tems developed by the users, that is, to examine the set of constraints from a visual or
workflow perspective. Many problems such as satisfiability, state reachability, and work-
flow dead-ends can perhaps be manifestations of complex policy design errors and should
therefore be reported to the policy makers. Much of Chapter 5 is dedicated to similar
issues, and we delay further discussion until then.
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4.4.3 Summary
In this chapter we examined how to implement constraints derived from our visual con-
straint modeling language. Much of the research in this area was conducted by researchers
in active database systems. Our work presents a bridge from the graphical representation of
constraint systems that we proposed to well understood methods of implementing tempo-
ral integrity constraints via a space optimized and policy relevant audit trail for individual
artifacts. In addition, we analyzed the impact of the business use of such constraints and
concluded that, for transactional workloads where individual objects are interacted upon,
a database suffers no (or a small constant) penalty over and beyond auditing costs for the
enforcement of such constraints.
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Chapter 5
Reasoning over Constraint Systems
So far we have discussed constraint specification (Chapter 3) and enforcement (Chapter
4). In this chapter we examine challenges associated with testing constraint systems and
answering questions about the possible future(s) of artifacts when subject to a set of DCML
constraints (e.g., whether an artifact subject to a constraint systems can ever violate an
operational requirement).
Constraints embedded in DCML diagrams are a set of enforceable restrictions specified
in constraint temporal logic using past operators only. However, when reasoning about the
future, the notion of enforceability is replaced by that of satisfiability, and thus we need to
extend our logic such that statements about the possible future(s) of artifacts can be easily
constructed and verified. In this chapter we consider the full past and future fragment
of CLTL and include the temporal operators X (◦), G (♦) and F () to represent next
time, always, and some time in the future, respectively. Note that these operators are
part of classical LTL and thus are also part of CLTL, but since they were not relevant for
the specification and enforcement aspect of constraints, we delayed their introduction until
now. It shall become evident in this chapter that CLTL restricted to the past is well suited
for specifying constraints and restricting the state space for artifacts. However, reasoning
about the future is best (most naturally) done using future operators and constructs that
allow users to perform forward reasoning in time.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 we demonstrate how the verifica-
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Figure 5.1: Constraints in all DCML canvases are first integrated at the artifact level
(unified artifact constraint diagram/system). Although these constraints are specified over
the artifact type, they are enforced over all artifacts contained in the database system.
tion of properties pertaining to a set of constraints can be reduced to problem of CLTL
satisfiability. We present a method of constructing a CLTL SAT problem, which, when
solved, allows us to determine if a user-specified property of the artifact lifecycle can be
met under the constraints enacted on the artifact type. While Section 5.1 focuses on veri-
fication of properties of a set of constraints associated with a single artifact type, Section
5.2 examines the problem of verifying properties across several interacting artifact types.
Finally 5.3 summarizes this chapter and briefly discusses research most closely associated
to the work presented in this chapter.
5.1 Model Construction
5.1.1 Terminology
Figure 5.1 summarizes our constraint integration methodology, showing how various DCML
constraint canvases are brought together for monitoring and enforcement. Recall that in
Chapter 3 we introduced the notion of different policy makers having separate canvases
for constraint specification on a single artifact type. Our main reason for doing so was to
allow for the distribution and separation of constraint specification responsibilities among
different policy makers. However, there is always a single “unified” DCML diagram per
artifact type that combines the DCML canvases drawn out by individual policy makers.
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With this approach we can reason about the possible behaviour of artifacts at different
levels (i.e., at the individual canvas level, the unified constraint system level, and the
physical storage/database level). To distinguish reasoning at various levels we define the
constraint systems at these levels as follows:
Definition 6. A canvas constraint system (CCS) is a CLTL formula that is formed by the
conjunction of all individual constraints embedded in a single DCML canvas.
Definition 7. An artifact constraint system (ACS) is a CLTL formula that is formed by
the conjunction of all canvas constraint system(s) acting on an artifact type.
Recall that each visual construct in DCML introduced in Chapter 3 (Table 3.1 on page
65) embeds one or more restrictions specified in CLTL over the artifact type. Many such
restrictions can be embedded in a single DCML canvas created by a single policy maker.
If we take the constraints in one such canvas and simply combine them into one logical
formula, that is, conjoin each assertion derived from interpreting the graphical notation,
we will have achieved a CCS that represents all the constraints in a single canvas. Note
that since each artifact must comply with all constraints independently, it must therefore
comply with the single combined formula as well.
Similarly, we can collect all the canvases in one unified constraint diagram and this
leads us to the notion of an ACS. Note that there is always only one ACS per artifact type,
and it represents all the constraints specified by different policy makers on that artifact
type. This combined constraint must forever hold true in all individual artifact histories
of the type. In other words the ACS captures all the constraints on an artifact type, and
each individual artifact’s history must comply with the ACS.
This naturally leads us to the definition of a database level constraint system that
in some way represents the interaction of all artifact level constraint systems for all user
defined artifact types. Note however that we cannot simply combine CLTL constraints
specified over disparate objects/domains onto a database via a simple conjunction. Con-
sequently, we defer the discussion of a database level constraint system until Section 5.2.
Note that, from this point onwards, we will use the terms CCS and ACS instead of a
DCML canvas and a unified DCML diagram for an artifact, since these terms more for-
mally represent the visual notation in CLTL.
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Figure 5.2: A set of restrictions relating and stitching together different states of an artifact
(names shorted to U, P and S). An interpretation of this diagram given on a constraint-
by-constraint basis could be that (1) if an artifact gets paid it must have been previously
unpaid, (2) if an artifact gets shipped it must have previously been paid and (3) a shipped
artifact’s lifecycle can never be terminated.
The terminology can be best illustrated through an example. Figure 5.2 depicts a
DCML canvas where the InvoiceProcessing artifact (as defined in Section 4.1.2) must go
through a restricted set of stages during its lifecycle. To convert this canvas into CLTL
constraints, we can once again rely on the notation-to-CLTL mapping provided in Table
3.1 on page 65. In our example we use the short-hand notation of the first letter of the state
to denote the function associated with that state applied on the artifact attributes. The
resulting constraints derived from each of the constraints labelled 1 through 3 in Figure
5.2 are as follows:
Constraint 1
P ∧ ¬ • P ⇒ •U
“If the artifact is in state P and it was previously not in state P, then it must have
previously been in state U.”
Constraint 2
S ∧ ¬ • S ⇒ •P
“If the artifact is in state S and it was previously not in state S, then it must have
previously been in state P.”
Constraint 3
110
S ⇒ ¬φE
“If the artifact was ever in state S, then it should not be in state φE.”
Thus by Definition 6, the CCS for Figure 5.2 is the following single CLTL formula that
has to forever hold true in the history of individual artifacts of the specified type:
CCS1(A) := [P ∧ ¬ • P ⇒ •U ] ∧ [(S ∧ ¬S)⇒ •P ] ∧ [S ⇒ ¬φE] (5.1)
If there are k different CCSs acting on an artifact, then, by Definition 7, the ACS can
be defined as follows:
ACS :=
k∧
i=1
CCSi
The reader should observe that an ACS is a conjunction of all the if-then conditions
that are created by different policy makers. Each of these if-then conditions is equally
enforceable in a compliant history of an individual artifact. Thus, an ACS reduces all the
constraints embedded in various DCML canvases acting on an artifact to a single CLTL
formula.
5.1.2 The What and Why of Verification
The question of why verification really matters was comprehensively addressed in Chapter
1, where we pointed out that one of the major reasons why policy management in database
systems is very expensive is that the unintended consequences of various interacting con-
straints are hard to isolate. Not only can constraints interfere with each other, but they
can also interfere with established business objectives and practices pertaining to various
artifacts. For example, an incorrectly implemented constraint may cause legal (required)
paths in an artifact lifecycle to be un-traversable. More importantly, proving (to savvy
auditors or to internal managers responsible for specific processes) that unintended con-
sequences of a set of constraints can never occur is extremely difficult when constraints
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are programmed in an ad-hoc fashion. To this end, the ability to verify and prove that
“something bad” cannot happen is vitally important.
Therefore we need to be able to define what this “something bad” is before we can
verify that it never happens. We have already demonstrated that CLTL restricted to past
operators is an expressive logic for specifying enforceable constraints over artifact histories.
However, we now claim that CLTL is sufficiently expressive to describe invariants about
artifacts that may warrant verification. Consider our running example of the InvoicePro-
cessing artifact and a situation where a policy maker wants to verify if there can ever (in the
future) exist a “shipped invoice that is subsequently marked as unpaid”, s/he could write
that check condition as an LTL assertion F(•S ∧ ¬U). Similarly the concerned individual
can check formulas that specify complex paths in the workflow. For example, if s/he wanted
to determine whether it is possible for an artifact to comply with (traverse) the transition
from state S1 to S3 after being in state S2, then the formula F(S3 ∧ •(S1 ∧S2)) could be
used to represent that particular sequence of state changes.. Thus, it should be apparent
that linear temporal logic can also be used to describe invariants, check-conditions, or some
prescribed behaviour of artifacts that may warrant verification.
Construction of a CLTL SAT problem
Having written formulas that specify properties (or invariants) about artifacts, then the
next natural step is to ascertain whether these formulas can (ever) be true or not. We can
phrase this problem as follows: Given a set of constraints applicable on an artifact type
(i.e., an artifact constraint system) and a property that warrants verification, can there
ever exist an artifact history, that (a) complies with the artifact constraint system and
(b) in which the property is true? In other words can the ACS and the property both be
satisfied at the same time?
Although this phrasing of the problem reduces the notion of verification of a user-
specified property about an artifact to CLTL satisfiability, there are a few more steps left
in completing the construction of the LTL satisfiability problem before it can be fed into
a CLTL solver for meaningful results. Foremost, note that the ACS does not capture the
implicit constraints introduced to manage artifact lifecycle instantiation and termination.
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Recall Section 3.4.4 starting on page 60 in which two implicit constraints regarding termi-
nation of lifecycles were introduced for every artifact. To simplify our construction we will
denote these lifecycle termination constraints as Cφ:
Cφ := (•φ⇒ φ) ∧ (φ⇒
∧
ai∈A
•ai = ai) (5.2)
We remind the reader that the restrictions embedded in Cφ were placed to ensure that
(i) once the implicitly introduced lifecycle termination marker (φ) is set to true, it forever
remains true and (ii) the attribute values of the artifact never change from that point
onwards. These restrictions were placed to ensure that an object cannot change once it is
in the “dead state.”
Finally, recall the instantiation constraint φS(A) introduced in Section 3.5.2 starting
on page 67, and note that it was used to represent an instantiation function that is to be
interpreted only for t=0. With this last component in hand we can completely specify our
CLTL SAT problem as follows:
φS(A) ∧G[ACS ∧ Cφ] ∧ F(CheckCondition) (5.3)
Note that this CLTL formals is intuitive to understand and requires the solver to find
a history/run in which three conditions are satisfied:
• φS(A): The history must satisfy the artifact instantiation constraint.
• G[ACS ∧ Cφ]: Forever (or Globally), the history must comply with the constraints
in the ACS and the termination constraints.
• F(CheckCondition): Subsequent to satisfying the instantiation constraint, sometime
in the Future (or eventually), the CheckCondition must become true.
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In other words we are requiring a SAT solver to traverse all possible legal artifact
lifecycles and determine if (eventually) the specified condition/property can hold true for an
artifact subject to a given ACS. If the above formula is satisfiable, then the CheckCondition
can be met and the “something bad” that the designer of the CheckCondition wanted to
avoid can happen.
Example
Consider our running example of the InvoiceProcessing Artifact and the check condition
introduced earlier: “can a previously shipped invoice be marked as unpaid.” This condition
was formulated as F(•S ∧ ¬U). The ACS for our example was given in Formula 5.1
and Cφ was described in Formula 5.2. Since the constraint diagram did not restrict how
InvoiceProcessing artifacts can be created/instantiated φS(A) is considered to be true. The
resulting SAT problem is as follows:
true
∧
G[(P ∧ ¬ • P ⇒ •U ] ∧ [(S ∧ ¬S)⇒ •P ] ∧ [S ⇒ ¬φE] ∧ [•φ⇒ φ] ∧ [φ⇒
∧
ai∈A
•ai = ai]]
∧
F[•S ∧ ¬U ]
(5.4)
Note that the above formula is a simple substitution of the various parts in formula
5.3. For visual clarity we have broken the formula into three different lines. Line one is the
initialization, which is unrestricted (i.e., an artifact can take any values to start). Line two
is the set of global constraints that the artifact must satisfy. These constraints include not
only the operational business rules (contained in the ACS) but also the termination con-
straints (last two conjuncts in line two). Finally, line three introduces an aspect about the
future that the solver must include for while abiding by the rules embedded in the previous
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two lines. That is, in the legal (compliant) future subsequent to artifact instantiation, can
the specified CheckCondition be true?
5.1.3 Bounded Satisfiability and Model Checking
Model checking can informally be described as the process of verifying a given property ψ
(often specified in LTL) against a given state system M . A typical model checker encodes
the system specification (usually, but not necessarily, in an abstract/meta programming
language) and the given property into a satisfiability problem of the form M ∧ ¬ψ. In
other words, the execution/traversal of the state space of the model of a system and
checking if ψ holds in all executions is reduced to the problem of determining if there
exists a particular run in which ψ does not hold. A well accepted observation in the model
checking community is that execution state spaces can become very large, and it is often
the case that violating runs are relatively small. Thus, it may be preferable to check only
executions of a bounded length k for violations of the property and gradually increase this
length. The process is repeated with increasing values of k (i.e., increasing the execution
lengths) until a counter-example is found or k becomes too large and makes the problem
difficult to solve given the available computing resources.
Note that there is a significant resemblance between model checking and CLTL satisfi-
ability when model itself is a CLTL constraint. This is evident from formula 5.3, where we
can see that the set of constraints enforceable on an artifact describe the model and the
CheckCondition describes the property. That is, the conjunction of the instantiation con-
straints, ACS, and the termination constraints describe fully the model. The requirement
that the CheckCondition is eventually met is introduced for a SAT solver to complete
the process of verification. Furthermore, if we limit the number of timesteps (sequences
of successive attribute assignments to an artifact) that a solver is allowed to consider, we
naturally arrive at the notion of bounded satisfiability or k-satisfiability.
Today, many modern model checkers have direct support for the specification and anal-
ysis of CLTL formulas, and thus they can act as k-satisfiability checkers for CLTL formulas.
If not readily available, support for the analysis of CLTL formulas can be introduced via
encodings. For example, Cunha has described an automated method of encoding LTL
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formulas as an Alloy model [45], and Rozier and Vardi [133] demonstrate a mapping in the
SPIN [80] and NuSMV [35] model checkers.
We believe that there are two main reasons why a model checker is best suited for the
task of verifying constraint systems: efficiency and ease of use. Modern model checkers
have seen tremendous research interest and provide an extremely efficient environment for
the types of constraints that are generated using DCML. They can leverage the strengths
of highly engineered SMT solvers that have direct support for reasoning over constraints
specified using typical business domains/operators such as integers and strings. However,
a much stronger argument in favour of relying on model checkers is that of accessibility.
Model checkers are often accompanied by various analysis tools that allow users to explore,
optimize, and augment their models in various ways. This is a perhaps a direct result of
the popularity of model checking and growth in the community using/supporting it. Thus,
reducing our problem to model checking allows us to exploit not only the efficiencies via
technical improvements in this field (SMTs, for example), but also to benefit from soft
improvements that will eventually help business users understand the results of a problem
in a complex policy system.
A note on Zot
In our examples and in the case study presented in this thesis we construct models in
the Zot model checker. Zot [124] is a model checking tool geared towards checking the
bounded satisfiability for metric CLTL formulas specified over decidable theories and has
now been available for more than seven years. Because of its simple LISP-like syntax and
the ease of interpreting violating runs (artifact histories or attribute assignments). The
main reasons we rely on Zot for constructing and verifying the examples presented in this
thesis is that Zot requires very little setup and initialization. Zot can be coupled with
several SMT solvers, and users of Zot can almost immediately begin writing assertions in
linear temporal logic and verifying them. Consider the following example of a constraint
system specified in the CLTL specification language:
(counter = 0) ∧G(counter = •counter + 1) ∧ F(counter > 5) (5.5)
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Intuitively we can see that the constraint system above does the same three things
that our SAT construction for verification does. It (a) initializes a variable called counter
with the value of zero, (b) requires that forever/globally (G) the value of the counter is
one higher than it was in the previous time step, and (c) that sometime in the future
(eventually or F) the value is greater than 5. This model is trivially satisfiable in 6 time
steps. The Zot model for this CLTL formula presented below is essentially a mirror image
of the formula:
(asdf:operate ’asdf:load−op ’ae2zot)
(use−package :trio−utils)
(define−tvar ’counter ∗int∗)
(defvar modelconstraints
(alw
([=]
(−V− counter)
([+] (past (−V− counter) 1) 1)
)
)
)
(defvar check condition
(
somf
([>] (−V− counter) 5)
)
)
(ae2zot:zot 10
(
&&
([=] (−V− counter) 0)
modelconstraints
check condition
)
:logic :QF UFLIA
)
Listing 5.1: A simple example of a Zot model of a CLTL formula. For simplicity we have
split it into three parts, namely modelconstraints, checkcondition and initialization.
The first two lines are are required to initialize Zot for CLTL satisfiability checking.
The only variable used in this example, counter, is defined in the third line. There is
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only one model constraint, and it requires that always (globally) the value of the counter
is one higher than it was one timestep in the past (note that arithmetic operators are
enclosed in square brackets and -V- is used to refer to the value of a variable). Like LISP,
the constraints are specified in prefix notation (that is, the operator is followed by its
operands). The check condition requires that sometime in the future (somf / F) the value
of the counter becomes greater than 5. Finally, when both the model and check conditions
are specified, Zot is run for a bound of 10 relying on the logic/theory of quantifier-free
linear integer arithmetic (QF UFLIA) to check whether there exists a run for which the
starting condition, the model constraint, and the check condition are all met.
The output of executing Zot paired with a solver (Z3) is straightforward as well. It is
essentially a run that complies with all the constraints. The output for the above model
is presented below:
−−−SAT−−−
LOOPEX = TRUE
I LOOP = 10
−−−−−− time 1 −−−−−−
COUNTER = 0
−−−−−− time 2 −−−−−−
COUNTER = 1
−−−−−− time 3 −−−−−−
COUNTER = 2
−−−−−− time 4 −−−−−−
COUNTER = 3
−−−−−− time 5 −−−−−−
COUNTER = 4
−−−−−− time 6 −−−−−−
COUNTER = 5
−−−−−− time 7 −−−−−−
COUNTER = 6
−−−−−− time 8 −−−−−−
COUNTER = 7
−−−−−− time 9 −−−−−−
COUNTER = 8
−−−−−− time 10 −−−−−−
∗∗LOOP∗∗
COUNTER = 9
−−−−−− end −−−−−−
Evaluation took:
0.131 seconds of real time
0.046800 seconds of total run time (0.031200 user, 0.015600 system)
35.88% CPU
118
287,516,718 processor cycles
758,440 bytes consed
Listing 5.2: Output of the Zot model showing a run in which counter exceeds the value of
5. In case of an unsatisfiabile formula Zot returns only with UNSAT.
Complete Example in Zot
Finally we conclude this section by converting the SAT problem in Formula 5.2 into a Zot
model. The Zot encoding for this model is once again straightforward and is given below:
(asdf:operate ’asdf:load−op ’eezot)
(use−package :trio−utils)
;Variables used: PAID, UNPAID, SHIPPED, PHI
(defvar Instantiation Constraints
(!! (−P− PHI))
)
(defvar Termination Constraints
(&&
;Previously PHI implies currently PHI
(alw ;Always or Globally
(
−>
(past (−P− PHI) 1) ;Previously PHI
(−P− PHI); Currently PHI
)
)
;PHI implies all attributes retain previous values
(alw
(
−>
(−P− PHI)
(&&
(|| (&& (−P− PAID) (past (−P− PAID) 1)) (&& (!! (−P− PAID)) (!! (past (−P− PAID) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− UNPAID) (past (−P− UNPAID) 1)) (&& (!! (−P− UNPAID)) (!! (past (−P− UNPAID) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− SHIPPED) (past (−P− SHIPPED) 1)) (&& (!! (−P− SHIPPED)) (!! (past (−P− SHIPPED) 1))))
)
)
)
)
)
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(defvar Model Constraints
(&&
(alw
(
−>
(&&
(−P− PAID)
(past (!! (−P− PAID)) 1)
)
(past (−P− UNPAID) 1)
)
)
(alw
(
−>
(&&
(−P− SHIPPED)
(past (!! (−P− SHIPPED)) 1)
)
(past (−P− PAID) 1)
)
)
(alw
(
−>
(somp (−P− SHIPPED))
(!! (−P− PHI))
)
)
)
)
(defvar check condition
(somf
(
&&
(−P− UNPAID)
(past (−P− SHIPPED) 1)
)
)
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)(eezot:zot 10
(
&&
Instantiation Constraints
Termination Constraints
Model Constraints
Check Condition
)
)
Listing 5.3: The complete Zot model for the example discussed in this section. For sim-
plicity each of the states is considered to be a boolean variable.
Observe that there is very little effort required to encode the entire constraint system
as a Zot model, as each connection between two states maps to an individual constraint
in the ACS (Model Constraints). This entire process is made convenient by the ability
to separate sub-formulas into different components and the direct availability of temporal
and logical operators in the Zot modelling language. A general purpose DCML diagram
to Zot model translator can easily be developed using the rules presented in Table 3.1 on
page 65.
5.2 Database Level Constraint Analysis
So far our discussion of verification of properties about constraint systems has focused on
a single artifact. Figure 5.3 depicts this situation, where multiple policy makers working
on different canvases (but still using the same variables) create a set of constraints visually.
Since each DCML canvas is associated with the same artifact type, these constraints can
be integrated together in an ACS (or equivalently a unified DCML diagram) and then
properties formulated about the artifact that warrant verification. Figure 5.4 depicts a
significant benefit of this approach of “unit testing” smaller lifecycles (or portions thereof)
embedded in various CCSs before integrating them into one large system of constraints.
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Figure 5.3: Different policy makers can work with the same definition of an artifact type to
specify different (sub)constraint diagrams. Because of the way these systems are designed
integration of constraints over a single artifact type (conjunction of constraints) poses no
challenge.
Figure 5.4: Different policy makers can work on individual components of the lifecycles of
artifacts. These lifecycles can be unit-tested and eventually be integrated as one unified
artifact constraint system.
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5.2.1 Defining Conflicts and Errors
Before we proceed to examining issues in database level constraint analysis (i.e., verification
of properties across several different artifact types), it is important that we define precisely
the term conflict as it pertains to an artifact’s lifecycle and the notion of check conditions
specified as properties in CLTL.
Let us consider a situation where the CheckCondition created by a user represents a
“desirable property” of an artifact. An example of a desirable property for our Invoice-
Processing artifact could be as follows: it should be possible for an invoice to get paid
(F(paid)). In other words, the constraints imposed by policy makers should allow for in-
voices to get paid. If however this CheckCondition is unsatisfiable when tested against
the constraint model, then the artifact lifecycle is over-constrained. Next consider the op-
posite situation, where the CheckCondition represents an “undesirable property,” such as
earlier example of an invoice that is marked as shipped and then subsequently marked as
unpaid. If this particular CheckCondition is satisfiable then we essentially have a situation
where the artifact lifecycle is under-constrained. Note that typically the notion of conflicts
(i.e., conflicting constraints enacted by error) most directly relates to the over-constrained
situation.
Although in both the above scenarios we posed a CLTL satisfiability problem, the
result (satisfiability or unsatisfiability) can lead us to very different conclusions about the
situation. This is because the the CheckCondition represents a condition similar to liveness
in the first situation and safety in the second. However, from this point onwards we will use
the terms policy level error and policy level conflict interchangeably to imply a situation
where one of the outcomes (satisfiable or unsatisfiable) on a CheckCondition is interpreted
as a negative result in terms of accomplishing a business objective.
5.2.2 Cross-artifact Reasoning
So far we have examined constraints specified on a single artifact and seen that canvas
constraint systems on the same artifact can be very easily brought together in an artifact
constraint system. However, when integrating artifact level constraint systems across mul-
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tiple base tables, several issues arise which make a direct conjunction of different artifact
constraint systems difficult. To provide a concrete example of the intricacies involved in the
verification of multi-artifact properties across the contents of the database, let us consider
three tables (two of which were previously introduced) and two new artifact definitions
that share the new common table:
CUSTOMER: (int CST ID, varchar NAME, varchar ADDRESS, . . ., varchar
ADDRESS COUNTRY, varchar CST TYPE)
INVOICE: (int INV ID, datetime LASTUPDATE, int CST ID, float AMOUNT,
bool SHIPPED, bool PAID, bool APPROVED, . . ., varchar NOTES)
SHIPMENT: (int SHIP REF, datetime LASTUPDATE, int CST ID,
datetime SHIPMETHOD, . . ., varchar NOTES)
To keep this example to the point, we shall omit drawing out individual states/diagrams
and only consider constraints in CLTL. Let us consider the following two artifacts and their
respective constraint systems. For further simplicity, each ACS has only one constraint in
it.
OrderShipment Artifiact: SELECT * FROM INVOICE NATURAL JOIN SHIPMENT
Constraint 1: If an invoice is worth less than $1000, do not use the
“overnight” shipping method.
Constraint 1 in CLTL : •(amount ≤ 1000 ∧ ¬shipped)⇒
¬(shipped ∧ shipmethod =“overnight”)
CustomerShipment Artifiact: SELECT * FROM CUSTOMER
NATURAL JOIN SHIPMENT
Constraint 2: Purchases for business customers must be
shipped overnight.
Constraint 2 in CLTL : (cst type =“Business”∧shipped)⇒
(shipmethod =“overnight”)
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This scenario is extremely simple and can be summarized as follows. A policy maker
from the Sales department has established a policy (constraint 1) on the OrderShipment
artifact that requires that low valued invoices, those valued less than $1000, must not
be shipped using the overnight shipping method. At the same time the customer service
department has a policy (constraint 2) on the CustomerShipment artifact that requires that
in order to receive high priority all business customers’ purchases must only be shipped
using the fastest method possible, which is overnight shipping. It is important to keep
in mind that although this is an extremely simple and concocted example, such a system
of requirements could emerge quite commonly in business situations. For example, either
constraint 1 or constraint 2 could have been present and a new policy directive may now
require that the other be implemented as well.
Error Detection and Virtual Artifacts
Observe that both these constraints are independently correct and enforceable. However,
the end result is that if a business customer purchases items of value less than $1,000,
there is no way for that order to be shipped. This implication will not be easily apparent,
since the two constraints are enforced over different combinations of tables (i.e., different
artifact types). A customer can have many shipment records as long as these records in
their lifecycle meet constraint 2, and, independently, orders can have associated shipment
records as long as these records in their own lifecycle meet constraint 1. However, it is only
when we examine all three entities (a shipping record for a given customer’s invoice) at the
same time and formulate a proper argument (in the form of a temporal property/assertion)
about them that we can reach meaningful conclusions about the interplay of shipping
different valued orders by business customers.
In other words, if we consider the question of whether there exists a way to ship a low
valued order placed by a business customer, across all three tables, the obvious unsatisfia-
bility result will follow. It is important to note that when examining only two tables at a
time we leave the attributes of the third table as free variables in any SAT problem. Since
the two-table at a time approach does not fully model the three-table situation at hand,
it is incapable of broader level reasoning regardless of the properties checked against it.
125
Figure 5.5: A database with 3 tables and three artifacts that join on the shaded variables
(A4, B1 and C1). Reasoning over artifacts AB and BC does not capture reasoning over the
broader model represented by the artifact ABC. This is because individually, models over
the artifacts AB and BC are agnostic to the attributes not represented in them. The shaded
variables represent a join condition, which in CLTL can be expressed as Join(A,B) :=
¬(•φS ∨ U(φE)) ⇒ [(•A = A) ∧ (A = B)]. A join condition between A and B requires
that if the artifact was not previously in φS and not going to φE in the next time step,
then the previous value of A is the present value of A and the present value of A is the
present value of B. Thus variables A and B are joined once at the first time step and will
perpetually retain the same value in all executions explored by the model checker.
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Consider the abstract visual depiction of this example presented in Figure 5.5. Observe
that constraints defined on the artifact AB are only applicable on the attributes of Tables
A and B, and similarly constraints defined on artifact BC have no direct bearing on the
attributes of Table A. From a verification perspective, properties and assertions written
against each of these artifacts pose the questions of whether there exists:
1. a pair of elements from table A and B that join on A4 and B1 and fail to comply
with a given assertion or;
2. a pair of elements from table B and C that join on B1 and C1 and fail to comply
with a given assertion.
Therefore, in situations where the reasoning is restricted to a given set of tables, the
model and property under question do not consider constraints that exist in other poten-
tially related artifacts. To address this issue, the user that is attempting to verify policies
has to ask the right question across several tables and essentially force the join condition
to be true: That is, for the given constraint model across all three tables, can there exist
tuples from tables A, B, and C, that simultaneously join on A4, B1 and C1 and also fail to
comply with a given assertion. By forcing the join, the user has extended the constraint
model (view ABC in Figure 5.5) and expanded the vocabulary (list of attributes) on which
assertions can be verified. We denote such views that represent artifacts or interactions
between artifacts that are not explicitly defined for policy purposes as virtual artifacts.
At this point it should be apparent that the quality of the conclusions drawn about the
behavior of a database system will be only as good as the quality of the individual policy
models and the questions posed against them. Furthermore, properties checked against
individual artifact constraint systems may provide significant insight to the individual
models, but these properties are not sufficient for reasoning over the entire database. To
properly reason across several artifacts, we have to examine all base tables that they refer
to and then introduce individual constraints and appropriate joins clauses for each of the
related pairs of artifacts.
Complicating the situation even further is the fact that when several artifact constraint
systems are integrated together over a database, there is no inherent notion of correctness
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derivable from the properties specified on the individual artifact constraint systems. For
example, in the given set of specifications that we just discussed, there was no assertion
mandating that all orders should be “shippable,” and it may very well be the case that
business users are required to have a minimum purchase of $1,000 or higher for their
order to be processed. Thus, it is impossible to know whether what seems like an obvious
problem in the integrated model (virtual artifact) is actually a cause for concern or just a
well thought out consequence. As a result we have to rely on the users/testers to provide an
encompassing definition of what should happen (definition of a broader/virtual artifact as
depicted in Figure 5.5 and desirable properties thereof) in the combined set of constraints
acting on a database.
5.2.3 Making Life Easier for the DBA
The main challenge in the integration of various artifact level constraint system is that
of developing global models (virtual artifacts) within a database, integrating individual
constraints applicable on these models, and then specifying properties to validate over
these sets of models and constraints. This problem shares several aspects of similarity
with that of unit-testing/system-testing in software engineering and compositional model
checking [37]. In all of the above cases, users accomplishing these tasks require a significant
understanding of the system that is being modeled (constrained). Here the word user
refers to a tester or an auditor of the database level constraints, and the expectations
from him/her are no different than a typical software tester. S/he must have a thorough
understanding of the system’s expected behaviour and be able to articulate possible avenues
of failure in the appropriate testing language (CLTL).
Although we claimed earlier that many policy makers can diagrammatically formulate
artifact lifecycles on their own, we now have to acknowledge that there will be far fewer
power users who will be assigned the role to verify global properties about the interplay of
artifact constraints systems. Additionally, these power users will have to report potential
problems back to the original policy makers and play an active role in mediating conflicts.
The most likely candidates for this job will be database administrators who need to be
aware of the intricacies involved in temporal reasoning and possess knowledge regarding
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the business intent of the entities and relationships present in the database.
Developing Database Level Constraint Models
Developing test cases against complex systems consisting of several components is clearly
not an easy task, and it may even be considered an art. Without trivializing the problem
we can see that there are many immediate directions that a DBA can follow in verifying
properties about the interacting lifecycles of various artifacts.
In most situations, the source of contention will invariably be the data that is shared
among several artifacts. Clearly if a relational schema has clusters of unrelated tables, then
it stands to reason that the constraints in one isolated set of tables should not interfere
with another. As the example presented in Figure 5.5 showed, joins across tables in the
artifacts definition typically leads to the sharing of underlying data across many different
artifact definitions. In the case of Figure 5.5, a broader model (virtual artifact ABC) had
to be defined so that it encompasses both artifacts and is capable of expressing (unifying)
constraints on both artifacts and simultaneously reasoning over them.
Unfortunately, there is no formal algorithm that can generate global models that will
be of interest to a given tester. Carefully sifting through combinations of smaller systems
that can be progressively integrated is a task left to the judgement of the DBA.
Development and Verification of Complex Properties
Let us say that a DBA/tester is able to identify a situation like the one presented in Figure
5.5 and that a model that encompasses multiple artifact constraint systems is readily
available. The discovery of conflicts still requires that appropriate properties be formulated
against this model. In many situations these properties can be developed by looking at
system specifications. Consider, in light of our running example, the emergence of an
overarching requirement of the model (somewhat similar to a liveness property), requiring
that, for all types of customers and amounts, an order should be able to eventually reach
the shipped state. Since this requirement cannot be met in our example, we have a conflict.
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Note that this is the first time we have introduced a quantifier (universal quantification
over the domain of customer types and amounts) in our scope of reasoning. In the next
chapter we go into greater detail about the implications of having a quantifier-free con-
straint specification language and our reasoning for choosing the particular fragment that
we have. For now we only point out that these properties that a tester/auditor may want
to verify need not be in the same quantifier-free fragment of LTL that we proposed for
constraint diagrams. In fact, the tester can rely on as much expressivity as the situation
requires. For our constraint system specified over finite domains, we can repeatedly ask
a solver for every combination (cross product) of types of customers and amounts in the
invoice to identify runs where the order is shipped. Although this is not a very efficient
approach, we will invariably encounter the situation in which a business customer orders
goods of less than $1,000, leading to an unsatisfiability/unreachability condition for the
shipped state. In practice, the knowledge about the underlying domains and relevant the-
ories help us avoid exhaustive enumeration. Knowledge about the theory of linear integer
arithmetic can lead us to conclude (as it would for a programmer testing a piece of code)
that testing only boundary conditions ($999, $1000 and $1001) is sufficient to make sound
conclusions.
The knowledge about domains is of significance during this stage. We have already
assumed that the model tester (DBA) is a highly capable person. Thus, it stands to
reason that s/he should be free to introduce additional domain knowledge to augment or
further restrict the model if it leads to better (faster or more efficient) reasoning. For
example, instead of enumerating over all possible strings, a DBA can make his/her life
easier and restrict enumeration of shipping methods and customer types over a short list
of possibilities defined either in the constraint system itself or available from within the
database. By giving the tester utmost flexibility (much more than the designers of the
canvas constraint systems had), we can certainly provide a bigger and better arsenal of
tools for him/her to exploit. However the flip side of this is that it expands the scope of
responsibilities, making the job of the DBA even harder when there are no set criteria for
correctness.
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5.3 Summary and Related Work
In the previous chapter we looked at how a given a set of constraints in DCML can be en-
forced. In addition, we examined several issues pertaining to the feasibility of enforcement.
In contrast, this chapter made the case that developing a “correct” system of constraints
at either the artifact level or the database level is an extremely challenging task. Although
empowering business users to create constraint diagrams on their own is a noble idea and
reduces the burden on a single authority to monitor/manage a database, it is certainly not
without its perils. We observed that even though the developed constraints will always
be enforceable, the end result of integrating many constraints and enforcing them can be
the introduction of latent problems that may need to be identified before implementation.
Thus, we distinguished the notions of enforcement and correctness and brought forward
the idea of testing a system of constraints.
Underneath the infrastructure for reasoning that we presented is a very simple obser-
vation: A database in its purest form is a set of unrestricted tuples. It is essentially a
“universal model,” as described by Rozier and Vardi [133], where tuples can “move” or
switch between any arbitrary values as time progresses. It is only when we start assign-
ing meaning to the different attributes, give them domains, give interpretations to joins
among these tuples, add constraints (primary key, foreign key, domain constraints, asser-
tions, checks etc.) that we start to build a scenario that restricts the universal model to
suit a particular situation. Our approach augments a database with additional constraints
specified in CLTL that are applicable over the lifecycle of a single unique combination of
such tuples.
A consequence of our choice to use CLTL to specify constraint systems is that the prob-
lem of verification of such systems is essentially reduced to CLTL satisfiability and model
checking. Several surveys and text books on model checking have been published, and it
would be a digression to discuss them. In addition to the work done with Rozier, Vardi has
on two different occasions pointed out the similarities between the research conducted in the
areas of satisfiability and model checking and the connections therein to database systems.
He demonstrated that CSP/SAT problems can be reduced to several problems in query
analysis and vice-versa [166]. Later he noted that many database-centric problems, such
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as serializability of transactions, can be framed as model checking problems [167]. Several
other authors have also presented work modeling the behaviour of concurrently running
transactions and testing their behaviour [9, 53]. Note that our foremost goals were that
of interpreting workflows, constraint specification, and enforcement in database systems.
However the additional infrastructure of verification through model checking comes as an
additional benefit that results from our choice of language to develop constraint systems.
The idea of using model checking (and reasoning over state systems in general) to
abstractly identify inconsistencies in business processes has also been explored several times
[121, 158, 56, 12]. Our work is similar and relies on a establishing a mapping between
workflows and enforceable constraint systems while simultaneously enabling verification
over these constraint systems. Most importantly, our approach distinguishes itself by being
concrete, and attempts to reason at the level of individual database level rows instead of
abstractly defined business objects.
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Chapter 6
Usability, Limitations and Extensions
In this chapter we revisit the goals we set in the introduction and examine several unan-
swered questions about the usability, limitations, and extensibility of our proposed tech-
nique for enforcement and static reasoning with constraints. We demonstrate that policy
makers can extend DCML to suit their particular needs and introduce a broad range of
constraints to transfer their business level workflows over to a database. Recall that in
Chapter 3 we presented a limited number of constraints with different notations (arrow
ends) to define DCML (Table 3.1 on page 65). In this chapter we will make the case for
an extended situation-specific DCML toolkit that can be customized for users attempting
to enforce various types of policies in relational database systems.
There is a fine balance between extensibility and usability that is often determined by
the limitations of a complete system. In our case the three topics are closely related by
the logical formulation of our solution. This chapter takes a closer look at this relationship
and highlights some important observations. As was the case in the previous chapter, we
take a broad meaning of the word “user” and consider the notion of usability from both a
policy creation/visualization and policy testing/management perspective.
This chapter is divided into four sections. In Section 6.1 we take a closer look at the key
determinants of expressivity of constraints in our proposed framework. We examine the
impact of the expressivity of the underlying query language used to define artifact types
(SQL) and the expressivity of the language used to describe constraints over artifacts
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(CLTL). In addition we discuss how the interplay between these two imposes limitations
and impacts the overall usability of an LTL-based visual constraint modeling language such
as DCML. In Section 6.2 we consider three possible extensions of DCML. These extensions
add a significant amount of expressivity in the types of constraints that can be enforced on
artifacts while maintaining the overall usability of DCML. In Section 6.3 we take a more
formal look at workflow languages and demonstrate that DCML (and, more generally,
LTL) is sufficiently expressive to capture the control flow characteristics of most modern
workflow languages. We rely on the work done by van Der Aalst et al. [163] to characterize
the features present in workflow languages as “patterns.” It is shown that most workflow
patterns (specifically those relevant to a single class of objects, i.e., a single artifact type)
can be mirrored in an LTL- based visual constraint modeling language such as DCML.
Finally, Section 6.4 summarizes and concludes this chapter.
6.1 On Usability and Complexity
The reader familiar with model checking and the relationship between SQL queries and
first order logic will have observed that there are three major determinants of complexity
that impact how efficiently polices can be enforced and if they can be statically (and
meaningfully) verified. They are as follows:
• the expressiveness of the view (query) that defines an artifact type,
• the complexity of the artifact constraint system, and
• the complexity of the check condition that requires verification.
Chapter 4 examined issues pertaining to the complexity of the artifact definition and
the impact of the types/frequency/coverage of updates issued against the database on
efficiency in constraint enforcement. It analyzed the compromise between storage space
and computational efficiency that the database administrators may have to face. The
problems related to the efficient monitoring of a database for LTL constraint enforcement
are well known in the database community in the context of triggers and materialized view
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Figure 6.1: Restricting the state space of n-tuples defined over a database requires that
we analyze the implications of how these tuples are derived. For example, if the query
defining the view is unsatisfiable the entire constraint system is essentially meaningless. For
arbitrary unrestricted queries, determining satisfiability is well known to be undecidable.
Similarly, when sufficiently expressive views are utilized, reasoning over constraints that
cannot be mapped back onto the physical contents of the database is severely impeded.
Even though such constraints may be enforceable, they provide limited knowledge about
the possible behaviour contents of a database.
maintenance. Chapter 5 addressed the problem of verification of properties over artifacts
that are subject to a set of complex constraints. However, there remain several questions
regarding the expressiveness of the artifact type (view) definition language (i.e., SQL), the
expressiveness of the constraint specification language (i.e., CLTL), and how they impact
our ability to gain meaningful insight about the constraint systems that have yet to be
addressed.
Figure 6.1 captures many of the issues that emerge because of the mapping from the
artifact as a uniquely identifiable n-tuple to the contents of the database over which it is
defined. The primary purpose of having this layer of indirection is to provide each policy
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maker with a clean snapshot of a specific class of business objects (artifact type) scattered
in different tables. The benefits of doing so (primarily simplification and distribution of
roles and responsibilities) have been repeatedly stressed in this thesis. However, we need
to address the fact that ill-defined views (artifact types) can lead to significant difficulties
(discussed shortly hereafter) in verifying properties about ill defined artifacts.
Most of the examples of artifact types presented in this thesis have been simple, every-
day businesses objects, such as invoices, sales records, etc. The contents of such artifacts
are directly stored in the database and do not require any operations (manipulations or
modifications) to be captured in a view. The reader familiar with first order logic and
relational algebra will recognize that such views are defined using conjunctive SPJ (Select-
Project-Join) queries and are also referred to in the literature as existential queries. Their
key advantage is that they make the connection between existence/counter-example gen-
eration much easier to be understood. This is due to the fact that, when considering
SPJ-based artifact types, a direct connection to constituent rows is available to explain the
history of artifacts.
It is generally accepted that many “typical business records” can be captured using
SPJ views. In this thesis we will not delve into why SPJ views are technically much eas-
ier to reason with than more expressive views. The reader is however directed to prior
classical work that have done substantial analysis on the satisfiability and decidability of
classes of queries under varying assumptions (e.g., [94]). However, we argue that technical
limitations aside, there are major non-technical limitations imposed by the use of com-
plex views to define artifacts, specify constraints over them and interpret the meaning of
those constraints for policy makers. We will demonstrate that, in the context of policy
verification, restricting artifact definitions to conjunctive queries (or the related notion of
updatable views) provides the perfect balance of usability and complexity for the class of
business level constraints we have targeted in our work.
6.1.1 Meaningful Constraints over Complex Views
To illustrate the “meaningfulness” of constraints over complex views, let us consider Figure
6.1 and an artifact that contains the aggregate function SUM() over an integer attribute
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in a database table. One can argue that we have gone beyond the capabilities of first-order
logic by using aggregate functions, but it is important to note that we have only done
so in defining the artifact. Reasoning about the possible values this sum can take is still
practical.
It is important to recognize that a constraint on the sum of a set of values does not
constrain any of the individual values of items in a set. For example, if the sum of a set of
values is required to be less than zero, the set itself is not restricted in any way and can
contain any number of positive and negative values, provided they collectively add up to
an amount less than zero. For the purposes of verification, constraints specified over such
derived attributes will be meaningless and have no bearing on how the actual data values of
a single artifact behave. Nonetheless, even though we lose the strong connection between
a database state space and the artifact state space when going beyond conjunctive/SPJ
queries we can (a) still enforce constraints on complex artifacts and (b) perform some
reasoning at the level of the artifact.
6.1.2 Complex Functions and Constraints over Sets
However there is a big caveat here: through the use of non-trivial functions, we also lose our
ability to reason across constraint systems. For instance, consider the case where one policy
maker in one constraint system requires that all individual values for a given attribute in
a table will forever be less than zero and another policy maker in a different constraint
system (enacting constraints on a different but related artifact type) requires that the
aggregate of the same values must forever be greater than zero. Since an off-the-shelf SAT
solver / model checker has no knowledge about the theory of sums over unbounded sets, it
is impossible to correctly verify whether a set of values can satisfy both these constraints.
In other words, in the current framework we cannot integrate these two constraint systems
without bounding the set size and encoding the equivalent finite problem in a SAT solver.
Verification in such situations can thus only be accomplished when we have available
proper frameworks (theories) for reasoning with the appropriate functions. This, of course,
also includes the infrastructure to model temporal properties over arbitrary sets of variables
and not just a single tuple. In addition to summation, user-programmed functions pose
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the same problem. If the model checker is augmented to reason over such functions, then
clearly the query language to define artifacts can be also extended. That will, in turn, allow
us to formulate properties over systems that interact with each other through constraints
on the underlying data. However, without this additional infrastructure, complex set-
oriented functions in the constraint systems on their own will have limited usability (i.e.,
only at the level of an artifact) and in general be unable to provide guarantees to testers
of a system attempting to bring together different constraint systems.
6.1.3 A Case for Reduced Complexity
A much stronger argument in favour of avoiding arbitrary complexity lies in the exami-
nation of how typical business workflows and process models are organized and why the
proposed class of logic/constraints is ideal to support them. When specifying CLTL con-
straints over SPJ views, we have (i) restricted ourselves to a single existential quantifier
in first order logic (i.e., verification questions that ask whether there can exist an illegal
sequence of history entries for a single object) and (ii) only allowed the use of temporal
operators over atomic propositions in DCML.
Note that with regards to point (i), the lack of the universal quantifier restricts us
to reason over the existence of a single artifact (or virtual artifact) in isolation. This is
convenient for users because most policy situations emerging from workflows consider only
the lifecycle of single class of objects. In other words, since all instances of a workflow
follow the same set of rules, finding one instance that violates those rules is sufficient to
discover an error.
Point (ii) above relates to the fact that arbitrary use of temporal and arithmetic opera-
tors within propositions is avoided in our constraint system construction. When defining a
particular state, the object is “frozen” to its “current” values. For example, using DCML
a constraint such as •(x < y) can be generated because at a particular point in time we
can compare attributes of an artifact using the < operator and refer back to that state
condition being met as part of a state transition. That is, a policy designer can define a
state where the current value of x is less than the current value of y and refer back to this
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state implicitly when embedding restrictions in LTL. However, given the way we have de-
fined DCML, a state itself cannot be defined by arbitrarily using temporal and arithmetic
operators, e.g., (•x < y) cannot be defined. Thus, a state in which the previous value
of x was less than some prior value of y cannot be modeled by the visual construction
notation. Consequently, one can argue that from a technical standpoint some expressivity
and flexibility in reasoning (well within the capabilities of a model checker as exhibited by
Listing 5.2 on page 118) is perhaps unnecessarily lost.
We believe that this “lost expressivity” provides enormous usability for the users of such
a policy management framework. The biggest gain in usability comes from the fact that
canvas constraint systems become very closely related (visually) to path-oriented workflows
rather than exotic automata. “States” directly relate to stages in a business process, and
these stages are themselves identifiable based on the properties of a business object. The
most appropriate real-world analogy to this situation is that of an assembly line, where
a worker familiar with the process can look at a widget (and the widget alone) at any
time and determine what stage of the assembly process it is in. This restriction precludes
potentially some exotic class of business processes that have loops in them and the number
of times an object has been through a specific loop is of significance for future decision
making. Our work, however, focuses on the more common situation: by looking at an
object’s attributes alone, a policy designer is able to identify what stage of the workflow
it is in. Consequently by not providing the additional expressivity, we ensure that the
mapping from business level workflow states to artifact states is straightforward and easy
to accomplish for the most common class of workflows. In the next section we discuss
how the overall expressiveness of systems of DCML constraints can be increased on a
situation-specific basis.
6.2 Enhanced Constraint Systems
6.2.1 Extending the DCML Toolkit
The previous sections should lead the reader to appreciate that there are indeed many
issues that lie at the intersection of usability and technical limitations in our proposal. By
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Figure 6.2: An example of a workflow constraint that mandates, in addition to the exit
restriction, that the user updating the object (causing it to go from State A to State B)
must belong to specified user group.
the end of this chapter, we will be able to summarize them and provide a clearer description
of the scope of features that can be supported and the specific limitations they introduce.
To illustrate the broader point and at the same time strengthen our proposed model, we
now present what we consider “usable extensions” of DCML, which provide a significantly
increased array of policy enforcing/modelling tools accompanied by limited compromise in
usability. We focus on three such extensions, and in each case we discuss the benefits and
consequences of providing the additional facility to policy makers.
6.2.2 Metadata and Temporal Access Control
So far we have focused on enacting and reasoning over policies on artifacts whose contents
are directly available in the underlying tables of a database. However additional metadata
regarding individual objects in a database may be useful for policy making. Most database
systems can store, alongside the history of an artifact, additional details such as the user
name, user group, role, and purpose of the transaction that initiated the change in an
artifact. The instrumentation to store this metadata alongside artifacts can easily be
embedded in the underlying triggers that maintain the artifact history. The definition of
the relevant view/artifact/object history in such situations can be visualized as follows:
ObjectHistory = (ID, timestamp,A1, A2, . . . , AN , user, usergroup, txntype,
application, . . . , purpose)
The additional attributes user, usergroup, etc. represent metadata from the event
acting on the object. Transactional metadata is often of great value to auditors, and many
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business processes rely on knowledge about users, purposes, and types of transaction to
move these processes forward in different directions. Consequently, many classes of business
policies are specifically related to not only the contents of an artifact before and after an
update, but also to the user or the application committing that change (Figure 6.2). Other
examples of such policies include specifications that require “expense claims of over $50 in
value must be approved by the user named Wendy” or “if an invoice is being moved from
the not shipped state to the shipped state, then the change must have been initiated by a
user in the logistics user group.”
Process-oriented temporal access control restrictions are generally very difficult to
model in languages that are not state oriented. However, if artifacts’ histories were to
encapsulate access control events as part of their definitions, then we can easily define
states based on conditions associated with this additional metadata. Consequently, we
could integrate process-centric, temporal access control models with business process mod-
els, and they could be validated/tested within the same constraint system.
Furthermore, within the framework of policy/artifact constraint systems, we can also
accommodate a mix of temporal and non-temporal access control policy models. Appli-
cations of such systems include situations where different paths are taken in the lifecycle
of an object based on the privileges of certain individual users. Once an object takes a
particular path at such a juncture, it need no longer be restricted by the initial access
control constraint. For example, this could be applied when a critical decision needs to
be taken by a user who has an elevated access control privilege specific to that process
(such as a supervisor), but subsequent to this decision the process need not be restricted
in terms of access control. Similarly, access control event chaining can be accomplished
in a manner similar to generalization of state-oriented constraints, allowing us to specify
complex conditional temporal access control constraints, such as “expense claims can only
be paid out by employees in the finance department, if they have previously been approved
by an employee of the administration department.”
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Limitations
Implementing temporal access constraints requires very little effort in addition to augment-
ing definitions of artifacts to store historical metadata. Once the triggers that maintain
histories of artifacts are modified, additional metadata can be treated as regular attributes
to define states and enact policies. Thus, access control restrictions are rephrased as data
integrity restrictions constraining how the artifact can evolve.
However, there is a major caveat for policy makers attempting to reason over such
constraint systems. This business process level reasoning does not eliminate the underlying
access control layers present in the database server and the operating system. That is, if
an independent access control mechanism within the database engine explicitly rejects a
modification, then whether a constraint system allows it or not becomes irrelevant. The
temporal access control restrictions within a constraint system essentially augment the
access control rules already present, and a transaction is required to pass both levels of
constraints. The above fact implies that the job of the DBA is made more challenging when
verifying properties about constraint systems involving access control. More specifically,
the DBA must also incorporate the behaviour of the database and operating system level
access control systems.
Fortunately, in most modern database systems the access control layer is relatively sim-
ple to model. It primarily consists of GRANT/DENY statements for INSERT, UPDATE,
and DELETE operations on tables for specific users and group. The implications of each
of these conditions has to be integrated with the constraint systems. For example, if a
particular user does not have permission to modify rows from a particular table, this re-
striction must be appropriately transferred as a CLTL restriction on the appropriate views
involving the table in question. In case of INSERT and DELETE permissions, the corre-
sponding restrictions will be modelled by restricting φS(A) and/or never entering φE, if the
transaction is initiated by a certain user/usergroup. In case of UPDATE, we will require
a global assertion (G) mandating that a specific user is unable to modify the artifact.
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Figure 6.3: An example of a workflow level constraint to enforce an enhanced exit restriction
that requires that the change taking an artifact from state A to state B must take place
within 7 days.
v
Read access to the database
It is also important to remind the reader that our focus is restricted to maintaining integrity
only; privacy restrictions are not supported. This is in contrast to general-purpose access
control, which deals with restricting both the ability to modify data and the ability to read
data. Since read requests generally do not impact objects/workflows and (in the classical
sense) cannot violate integrity constraints, we do not address this topic.
However, we note that if a database system is “logging access requests,” i.e. a database
is maintaining a history of outcomes to read/write permissions requests handled by the
underlying access control engine, then implementing temporal restrictions based on a se-
quence of reads/writes is plausible. A business scenario that could justify such a feature is
one that requires separation of duties: “if a user has accessed certain parts of the database
or made certain modifications in the past, deny the current access request.”
6.2.3 Metric Temporal Logics
Metric Temporal Logics (MTL) or real-time logics are natural extensions of temporal logic
where operators are enhanced to include timed restrictions (Figure 6.3). Whereas LTL re-
ferred to time implicitly (previously, next, etc.), MTL allows for precisely timed conditions
(within some t time periods). A business specification requiring that “a payment must be
made within 7 days of approval” is one that lends itself to be modeled in metric temporal
logic. Extended operators in such logics operate on a well-defined notion of the domain
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of time. MTL operators also look similar to LTL operators, for example x and •x are
typically interpreted as sometime in the past x time units and exactly x time units ago,
respectively.
However unlike propositional temporal logic and CLTL, there are many different metric
temporal logics that have been proposed to cater for very specific situations. For example,
in metric interval temporal logic (MITL) the operator [x,y] can be used to specify an
interval of time in the past (between x and y time units in the past) in which a condition
must hold true. Similarly MITL can be further extended to include windowed periodicity,
and the MPITL operator [x,y,z] can be used to specify that a condition must hold true
for a time period of y − x starting at every zth time period in the past. The business
use cases for such complex metric temporal logics are rare. Even though in our search
for examples we did not encounter workflows that specifically employed complex metric
logics, we can hypothesise that they do manifest themselves in situations where calendar-
style time periods need to be identified. For example, a business may want to identify a
recurring set of dates in the future to hold meetings, such as the 27th day of every third
month unless it falls on a Sunday. Similarly a business may conduct an inventory audit
during the second last week of every quarter, and thus specific procedures for introducing
new inventory might need to be followed during that time period. Disclosure rules during
the “quiet” period before sensitive financial information is released is another example of a
recurring business situation that might require different database-level rules to be enforced.
One can easily imagine many more examples.
Fortunately, the problem of satisfiability for many fragments of metric temporal logic
is no more difficult than the satisfiability of non-metric temporal logic. The key lies in
recognizing that a metric operator over k-time periods can be encoded as k-nested applica-
tions of non-metric temporal operators. Similarly, if time is treated as a persistent integer
t (as is the case in many computer systems), one can encode CLTL formulas that explicitly
refer to t to represent MTL formulas. For a comprehensive discussion of these encodings,
the reader is directed to the very recently published works of Pradella et al., in which
they describe how an existing bounded model checker / SAT solver can be used check the
bounded satisfiability of MTL formulas [125, 126]1. For a recent survey summarizing the
1Pradella et al. are also the authors of the Zot BMTL solving toolkit [124]
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known decidability and satisfiability results for various fragments of MTL, the reader is
directed to the work of Ouaknine et al. [118].
Moving into the Future
Although the infrastructure of metric temporal logic fits nicely into the notion of specifi-
cation and verification of constraints, the restrictions imposed by the original setup still
hold. Notably, constraint specification must be restricted to past metric temporal oper-
ators only. This is to avoid real-time constraints that are un-enforceable, for example,
a situation where “something must happen within x time units into the future” and the
database system just sits idle/oﬄine causing a trivial violation through the passage of
time. Future metric operators can of course again be used during verification to specify
conditions that need to be tested against a system of enforceable constraints specified on
the past.
6.2.4 Constraint Systems for Auditing Only
Our final application is auditing in place of constraint enforcement. This is a trivial
application having two major benefits. It imposes minimal transactional overhead (i.e., no
run-time monitoring costs in addition to keeping an audit log, which most mission critical
processes do anyway) and requires extremely little effort to implement by internal/external
auditors. DBAs, programmers, and all users/applications can continue to interact with the
database under any other constraint regime. However, periodically a copy of a database
(that contains a history of all artifacts) is taken and run against various process-centric
constraint systems to check for any violations in the past.
In other words, all that is done is to check periodically if constraint violations have
already occurred or not. By doing so, violations are not prevented and neither is there a
proof that they can never happen, but an organization can, in theory, periodically check
its current database for compliance and remedy the situation.
In addition to the above, this process can be made part of a formal audit by an external
compliance officer. The application greatly simplifies the actual job of auditing violations.
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Instead of having to write complex temporal queries over the database schema to check
if specific types of violation occurred, these queries can be built visually using the state-
to-state constraint mapping notation that we have presented. Thus, we propose that
constraint systems can also be used as a stand-alone query building and database auditing
tool.
6.3 Converting Workflows into Constraint Systems
So far, we have asserted the ability of a CLTL based constraint language, such as DCML
(or a variant thereof), to capture the control flow semantics of a large class of business
processes. In this section we analyze a taxonomy of common control flow constructs found
in workflow languages and show how their behaviour can be emulated in CLTL. Thus, we
demonstrate that the features present in most modern workflow languages can be easily
accommodated in our proposed LTL-based constraint modeling language.
The definitive work on analyzing common “patterns” exhibited in workflows was done
by Van Der Aalst et al. [163], who identified 20 patterns pertaining to the flow of control
present in many commonly used workflow languages. Since the publication of their work,
these patterns have become the gold standard by which workflow languages (visual or
lexical) are compared. The reader familiar with LTL and these patterns will be well aware
that LTL is a far richer specification language than visual workflows and may find the
following reductions trivial. In the subsequent discussion we will refer to these patterns by
their names and abbreviations (P1 through P20 [163]).
6.3.1 Basic Control Flow Patterns
Pattern P1 (sequence) requires that a task is completed before another startsm and we have
already discussed two variants of this pattern in our examples (exit and entry restrictions
in Table 3.1 on page 65). Patterns P2 (parallel split), P4 (exclusive choice), P6 (multiple
choice)m and P16 (deferred choice) are essentially dependencies between 1 state and N
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Figure 6.4: A one-to-n pattern specified in DCML where n=3. The constraint can define
a dependency between the state X in the previous timestamp and the presence in any/all
of A, B, and/or C in the next timestamp.
other states as depicted in Figure 6.4. For parallel split, we can interpret the constraint as
the LTL formula as:
•X ⇒ A ∧B ∧ C (6.1)
Exclusive choice (P4) from X to A, B, or C but not any two of them together can be
described in LTL as follows:
•X ⇒ (A ∧ ¬B ∧ ¬C) ∨ (¬A ∧B ∧ ¬C) ∨ (¬A ∧ ¬B ∧ C) (6.2)
Similarly, multiple choice (P6) is essentially any combination of A, B, and C in the post-
condition and equivalent to exit-restrictions in DCML. Deferred choice (P16) is intended to
ensure that the process moves on in other respects and the choice between any combination
of A, B, and/or C is not made immediately. Since our framework allows an artifact/process
to be in multiple states at one time, the object can stay in state X and otherwise progress
outside the choice framework of any multi-choice patterns.
Note that some workflow languages can implicitly require that all states/stages be
mutually exclusive. Constraints on state transitions in such cases can be accommodated
by ensuring that formulas are interpreted slightly differently. The correct LTL equivalent
of such workflows languages would be •precondition ⇒ ¬precondition ∧ postcondition,
ensuring that the process moves out of a state when a “choice” at a workflow decision
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Figure 6.5: A generic n-to-one pattern where n=3. The diagram is a mirror of Figure 6.4.
The notation can be introduced in DCML to represent constraints of the type specified in
Equations 6.1 or 6.2.
point is made. Also note that the examples above (Equations 6.1 and 6.2) only have three
“exit states” or choices and that it is trivial to extend them to choices between n-states.
Pattern P17 (interleaved parallel routing) is essentially a special case of ordering several
tasks, where some can be run in parallel but others need to be completed sequentially.
Once again P17 can be accommodated by chaining together several pre-condition implies
post-condition style LTL restrictions.
Patterns P3 (synchronization), P5 (simple merge), P7 (synchronization merge), and
P8 (multiple merge) are essentially n-to-one constraints in LTL (depicted in Figure 6.5).
These can be captured in LTL by simply rearranging the post-conditions and pre-conditions
described earlier. For example, a simple merge can be described as:
X ⇒ •(A ∧B ∧ C) (6.3)
The purpose of different types of synchronization patterns is to accommodate various
choice patterns described earlier and to model different wait/proceed requirements. Pattern
P9 (discriminator) is closely related to sync/merge patterns, in that it allows workflows to
proceed further after any single pre-condition is met. It too is simply modeled by meeting
any of the conditions through n OR-clauses.
Pattern P10 (arbitrary cycles) is directly supported because an artifact can cycle back
and forth between any two states. In the characterization of Van Der Aalst et al. the issue
of bounds in such cycles is not addressed. As mentioned in Section 6.1.3, our modelling
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language can be extended to support bounded loops and counters via the use of temporal
operators in state definitions. However, the standard DCML presented in Chapter 3 only
allows for cycles between states without bounding the number of such cycles.
Pattern P11 (explicit/implicit termination) is supported as well. Either an artifact can
transition to φ explicitly (from potentially any other state) or simply forever remain in a
state that the policy designers can designate as a terminating/archival state. The support
for patterns P19 (cancel task) and P20 (cancel case) can also be described in a similar
fashion, because any particular branch in the constraint system taken by an object can
be abandoned (i.e., does not proceed further) or cancelled (explicitly terminated) at any
time. That is, an object can reach a conclusion for every split/choice made or not progress
towards any particular path taken, thereby effectively cancelling the subtask in a larger
workflow.
Pattern P18 (milestone) is a check condition in workflows that forms a checkpoint for
further processing, ensuring that regardless of the prior workflow behaviour, the condition
specified in the milestone should be met before proceeding further (see Figure 3.14 on page
76 for an example). The term “milestone” in workflow patterns is used synonymously with
a “condition,” and thus any state in a constraint diagram directly represents a milestone.
6.3.2 Multiple Instance (MI) Patterns
In the characterization of workflows proposed by Van Der Aalst et al., there are four
patterns that pertain to multiple instances: P12 (without synchronization), P13 (with a
priori design-time knowledge), P14 (with a priori run-time knowledge), P15 (without a
priori run-time knowledge). Since the intent of these patterns was to capture semantics
where the independent processes interact (can be spawned and joined) within a single
workflow, it is difficult to associate them directly with constructs in our language, which is
aimed directly at restricting the lifecycle of a single artifact type. We do, however, argue
that when these patterns are interpreted in a broader sense (as opposed to just threads of
execution), many of these patterns are applicable in constraint systems.
Foremost, we note that even though a constraint system describes lifecycles of arti-
facts, many different artifacts can concurrently trace different parts of this lifecycle. So if
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Pattern Name Supported
P1 Sequence Yes
P2 Parallel Split Yes
P3 Synchronization Yes
P4 Exclusive Choice Yes
P5 Simple Merge Yes
P6 Multi-Choice Yes
P7 Structured Synchronizing Merge Yes
P8 Multi-Merge Yes
P9 Structured Discriminator Yes
P10 Arbitrary Cycles Yes
P11 Implicit Termination Yes
P12 Multiple Instances without Synchronization Yes*
P13 Multiple Instances with a Priori Design-Time Knowledge Yes*
P14 Multiple Instances with a Priori Run-Time Knowledge No*
P15 Multiple Instances without a Priori Run-Time Knowledge No*
P16 Deferred Choice Yes
P17 Interleaved Parallel Routing Yes
P18 Milestone Yes
P19 Cancel Task Yes**
P20 Cancel Case Yes
Table 6.1: A summary of the capabilities of our model under the workflow patterns frame-
work as proposed by Van Der Aalst et al. [163]. *P12-P15 have to be interpreted in the
non-traditional sense to be applicable. **P19 is interpreted as a task within the same
workflow/canvas
an artifact contains within it n sub-artifacts, we could potentially model the lifecycle of
individual interactions of these n objects.
In our examples of invoices and sales orders, these lifecycles were completely indepen-
dent and could not “communicate” with each other (e.g., one invoice could not “share
variables” with another, as done by concurrently running threads). Thus, on the surface
it may seem as if multiple instance patterns cannot be supported. However, as mentioned
above, we can broaden the description of an artifact by including within the definition
interactions between a bounded number of similar process-oriented concepts. For example,
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Figure 6.6: Visual notation (lines, boxes, etc.) serve as templates for various LTL based
control flow restrictions in a workflow. For example, the above newly introduced arrow
could be interpreted as an LTL restriction specifying that “A implies always in the past B”
with its logical interpretation as A⇒ B. Such constraints cannot be modelled in visual
workflow languages used in everyday business situations and thus require more intimate
knowledge of LTL on the part of policy makers.
we can model “pairs of invoices” as artifacts (via a self join) and thus argue that with a pri-
ori knowledge about the number/type of concurrent sub-processes (n=2 when examining
all pairs), we can construct complex workflows that model interactions between multiple
same-type artifacts.
Building a constraint system for these oddly interacting artifacts is non-trivial, but
the end result does somewhat conform to the notion of reasoning with multiple instances
with a priori design time knowledge. We still cannot “spawn” tasks within workflows in
the traditional sense, since that would require taking actions on the database, and, as
discussed earlier, that functionality is beyond the scope of this work. Thus, we argue that
in some circumstances we can accomplish a priori reasoning over multiple instances. We
also note that ours is not the first instance where these patterns have to be interpreted
such that they can be accommodated over a proposed modeling language. Prior work has
had to make similar interpretations on what such MI interactions would mean in a scenario
that is not directly relatable to traditional pictorial workflows [67].
6.3.3 A Note on Notation
In this chapter, we have discussed several ways in which our originally proposed DCML
semantics (Table 3.1 on page 65) can be extended to accommodate the needs of policy
makers in a broad range of scenarios. The extensions for which we specifically depicted
visual notation include metric temporal constraints (Figure 6.3 on page 143) and temporal
access control constraints (Figure 6.2 on page 140).
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We wish to point out that the purpose of proposing pictorial representations of such
constraints was make a broader point that an LTL/state-oriented constraint system is an
extremely flexible tool that can be adopted to suit the needs of individual policy makers
in a large number of situations. Since DCML is very closely related to LTL, a wide range
of constructs can be introduced into the modeling language to extend DCML. Figure 6.6
above presents one final example of such visual constraints.
In this work we deliberately choose not to present and promote a definitive all encom-
passing extended DCML/LTL constraint system toolkit. There are two major reasons why
we refrain from suggesting the holy grail of LTL constraint system restrictions and only dis-
cuss possibilities for extending DCML. Foremost is the fact that visual notation is best left
for policy designers (or graphic designers) to create. Choosing the right arrow-heads, type
of lines, and colours to use is best left for the users that work in the trenches of workflows
and corporate policy management. Consequently, if users of our proposed technique want
to re-interpret different arrows for their own needs, they are free to do so. Secondly, it would
go against the principles of extensibility, customizability and, separation/distribution of
responsibilities to propose a standard one-size-fits-all set of state-oriented restrictions and
call it a universal toolkit. Examples such as Figure 6.6 above have repeatedly shown that
there is a lot LTL can do which goes beyond traditional workflows, and thus there should
be room for database level constraint system designers to extend their toolkits according
to the specific situation that they are in and to tailor it for specific audiences. Our main
goal in introducing fixed semantics for DCML in this thesis is to demonstrate the overall
usability of an LTL based visual constraint modeling language.
6.4 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter we examined several issues that lie at the intersection of usability and
limitations of our proposed constraint modeling framework. We observed that there are
three key factors that need to be considered when attempting to extend the proposed
infrastructure: artifact type complexity (view complexity), constraint system complexity,
and the complexity of the property that warrants verification. We discussed three specific
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extensions and examined how each of these factors played a role in enforcement and verifi-
cation. Metric temporal logic [8] was an obvious first choice to examine since it is directly
supported by modern LTL model checkers / SAT solvers and very intuitively provides
additional expressiveness in temporal logic. Next we examined the problem of specifying
process-oriented temporal access control restrictions [111, 129]. We showed that transac-
tion related meta-data can be made an integral part of the artifact and thus can be used to
rephrase access control restrictions as restrictions on the history/evolution of an artifact.
We pointed out limitations that must be adhered to and caveats for DBAs verifying prop-
erties on and across these enhanced artifact constraint systems. In our final example of
usability, we argued that the visual depiction of constraint systems can be used for auditing
(i.e., building auditing queries) requiring very little buy-in from system administrators.
Along the way we hope to have made clear several important points about usability
and extensibility. Our framework can easily accommodate the majority of workflow pat-
terns used in modern workflows and can go well beyond simple flow-oriented restrictions,
especially in situations where various extended fragments of LTL are employed together.
Even within one fragment, a wide array of restrictions that do not correspond to traditional
workflows can be modelled. We pointed out that with such flexibility, it is unlikely that a
single set of restrictions can accommodate the needs of all policy makers. Thus, the task
of proposing a definitive set of visual restrictions on a drawing canvas is best left to DBAs
and corporate policy makers for their specific situations. We believe that there are par-
allels between our proposed modelling language and meta-modelling languages presenting
an approach that can be tailored to specific applications. We believe that like-minded user
groups and policy makers should thus be allowed to create and share various customized
toolkits along with interpretations of constraints for their specific needs.
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Chapter 7
Case Study: Form GC179
In this chapter we present a real-world business process and examine in detail how complex
operational constraints can be translated from their visual and textual descriptions into
DCML models. Section 7.1 provides the necessary background and identifies the source
documents from which policy specifications are taken for this case study. It also highlights
our aims, objectives, and assumptions. In Section 7.2 we present in detail the business
process being examined. Section 7.3 then presents our interpretation of the business process
in DCML. Section 7.4 generalizes the specific case study presented in this chapter and
highlights several variables that were either not fully captured by the example presented
or cannot be captured in one case study alone. It presents a comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis of our proposed constraint modeling, enforcement, and verification infrastructure
which can be used to measure its true usefulness. Finally, Section 7.5 concludes this chapter
by providing a brief summary of this chapter.
7.1 Background
The payroll responsibilities for the Government of Canada are handled by the department
of Public Works and Government Services (PWGS). The Regional Pay System (RPS)
operated by PWGS administers the payroll for more than 300,000 employees of the federal
155
government within 110 departments and agencies. The system operated by PWGS is the
largest payroll deployment in Canada, and it performs approximately 8.9 million financial
transactions annually valued at roughly $17 billion Canadian Dollars [127].
One specific function of this payroll system is to interact with various departments and
handle requests for extra pay made by the employees of the government. Form GC179
(also known as the The Extra Duty Pay/Shiftwork Report and Authorization Form) is the
designation given to a formal request for additional salary (typically in lieu of overtime
services rendered) made by an employee of the Government of Canada. For various reasons,
including security, privacy, and accessibility, each department of the government can design,
maintain, and manage its own GC179 form/template. The only major requirement in
handling such forms is that the final request for cash payments must be exported into
the RPS operated by PWGS Canada. We speculate that for most departments of the
federal government, GC179 requests are completed and processed electronically. However,
examples of conditions under which flexibility in handling GC179 requests is required
include situations where employees are unable to access a paper form or a computer (such
as in remote field operations). Some departments of the government offer alternative means
of handling GC179 requests for their employees. For example, the Department of Finance
allows its employees to accrue vacation time instead of receiving taxable cash salary for the
overtime service rendered [55]. In short, there is no standardized GC179 form or associated
process across the federal government.
Consequently, each department of the Government of Canada must design its own set
of policies, rules, and processes for handling GC179 requests. It stands to reason that
the various HR related databases operated by the departments of the government must be
subject to certain rules developed internally. Most importantly, each department is subject
to audits conducted by other branches of the government, such as the Treasury Board of
Canada (TBC) and the Office of the Auditor General. Naturally, such audits scrutinize the
published practices of every department and verify that the data regarding pay administra-
tion complies with the published practices. In addition, the branches of Government that
oversee and audit the operations of others’ also publish their own interpretations of legisla-
tion in the form of policy directives and guidelines on how to handle various processes. For
example, the policy suite published by the TBC [155] contains a host of policies that each
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department of the government should consider before developing its own internal rules.
The suite includes recommendations and guidelines on many employee related issues, such
as fairness in pay and working conditions, as well as handling of financial matters when it
comes to employees. Although departments can use these policy suites as guidelines, they
are not specification documents delineating specific business processes, and therefore there
is no single policy document that specifies how a GC179 request should be handled.
The challenge of compliance with overtime-pay related rules for a department of gov-
ernment is three-fold: (1) design a coherent and workable set of rules to handle GC179
requests, (2) ensure that the rules do not conflict with the overall policy directives of the
Government of Canada, and (3) ensure that the record keeping aspect of the department
(database) is compliant with the designed rules. The case study presented herein exam-
ines the above three aspects of compliance in handling GC179 requests within one specific
department of the Government of Canada.
7.1.1 Purpose of the Study
Our goal in this chapter of the thesis is to highlight the usability and usefulness of our pro-
posed constraint modeling language (DCML) and the associated verification infrastructure.
We do so by accomplishing two specific objectives: (i) demonstrating that a typical busi-
ness process (in our case represented by the handling of GC179 requests), when codified by
business users in terms of process models, flowcharts, and associated textual descriptions
of the process, can be easily mapped onto a DCML diagram; and (ii) demonstrating that
the implementation and verification of DCML constraint models that represent real world
situations can be accomplished by users with minimal technical understanding of CLTL.
Thus, we hope to show that the framework presented in this thesis is practical, efficient,
and easy to use for database systems that store information about real business processes.
We believe that the chosen example is representative of a large class of sequential business
processes. To further support our claims, the workflow and associated constraints presented
are taken directly from publicly available sources without significant alteration.
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7.1.2 Information Sources and Assumptions
Many departments of the government regularly publish the findings of internal and ex-
ternal audits. For the specific case of handling GC179 requests, several departments, in-
cluding Veterans Affairs Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, and the Department
of Finance Canada have made their GC179 audit reports and findings publicly available
[6, 55, 168]. Typically, these reports serve the purpose of increasing transparency. However,
the information contained in these audits about the processes and specific safeguards that
should (and are) in place represents an ideal testing ground of converting process-centric
business rules onto database level constraints.
In this thesis we focus on the specific case of the Department of Finance, which, among
many of its duties, is responsible for preparing the budget of Canada and handling the
financing/borrowing operations of the Government of Canada in financial markets. Our
primary reason for choosing the Department of Finance’s audit report for handling overtime
pay requests [55] is that it is the most comprehensive of its kind. More specifically, it
(a) explicitly lists and details the various checks and constraints on the processing of
GC179 requests, (b) provides rationale in developing constraints by linking them to high
level policy objectives as published by the Treasury Board of Canada, and (c) contains
visual/graphical depictions of the business processes associated with GC179 requests.
In short, the report comes very close to being a specifications document created by the
department, by virtue of it containing most of the information required to convert business
processes into database level constraints. The only significant aspect of information missing
from the report is the description of a database schema (table structure and data fields)
of the HR database of the Department of Finance. Therefore, the only major assumption
on our part is that of extracting a list of data fields and attributes (more specifically, an
artifact type definition) relevant to the processing of GC179 requests based on the details
presented in the report.
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Figure 7.1: GC179 overtime request handling process model taken from Appendix 2 in
Department of Finance Audit of Leave and Overtime Report [55].
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7.2 Process Model and Flowchart
The process model for handling GC179 requests, taken directly from Department of Finance
Audit of Leave and Overtime Report [55], is presented in Figure 7.1. The model can be
traced from top-left, where an employee completes a GC179 form, to the bottom-right,
where data is exported into the RPS and a cheque is cut for the employee. The description
of this process and specific constraints are summarized below.
1. All GC179 requests are handled electronically and can be created in the system in
two ways. After completing the overtime work, an employee can either complete a
GC179 request or the same can be completed by a designate of the employee. In case
a designated employee files the GC179 request, it must subsequently be reviewed and
cross-checked by the employee named on the GC179. This additional step must be
done electronically as a discrete and separate event. However, there is no explicit
requirement that the actual transaction that marks a GC179 request as cross-checked
is performed by the employee named on the request. GC179 requests can be marked
as cross-checked by the designate, as long as this is done in a separate transaction.
The purpose of the additional step is to ensure (at least in theory) that the designate
actually confirms the details with the employee after creating a GC179 request.
2. All GC179 requests require supervisor approval before they can be processed. Even
if the GC179 request was pre-approved, it must be reviewed to ensure that the scope
of the request matches that of the pre-approval. In addition, an employee can not
be his or her own supervisor, and once a supervisor approval is given, the details of
the request can no longer be altered by the employee unless the request is explicitly
“sent back” to the employee for amendments. Finally, a supervisor can only approve,
permanently reject, or send back the request and can not alter it in any other way. If
amendments to the request are required they must be made by the named employee
or his/her designate in a manner described in point (1) above.
3. GC179 requests that have received supervisor approval must then be authorized by
an employee that is the Section 34 Authority in the department, as designated in the
Financial Adminstration Act of Canada (1985). The designated Section 34 Authority
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for a department are one or more employees that are responsible for the overall
financial oversight. The purpose of this approval is to ensure that the charge/claim
is properly documented, reasonable, and necessary. The employee acting as the
Section 34 Authority must be different from both the employee named in the GC179
request and the supervisor of that employee. Once again, the Section 34 Authority
can only approve, permanently reject, or send back the request and can not alter it
in any other way. If amendments to the request are required, they must be made by
the named employee or his/her designate in a manner described in point (1) above.
4. GC179 requests that receive Section 34 approval are then processed by an HR ad-
ministrator of the department. Employees can be compensated for overtime in two
ways: cash or vacation hours (eight vacation hours are treated as an extra day of
vacation). Employees must choose at the time of completing a GC179 request how
they wish to be compensated.
(a) If an employee requests vacation hours, a calculation is made by the HR staff
to determine how many vacation hours should be accrued. This is done on a
case-by-case basis because the multiple applied to overtime hours to determine
vacation hours can change depending on circumstances (e.g., overtime pay rules
may be different for regular weekends and statuary holidays). The final number
of accrued hours calculated is verified by a comptroller of records and then added
to the total number of available vacation hours on record for the employee.
(b) If cash payment for overtime is requested, then the HR staff calculates (based
on the employee’s pay rate or yearly salary) the appropriate amount to be paid
for this GC179 request. This calculation is verified by a comptroller of financial
records and then made ready for export into RPS. Once RPS has processed
the payment, it returns a payment identifier, which is then associated with this
GC179 request, and no subsequent changes are allowed to the request.
5. GC179 requests that have not yet been processed by HR can be deferred back to the
employee or designate for changes. This is typically done when any of the supervisor,
Section 34 Authority, or the HR staff is not satisfied with the request and its associ-
ated details. When a request is deferred back to the employee it loses its supervisor
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and Section 34 approvals and must go through the process (including cross checking
if necessary) once again.
6. GC179 requests that have not yet been processed by HR can also be permanently
rejected. Once a GC179 request is rejected, it can not be modified in any way.
Therefore, all processing on such requests is terminated and they are forever archived.
7. There is also an alternate process for employees who have accumulated a large amount
of vacation hours to “cash them out.” A written request must be received from the
employee, which must then be scrutinized by the Section 34 Authority (for availability
of funds and reasons for the request), and then subsequently forwarded to HR. An
employee in HR will re-examine one or more prior GC179 requests for which vacation
hours were awarded, subtract the vacation hours from the employee’s remaining
vacation hours, perform the appropriate salary calculations, and make the salary
data ready for export into RPS. Before the data is exported into RPS and a cheque
is cut, it must be verified by a comptroller.
7.3 Implementation
7.3.1 Artifact and State Definitions
Since the audit report does not specifically mention the internals of the database operated
by the Department of Finance, we assume that the attributes listed in Table 7.3.1 define
the GC179 artifact type completely. We believe that most database designers will treat
a GC179 request as a strong entity, and thus the artifact definition will only consist of a
selection on a single table. Constraints (DCML diagrams) will therefore be applicable on
a single sequence of assignments to these attributes.
From the description of the process given in Section 7.2, we extrapolate that, at a high
level, there are 3 different phases in the lifecycle of a typical GC179 request: (i) data entry,
(ii) managerial approvals and (iii) HR/back-office processing. Based on our reading of the
process, we have identified 13 distinct states involved in the processing of GC179 artifacts
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Attribute Name Type Details
GC179 ID int Unique identifier of the request
EMP ID int Employee ID of the beneficiary
FILLED BY EMP ID int Employee ID of the designate (if any)
CROSS CHECKED bit Request cross-checked by the benefi-
ciary?
DETAILS varchar Details associated with the request
CHANGES REQUIRED bit Does request/form data need editing?
APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID int Employee ID of the supervisor
SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID int Employee ID of Sect. 34 Authority
HR EMP ID int Employee ID of the person who per-
formed the vacation/salary calculation
HOURS ACCRUED float Vacation hours credited in lieu of over-
time
CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT float Cash paid in lieu of overtime
HR-PAYROLL TXN ID int Transaction identifier for the payroll /
HR calculation record
EXPORTED TO RPS bit Request exported into RPS?
PAYOUT REQUESTED bit Was a cash payment requested?
COMPTROLLER EMP ID int Employee ID of Sect. 33 Authority /
Comptroller
PMT ID int Transaction ID of the payment made to
the beneficiary by the RPS
LASTUPDATE EMP ID int Employee ID of the person who last
modified the request
Table 7.1: Attributes of the GC179 artifact
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DCML State Explanation and Purpose
φS Uninitialized State
FILLED BY DESIGNATE Request completed by a designated employee
and awaiting verification.
SELF FILLED Request completed by employee (no cross
checking required). Awaiting supervisor ap-
proval.
CROSS CHECKED Request cross checked and awaiting supervi-
sor approval.
CHANGES REQUIRED Request deferred back to employee for
amendments.
REJECTED (φE) Request permanently rejected (artifact life-
cycle terminated).
APPROVED BY SUPERVISOR Request approved by supervisor and awaiting
Section 34 approval.
APPROVED BY SECT34 AUTHOR-
ITY
Approved by Section 34 Authority and await-
ing HR processing
VACATION HOURS CALCULATED Vacation hours calculated and request is
awaiting comptroller review.
CASH PAY CALCULATED Cash pay calculated and request is awaiting
comptroller review.
DATA EXPORTED TO RPS Comptroller review completed and data ex-
ported to payroll system.
HOURS ACCRUED Comptroller review completed and hours ac-
crued to employee vacation record.
PAYMENT MADE Payment confirmation received by RPS.
Table 7.2: States of GC179 artifact
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in the above three phases. They are listed in Table 7.3.1. Our interpretation given to the
states is very intuitive and augments the visual process model presented in Figure 7.1. In
the next section we provide our DCML diagrams for each of these phases.
7.3.2 DCML Diagrams
Phase 1: Data Entry
Figure 7.2: Data Entry Phase of the GC179 lifecycle
Figure 7.2 summarizes the data-entry phase of handling GC179 requests in DCML
and Figure 7.3 presents it in full with all the states fully defined. There are only three
constraints during this phase and they are as follows:
1. Initialization: A GC179 artifact can be instantiated in either the SELF FILLED or
FILLED BY DESIGNATE states.
2. Cross Checking: When leaving the FILLED BY DESIGNATE state, an artifact must
either enter the CROSS CHECKED state or the CHANGES REQUIRED state.
165
Figure 7.3: Data Entry Phase of the GC179 lifecycle - Complete DCML Canvas. The
attributes and their required values that differentiate one state from the others are high-
lighted in bold font
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3. Amending GC179 requests: A request in the CHANGES REQUIRED state, when
leaving this state, can only go to the SELF FILLED, FILLED BY DESIGNATE or
the REJECTED states.
There are some important observations that need to be pointed out. Foremost, under
the designed constraint system a value of zero is assumed to be unassigned. For example,
when the artifact is instantiated (either in the SELF FILLED or FILLED BY DESIG-
NATE states), the Section 34 Authority for it is required to be zero. The value of zero
is used to imply that the Section 34 approval has not yet been given. When this value
becomes positive in the lifecycle of the artifact, then the assigned value will be interpreted
as the employee identifier of the Section 34 Authority that approved the request. Note
that a similar interpretation is given to the EMP ID attribute (representing the employee
identifier of the person named on the request). In either of the instantiation states, this
attribute must be positive, which is then interpreted to imply that an employee ID has
been assigned or must be associated with every GC179 request at instantiation time.
Both the instantiation states (FILLED BY DESIGNATE and SELF FILLED) require
that upon reaching either of them the attributes GC179 ID, EMP ID and FILLED BY EMP ID
become invariants. Therefore, during the lifecycle of an individual GC179 artifact, these
variables will retain the values they are assigned during instantiation.
Also note that the state conditions are defined to ensure that an artifact that is in
the SELF FILLED state is also in the CROSS CHECKED state. This is because self-
filled GC179 requests do not require an explicit cross checking and thus are ready to
move on to the next phase of processing. However, an artifact that is in the FILLED BY
DESIGNATE state must explicitly transition to the CROSS CHECKED (via a change
in the CROSS CHECKED attribute). Similarly, the state CHANGES REQUIRED is
distinguished by the boolean attribute CHANGES REQUIRED, and all artifacts exiting
this state must have this flag unset before progressing further. Constraint 3 ensures this and
accomplishes the business objectives requiring that a GC179 request that has been “sent
back” to the employee for amendments must be examined by the employee or designate
(to be corrected in some way) before being put back in the processing pipeline.
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Phase 2: Managerial Approvals
This phase of the process involves managerial review of the GC179 request, and the only
two revelent states in this phase are APPROVED BY SUPERVISOR and APPROVED BY
SECT34 AUTHORITY. As before, Figure 7.4 presents a DCML canvas that summarizes
the constraints in this phase, and Figure 7.5 fully defines the states.
Note that during this Phase of processing, there are several ways in which the artifact
can be “pushed back” in its lifecycle to Phase 1. For example, the request may be deemed
to be incomplete or inadequate by the supervisor, by the Section 34 Authority, or by
the HR coordinator. In each of these cases, the artifact is moved to the CHANGES
REQUIRED state which, the way we have segregated states, is not explicitly part of Phase
2. Consequently, we include some states from Phase 1 to depict fully constraints that take
the artifact to the prior phase of processing. A brief summary of the constraints presented
in Figures 7.4 and 7.5 is as follows:
Figure 7.4: Managerial Approvals Phase of the GC179 lifecycle. Two states that were not
previously fully defined are introduced and their interaction with prior states is summarized
1. Supervisor Approval: A GC179 request can only arrive in the APPROVED BY
SUPERVISOR state if it was previously in the CROSS CHECKED state. Ob-
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Figure 7.5: Managerial Approvals Phase of the GC179 lifecycle - Complete DCML Canvas
serve from the function defining the APPROVED BY SUPERVISOR state that AP-
PROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID must be set to a positive value. In addition, there
are constraints on who can modify the artifact (i.e., who can provide the supervisor
approval) that ensure that the supervisor is different from the employee named on
the request. Finally, to ensure that a supervisor only provides approval and does not
materially modify the request, all other variables are guarded (sub-container labelled
G) in the APPROVED BY SUPERVISOR state.
2. Leaving the APPROVED BY SUPERVISOR state: Constraint (2) in Figures 7.4
and 7.5 ensures that an artifact leaving the APPROVED BY SUPERVISOR state
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must only be able to go to one or more of REJECTED, CHANGES REQUIRED
or APPROVED BY SEC34 AUTHORITY states. But since each of these states is
non-intersecting, i.e., the functions associated with any two of these states cannot be
satisfied at the same time, an artifact can only be in one of them when it leaves the
APPROVED BY SUPERVISOR state. Thus, combined with the guard conditions in
constraint (1), this further restricts which attributes modifications must take place
in order for an artifact to exit towards a particular state.
3. Entering the APPROVED BY SEC34 AUTHORITY state: Constraint (3) is an
entry restriction similar to constraint (1). Note that while constraint (2) implied
that when leaving the APPROVED BY SUPERVISOR state an artifact may go
to the APPROVED BY SEC34 AUTHORITY state, constraint (3) requires that
if an artifact enters the APPROVED BY SEC34 AUTHORITY state it must have
been previously been in the APPROVED BY SUPERVISOR state. The net result of
constrants (2) and (3) is somewhat similar to the micro-example presented in Section
3.5 on page 65. Once again the key differentiator of the exit state (APPROVED BY
SEC34 AUTHORITY) is that the SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID must be positive
(i.e., assigned) implying approval by the employee responsible for financial oversight
in the department. To ensure that the Section 34 Authority only provides the specific
approval and does not materially modify the request, all other variables are guarded
in the APPROVED BY SEC34 AUTHORITY state.
Phase 3: HR and Back-office Processing
The final phase of handling GC179 requests and the associated constraints are depicted
in Figures 7.6 and 7.7. Recall from Section 7.2 that GC179 requests that have received
Section 34 approval must go through one final review and approval by an HR coordinator
responsible for handling the payroll and vacation records for employees. The calculation
determining overtime salary or the equivalent in vacation hours is performed as part of
this review. Once completed the request can no longer be rejected and must proceed to
payment or accrual of vacation hours.
Constraint (1) in Figures 7.6 and 7.7 restricts what can happen to artifacts that have
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Figure 7.6: HR and back-office processing phase of the GC179 lifecycle.
received Section 34 approval. More specifically, such artifacts can either be permanently
rejected, sent back to the employee for amendments, or move forward in processing to-
wards payment or vacation hours being accrued for the employee. Constraints (2) and
(3) ensure that if a calculation for vacation hours or cash payment respectively has been
completed, then the artifact must have previously been in the APPROVED BY SEC34
AUTHORITY state. Since the states VACATION HOURS CALCULATED and CASH
PAY CALCULATED are by definition mutually exclusive an artifact can only progress in
one of the directions based on the value of the PAYOUT REQUESTED flag.
Constraints (4-5) together have the net effect of ensuring that an artifact waiting for
comptroller review in the VACATION HOURS CALCULATED state can only move to the
HOURS ACCRUED state and an artifact moving into the HOURS ACCRUED state must
have previously been in the VACATION HOURS CALCULATED state. This does not
preclude the calculation of hours accrued to be corrected or repeated, since the artifact will
remain in the VACATION HOURS CALCULATED states if this happens. For example,
if the comptroller discovers an error, the HR coordinator can still correct the relevant
field of the artifact (HOURS ACCRUED) to a different non-negative value while ensuring
that the artifact remains in the VACATION HOURS CALCULATED. However, both
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Figure 7.7: HR and back-office processing phase of the GC179 lifecycle - Complete DCML
Canvas.
172
these constraints are necessary to ensure that the path between these two states is strictly
followed and the object does not “escape” by going off diagram. Similarly, constraints
(6-7) and (8-9) accomplish the same objective of ensuring that an object only transitions
between the two states linked by these constraints.
Observe that there is extensive use of guards and invariant conditions in the four major
states of interest in this phase. The purpose of guarding a significant number of variables
is to ensure that the HR coordinator does not modify critical information that s/he is not
authorized to change. Because requests that have passed the last stage of review can not be
sent back for amendments, a significant number of attributes are made invariants as soon
as the calculation for pay or vacation hours is completed. The key variables that are made
immutable pertain to the earlier phases of processing and include those used to determine
whether the request needs changes (CROSS CHECKED and CHANGES REQUIRED),
the approval supervisors identifiers (APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID and SEC34
AUTHORITY EMP ID), and the method of remuneration requested by employee. Sim-
ilarly, once the comptroller review is completed (in the states HOURS ACCRUED and
DATA EXPORTED TO RPS), additional variables pertaining to processing are made in-
variants. Finally, in the case a cash payment is requested, the last variable to be modified
is PMT ID, which is returned by the payroll system external to the department.
7.3.3 The GC179 Constraint System
The single unified DCML constraint diagram that brings together the three phases of pro-
cessing GC179 requests is presented in Figure 7.8. The Zot code generated by translating
each visual constraint into CLTL is provided in Appendix A. The translation of DCML to
Zot was done according to the semantics of DCML presented in Table 3.1 on page 65.
To illustrate how this translation can be accomplished (and automated in the future
using a visual modeling tool), we now examine a two-state fragment of the complete GC179
artifact constraint system in further detail. The canvas we consider consists of the DATA
EXPORTED INTO RPS and PAYMENT MADE BY RPS states (bottom right of Figure
7.8) and is presented in Figure 7.9. The definition of the DATA EXPORTED INTO RPS
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Figure 7.8: Unified DCML Diagram for GC179 requests. See Appendix A for the same
model translated into Zot code for verification.
174
Figure 7.9: DCML canvas consisting only of the Data Exported to RPS and Payment Made
by RPS states. Embedded in this canvas are two constraints pertaining to state transitions
(exit and entry restrictions labelled 13 and 14 respectively) and four invariant constraints.
state can be read directly from the diagram:
exported to rps ∧ hr–payroll txn id > 0 ∧ comptroller emp id > 0 ∧ pmt id = 0
∧ lastupdate emp id = comptroller emp id
(S2)
Similarly, the function defining the PAYMENT MADE BY RPS state can also be read
from the canvas as follows:
pmt id > 0 (S2)
A GC179 request is in the DATA EXPORTED INTO RPS or PAYMENT MADE BY RPS
states if the above functions (S2 and S2 respectively) evaluate to true for the attributes
of the artifact. Note that these states are mutually exclusive because of the conditions
applicable on the pmt id attribute in their respective functions. Thus, at any point in
its history, an artifact can only be present in one of these states. The constraints in this
DCML canvas can now be read using the templates provided in Table 3.1 on page 65.
Constraint 13 (exit restriction) is interpreted as (•S1 ∧ ¬S1 ⇒ S2) and Constraint 14
(entry restriction) is interpreted as (S2∧¬•S2 ⇒ •S1). There is an invariant constraint on
the PAYMENT MADE BY RPS state which can be interpreted in CLTL as (•pmt id =
pmt id since S2). Similarly there are three invariant constraints on the DATA EXPORTED
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INTO RPS state. They are as follows: (i) (•exported to rps = exported to rps since S1),
(ii) (•hr–payroll txn id = hr–payroll txn id since S1) and, (iii) (•comptroller emp id =
comptroller emp id since S1). The complete canvas constraint system for Figure 7.9 is
simply the conjunction of all of the above constraints, and for brevity we omit depicting
them in a single conjoined formula.
In a very similar fashion we can construct the artifact constraint system (the complete
constraint model for GC179 artifacts) by interpreting the DCML notation and combining
individual constraints depicted in the complete DCML diagram (Figure 7.8). This complete
constraint model is provided in Appendix A using Lisp. As a final step, the constraint
system can be translated into a form that is enforceable by an SQL engine [33, 154, 34].
7.3.4 Verification Results
We were able to generate several (un)satisfiability results to verify the correctness of the
behaviour of GC179 artifacts as they evolve in a database. The following statements on
the model were formally verified and tested in the Zot model checker, using the CLTL
conditions provided in Appendix A:
1. Can an artifact reach the HOURS ACCRUED state while its PAYOUT REQUESTED
attribute is true? In other words, can vacation hours be awarded for a GC179 request
for which the employee has requested cash payment?
2. Can a GC179 request for which the employee initially requested a cash payment ever
be paid in vacation hours? In other words, can changes to the method of remuneration
be made after the request is created?
3. Can the comptroller of records reject the request?
4. Can the request be sent back twice to the employee for changes?
5. Can the request be sent back to the employee for amendments after HR approval
(i.e., from the VACATION HOURS CALCULATED or CASH PAY CALCULATED
states)?
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6. Can a request for payment be exported to the RPS without Section 34 Approval?
7. Can the employee act as the HR coordinator for his/her own GC179 request?
Note that each of the above statements, when tested against the model, has to be
interpreted over the attributes of the GC179 artifact in CLTL. As discussed in Chapter 5,
this task will be handled by either a database administrator or a policy testing expert who
(a) understands the business process associated with the artifact, and (b) can formalize the
above statements in constraint temporal logic. We believe that the formal equivalents of
the above statements (presented in Appendix A) make it apparent that formulating such
properties is not overly challenging. At the same time they provide significant insight on
the behaviour of artifacts stored in the database, highlighting situations where an artifact
is either over-constrained or under-constrained.
7.3.5 Summary
In Chapter 6 we showed that DCML (and more generally, CLTL) is capable of capturing
constraints embedded in a broad class of visual, state oriented descriptions of business
processes. Our reasoning was based on the fact that individual workflow patterns can
be emulated within LTL constructs. In this section we presented a complete real world
business process and its translation into its equivalent in DCML.
Note that DCML is, by design, also a constraint specification language. As a result,
the complete specification of a DCML model (e.g., Figure 7.8) can be large, contain many
intricately connected states, and perhaps somewhat overwhelming for a single reader. We
believe that this is not a shortcoming of the language, but rather an issue of entropy, that
is, Figure 7.8 contains substantially more information about the business process than is
contained in Figure 7.1. Throughout this thesis we have emphasized the fact that large
systems of constraints, whether they are presented visually, in natural language, or in
source code, are challenging for unfamiliar readers to understand. Consequently, breaking
down even moderately long business processes (such as the one presented in this section)
into smaller and more manageable portions is critical to enhance the usability of process
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modeling techniques. DCML accomplishes this goal through the use of smaller canvases
that integrate easily.
7.4 Will it Work in Practice?
A common criticism of research in the area of policy management is that it fails to answer
the following simple question: How useful is the idea being presented? Many proposals in
this area present a compelling framework and demonstrate usability in a range of scenarios.
Some (such as this thesis) will even present case studies based on real life situations to
make an argument for the usability of the proposed technique. However, what is typically
lacking from such proposals is a comprehensive blueprint using which other researchers can
conduct true and fair usability assessments of the proposed policy management system.
In this section we provide quantitative and qualitative guidelines against which use-
ability and applicability of DCML and its associated verification infrastructure can be
compared against other techniques. We do so by presenting a general road map of how
DCML can be utilized in practice. In addition, we highlight how additional real-world case
studies can be conducted and what specific questions would need to be answered to make
broad claims about the usability of DCML. We believe that the discussion presented will
serve to guide researchers attempting to implement and test the efficacy of our proposed
database-oriented policy management system.
The basic requirements to implement and test a policy management system specifically
geared towards database systems are as follows:
• Database: A schema, data, and the typical query workload are the most basic re-
quirements.
• Business Processes : There should be available descriptions of processes and the em-
inent need to enforce or audit them. Ideally these descriptions should be in a visual
notation (similar to workflows), but one may need the co-operation of users in con-
verting textual process description into workflows.
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• Users : The case study requires domain experts who can serve as corporate policy
makers (e.g., lawyers and accountants), policy implementers (users who convert poli-
cies into database constraint systems) and policy verification experts or infrastructure
managers (e.g., DBA or auditors).
For any case study to be realistic, the above three resources (and specific sub-components)
need to be available and accessible. We believe that there will be no major differences
among the characteristics of databases that store information about everyday business
processes. That is, databases storing records for typical business functions (HR, Sales,
etc.) will have similar overall design characteristics. Similarly, since LTL is sufficiently
expressive to capture wide ranging workflow semantics, the types and complexity of work-
flows that various organizations use will also not pose a significant challenge, provided
users are able to interpret them for conversion into DCML. However, as elaborated in
subsequent sections, the variability in technical skill among different types of users, both
within a single organization and across organizations in different industries, will perhaps
be the most significant factor in making claims regarding usability.
7.4.1 The Process
The overall challenge of testing usability of any policy management system is that of
following the steps toward enforcement described in Chapter 1 and illustrated in Section
7.1. In the specific case of DCML, there are substantial setup and initialization costs that
have to be incurred before any rewards can be reaped. For a set of business processes that
need to be enforced in the database, the appropriate artifact definitions need to be created
and agreed upon by the DBA and policy makers. Then a specific extension or variant of
DCML (e.g., ones that may include metric or temporal access control restrictions) need
to be agreed upon for various process types. In this stage the DBA will select particular
fragments of CLTL and assign meaning to them in the visual state-constraint notation
for individual sub-classes of policy makers. Then, policy makers (departmental power
users, policy experts for specific areas, or programmers specializing in different areas of
compliance) need to be engaged and taught how to create constraint diagrams over artifacts
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of interest. These users will then construct visual constraint diagrams over database level
artifacts. Finally, a database administrator, armed with intimate knowledge about the
business and the database, can begin the task of verifying interactions among multiple
constraint systems.
One can argue that such a method introduces several points of error in the interpreta-
tion of the specification by involving many different actors. However, a large amount of
anecdotal evidence collected during our research suggests that this is unavoidable. Man-
aging a web of ECA rules (essentially similar to a large number of “pre-condition implies
post-condition” rules generated by DCML) written by tens of different programmers will
also over time become an impossible and expensive proposition. More importantly, the
transparency of being able to identify precisely which constraint maps onto which transi-
tion in a workflow provides significant reduction in the cost of long term maintenance and
evolution of policies.
It is thus best if we analyze both the traditional and our proposed approaches in the
context of quantitative and qualitative metrics. The next section provides a summary of
the factors that need consideration. The discussion presented is by no means complete but
is sufficient to highlight the major questions that require resolution in order to make an
assessment of usefulness.
7.4.2 Assessing a Policy Management Framework
The four major categories of cost that we consider relevant are as follows: (1) setup, (2)
interpretation of policies, (3) implementation of constraints, and (4) extracting compliance
guarantees.
Setup
Most database programmers are familiar with writing triggers, constraints, and assertions.
Thus, there is practically zero setup time in the “no-framework” approach and a program-
mer can begin interpreting a policy document over the schema without delay. However, in
180
the context of our proposal, artifact definitions have to be agreed upon and various frag-
ments of CLTL have to be made ready in visual notation for different departmental policy
makers. Depending on the complexity of the organizational workflows and the database
schema, this process can either be time consuming or trivial.
There are some quantifiable metrics during setup that can be identified as relevant
indicators of overall cost. For example, the amount of overlap among artifacts and the
average number of workflows applicable on a single artifact definition represent information
that could be of interest to future researchers. These indicators are invariably related to
the business and how its data storage requirements impact the structural complexity of
the database schema. Similarly, the type, structure, and formulation of CLTL constraints
preferred by system administrators can also provide insight into how users who may not be
familiar with temporal logic respond to the framework. We have to keep in mind that most
of the complexity associated with CLTL is hidden to the policy makers through the use of
visual notation. However, the DBA or the equivalent supervisory team that decides on a
particular fragment of CLTL may itself have to learn about temporal logic and eventually
make decisions on notation, types of constraints, and the assumptions under which the
framework will be presented and explained to individual policy makers.
Since most quantifiable determinants of cost and complexity are situation-specific (i.e.,
dependent on policy makers, system administrators, and the complexity of the business),
it may be difficult to assess their correlation to the overall setup cost and make generalized
statements about their impact. Most notably, individual biases towards certain types of
constraints, processes, and workflows in one industry can lead us to make incorrect broad
judgements that may not be applicable in other situations. Nonetheless, we hypothesize
that if a comprehensive real-life examination of the usability of temporal logics in busi-
ness situations is conducted, many of these soft indicators of complexity and cost can be
identified and discussed in greater detail.
Interpretation
In Chapter 3 we argued that there are many advantages to everyday business users being
empowered to express their policies on top of database level artifacts. Intuition suggests
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that business users (not necessarily programmers) have intimate knowledge about policies,
and if they can directly implement or modify constraints on a database, then significant
cost savings can be realized.
To verify our intuition, it is essential to separate the notion of cost during the policy
interpretation phase into two components: (a) reduction in incorrect interpretations, and
(b) speed or ease of interpretation. In the traditional approach a programmer, if uncertain
about the interpretation, must interact with a business user familiar with the given policy
for guidance. Thus, the process is not only slower but arguably incurs a higher risk of errors
through the involvement of multiple parties. Similarly, we note that high level business
policy documents that contain descriptions and specifications of constraints rather than
their formal interpretations are best understood by non-programmers. So a business user
seems to be best qualified to read policy documents and interpret them in an error-free
manner.
Unfortunately, to verify the above hypothesis is far from easy. Putting the “no-
framework” approach against an artifact and LTL-constraint-system approach requires
that we conduct an analysis of the interpretation capabilities of a programmer against
those of a business user. Furthermore, we assume that this business user has now been
properly trained in developing constraint systems and that this experiment is conducted
in a controlled situation. This assessment is extremely difficult to replicate across several
situations. Ideally, we want to be able to make claims about the correctness of an average
programmer’s interpretation of a policy document on a database against those made by a
business user over a set of pre-defined artifacts and to identify how long the process takes
in each case.
Implementation
An examination similar to that presented in the interpretation phase extends into imple-
mentation. Once again, we want to pit a programmer against a policy maker. However, as
alluded to earlier, at and beyond this phase, the infrastructure of a comprehensive policy
modeling framework will likely outperform any manual approach. Practically all met-
rics ranging from run-time efficiency of code to time taken in development and testing of
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constraints will favour an automated code generation system geared towards a particular
database engine.
Nonetheless, it is important to measure this cost so that it can be offset against the
initial setup time. Note that, from a cost savings perspective, the programming hours that
are saved during implementation should be much higher than the administrative hours
during setup. We have to draw out this distinction since different users cost a business
different amounts per hour of effort. Thus, an accurate assessment of time saved requires
that we measure the time taken by programmers to create triggers for enforcing business
rules derived in the previous phase against a time of near-zero in the automated approach.
Maintenance
Maintenance of a set of policies and business rules can be described as the removal of certain
constraints and/or the introduction of new ones. The process of maintenance is ongoing and
not different from repeating the interpretation and implementation phases. Note, however,
that the one-time setup cost incurred under the artifact/LTL-constraint framework now
gets further amortized over the lifetime of a business and the database. Consequently, we
need to test the hypothesis, first presented in Chapter 3, that the marginal cost to make
changes to a policy/constraint system in the “no-framework” method is much higher (and
progressively increases with the complexity of the policy set) when compared to the same
marginal cost in the artifact/constraint-LTL approach.
Compliance Guarantees and Supporting External Audits
The final aspect in which the usefulness of our proposal needs to be evaluated is in its ability
to generate compliance guarantees and to provide some level of assurance to internal and
external auditors.
When examining the related problems of governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) in
Chapter 2, we observed that it is often difficult to predict what auditors will look for
in an given database. Thus, it is imperative to self audit and ensure that there are no
inconsistencies within corporate processes. Chapter 5 subsequently revealed that there are
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no standardized notions of correctness, inconsistencies, and conflicts when artifact level
policies interact. Thus, internal corporate compliance officers in conjunction with DBAs
need to rigourously test and subsequently prove that the constraints on a database can
never lead to undesirable consequences.
Since we cannot predict what an auditor will be looking for, the question of which
properties warrant formal verification is best left for experts in corporate GRC. However,
we can focus on the question of how to complete the verification process. Formal verification
of hand written code is challenging but still accomplishable. Our proposed system, on
the other hand, has significant advantages of automating this process and reducing it to
satisfiability and model checking (k-satisfiability). However, many questions about artifact
constraint systems and verification remain unanswered. For example, how large do we
expect these “typical workflows” to be, and how many variables, conditions, and types of
functions will be involved in the state definitions. Earlier we had stipulated that these
workflows rarely exceed 100 or so states, and analysis of a 1000 states represented an
extreme case. Such statements would either be supported or refuted in a longitudinal
study.
There are several other issues that were not addressed when evaluating the efficiency of
generating proofs in our framework. Foremost is the issue of an upper bound for k when
the notion of k-satisfiability was introduced in the context of bounded model checking. We
alluded to the fact that workflows typically have a maximum “diameter” that essentially
represents the longest possible non-looping sequence of state changes in which an artifact
can partake. Thus, it would be reasonable to consider that diameter as an upper bound
for k. However, without actually having a solid understanding of real-world user-generated
constraint systems, it is difficult to directly assess the feasibility of this upper bound. If
the time required to model check properties over workflows exceeds user expectations, then
certainly a wide variety of issue open up and many possible optimizations and simplifica-
tions may have to be examined. Along the same lines are questions pertaining to the
interpretation of unsatisfiability results, that is, how best to explain these results to users
(e.g., interpreting the least unsatisfiable cores) and the possible fixes for conflicts.
An important metric associated with compliance is that of policy coverage. Coverage is
a measure that divides the number of policies that a system can implement and reason over
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by the total number of policies to which a business is subject. Thus, it is important that
we measure the proportion of constraints that can be covered in our framework relative to
those that would require a more complex logic for reasoning (e.g., calendar and periodicity
constraints). This would provide significant insight into the applicability of a system built
around linear temporal logic and possible future extensions.
7.5 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a case study highlighting the challenges in converting business
processes into a set of database constraints. We then presented a summary of what we
believe would be the key areas in which our proposed constraint implementation and man-
agement infrastructure can be measured against the existing state of the art. This chapter
should have convinced the reader that assessing the viability of any policy and constraint
management framework in all settings is extremely difficult. However, we speculate that
a longitudinal study on the usability of DCML (or more generally, LTL) in everyday busi-
ness situations, such as, specification to constraint translation, will reveal many additional
concerns that we have not presented in our examination. Having a handle on these “un-
known unknowns” will certainly improve our understanding of users’ view of constraints
and workflows. Consequently, we believe that taking on this massive challenge of proving
usability of a visual-CLTL constraint notation is a significant and worthy avenue of further
research in this area.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter concludes this thesis by summarizing the thesis in Section 8.1 and briefly
discussing avenues of further research in Section 8.2.
8.1 Summary and Conclusion
This thesis presents a framework for modeling, implementing, and verifying process-oriented
constraints in database systems (Figure 8.1). Our work is motivated by the fact that emerg-
ing requirements for compliance and auditing will inevitably put relational databases under
the microscope of savvy auditors. These auditors are likely to go beyond ensuring that
there are no violations of published rules in the current instance, and thus businesses will
inevitably need to ensure that their databases will forever remain compliant with a given
set of rules, while seamlessly supporting everyday business functions.
This thesis builds on a large amount of infrastructure presented in prior work. However
the elegance of our approach lies in its simplicity and the particular way in which the
three areas of workflows, temporal integrity constraints, and model checking fit together
to solve a problem of extreme significance. We observe that at the surface, databases
are collections of arbitrary n-tuples that can evolve in a completely unrestricted fashion.
However, it is only when we begin to restrict individual portions of a database based
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Figure 8.1: A high-level overview of how DCML can be used to implement constraints in
database systems. Since business process descriptions exist in varying formats (top of the
policy stack), we propose the use of an intermediate constraint specification layer within
the database. We denote this as the database constraint modeling layer, in which first
order temporal integrity constraints are used to stitch together states derived from the
knowledge contained in the process models / workflows. Using DCML, we can then easily
implement these constraints and verify a broad range of properties about the interaction
of these constraint systems.
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on business processes, that a framework of constraints and verification becomes available
to answer critical questions. We strongly believe that in the near future there will be
increasing need to verify the behaviour of how databases evolve with regards to business
rules. The complexity of software systems and their nature of being black-boxes in business
environments make the database the key piece of operational evidence on which an auditor
can focus. Thus, generating compliance guarantees on the behaviour of the database will
be critical in ensuring that a business holds true to its claims of following the published
processes.
This work contributes to the state of the art in several different ways. Foremost, it
presents an easy to use mechanism that enables the average business user to harness the
power of linear temporal logic to visually map out process-centric constraints within a
database. Constraints such as process-centric access control were previously well outside
the domain of an average user to specify, but our framework makes it easy to implement
and maintain constraints in the context of databases. Furthermore, it offers the ability
to automatically enforce complex rules, which may have been formulated by non-technical
users, as well as allowing a more savvy class of users (internal auditors or DBAs) to
verify properties about the interactions of these rule systems. The work is not without
its limitations, with a major impediment being the high initial setup cost. However, once
a formal framework of artifact definitions and logical-to-visual LTL constraints is agreed
upon for a given database, the cost savings achieved over time in modeling, implementing,
and verifying complex process-centric constraints will be far greater in magnitude than the
initial setup cost.
8.2 Future Work
In Chapter 7 we examined in detail the challenges associated with assessing the usability
of a visual-LTL constraint modeling framework. We believe that a longitudinal study on
the usability of LTL in business situations represents a significant avenue of future work.
In addition, this thesis did not present a complete visual policy modeling software suite for
DCML, and we envision that such a tool will help in conducting a case study on usability.
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If users are able to graphically draw out DCML models and visualize their own templates
of constraints, they may be able to significantly improve their understanding of LTL. The
level of insight provided by such a tool will go well beyond assessing the usability of LTL
for the users who create DCML models. In fact, it may also provide the much needed
insight into the users who will be testing/verifiying large integrated constraint systems,
and system administrators responsible for auditing and enforcement.
In addition to the above, there are lines of future work within database systems research
that we believe to be promising. Our work attempts to connect databases and workflows
via state systems that represented integrity constraints specified in LTL. Many new ques-
tions arise if we relax the notion of consistency and try to establish connections between
workflows and probabilistic state systems such as Bayseian networks and Markov chains.
We now provide a brief discussion of these research topics.
8.2.1 Probabilistic Reasoning in Database Level Workflows
Recall that in our infrastructure there is no inherent value or reward associated with com-
pliance. All constraints are equally important and failing to meet even a single constraint
is deemed unacceptable. However, if we relax this restriction and associate some level of
utility or reward with different paths in a business process, we can then introduce the
notion of meeting specific goals and targets. In a general model we can assign values to
particular paths and state traversals and attempt to restrict or block paths that lead to
less than maximum achievable utility.
We can see many situations where the benefit of selectively (perhaps based on a prob-
ability function) allowing a transaction that violates a particular “soft-constraint” may
outweigh the costs associated with total compliance. As an example, consider an airline
business in which each plane has a fixed passenger carrying capacity. The airline has al-
ready identified for certain routes the probability distribution for how many passengers
do not show up for their flight or cancel at the last minute. In an effort to minimize the
number of empty seats for each flight, the airline wishes to selectively violate the constraint
that the number of tickets sold must be no greater than the number of seats on the plane,
in the hope that the number of no-shows will make the plane run at full capacity. The
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airline has developed a model for the risk (cost associated with providing hotel stay, refund,
liability, brand image destruction, etc.) for each passenger who does not get boarded, in
the event that the number of passengers who show up for their flight exceeds the plane’s
passenger carrying capacity. How does such a model get encoded as a set of utility-based
constraints in a database?
Since a database contains much historical information about the context in which a
certain decision is made, the challenge is to encode such models in terms of those decisions.
In theory, as a database evolves, so will the parameters of the model, and the decision
making process will keep improving to achieve higher total utility.
8.2.2 History Mining and Process Discovery
A database contains a wealth of information pertaining to business processes, and a signif-
icant amount of knowledge about these processes is embedded in various object histories.
Transactional databases that handle many similar tasks store histories (or artifact oriented
event-logs), which can exhibit common patterns that are ready to be exploited in different
ways. The idea of automatically creating visual and/or logical descriptions of processes
from logs is not new. Processing mining techniques have been examined in great detail in
the workflow community, and the reader is directed to the book by van der Aalst [159] as a
comprehensive reference. Open source tools, such as ProM [157], are also readily available
to aid users in discovering process models from event logs.
However, methods of visualizing processes based on specific needs of database auditors
and policy makers is an area that has not received much attention. Databases introduce
a significant level of complexity in the problem of event/log mining. For example, we
pointed out in Chapter 5 that the history of a given unique row in a table is different from
the history of the joins in which it participates. There are several issues pertaining to
the interplay of concurrent (possibly related) processes that makes the problem interesting
when examined from a database perspective.
Consequently we believe that examining the role of various users and different discovery
objectives (auditing, implicit constraint discovery in processes, etc.) in the context of
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databases is an excellent topic for further research. Note that compliance generally deals
with restricting the state space of a system, whereas process mining attempts to explore
and explain this restricted space. However, both can be used in conjunction, for example,
to discover variances and interesting behaviour within the restricted state space. Thus,
discovery of processes as envisioned in databases can provide us significant insight into how
compliance is achieved. It can also reveal avenues of deviation from published processes
and lead to additional constraints on a system for even more rigorous compliance.
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Appendix A
Zot Model for GC179
Complete Zot Model for the GC179 example presented in Chapter 7
(asdf:operate ’asdf:load−op ’ae2zot)
(use−package :trio−utils)
;booleans do not need to be explicitly defined in ZOT
(define−tvar ’GC179 ID ∗int∗)
(define−tvar ’EMP ID ∗int∗)
(define−tvar ’FILLED BY EMP ID ∗int∗)
;(define−tvar ’CROSS CHECKED ∗bool∗)
;(define−tvar ’CHANGES REQUIRED ∗bool∗)
(define−tvar ’APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID ∗int∗)
(define−tvar ’SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID ∗int∗)
(define−tvar ’HR EMP ID ∗int∗)
(define−tvar ’HOURS ACCRUED ∗int∗)
(define−tvar ’CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT ∗int∗)
(define−tvar ’HR−PAYROLL TXN ID ∗int∗)
;(define−tvar ’EXPORTED TO RPS ∗bool∗)
;(define−tvar ’PAYOUT REQUESTED ∗bool∗)
(define−tvar ’COMPTROLLER EMP ID ∗int∗)
(define−tvar ’PMT ID ∗int∗)
(define−tvar ’LASTUPDATE EMP ID ∗int∗)
;DEFINITIONS OF STATES
(defvar S Filled By Designate
(
&&
;State conditions
([>] (−V− GC179 ID) 0)
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([>] (−V− EMP ID) 0)
([>] (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) 0)
(!! (−P− CROSS CHECKED))
(!! (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED))
([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− HR EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 0)
([=] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 0)
([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 0)
(!! (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS))
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− PMT ID) 0)
;Access Control
([!=] (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) (−V− EMP ID))
([=] (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID))
)
)
(defvar S Self Filled
(
&&
;State conditions
([>] (−V− GC179 ID) 0)
([>] (−V− EMP ID) 0)
([>] (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) 0)
(−P− CROSS CHECKED)
(!! (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED))
([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− HR EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 0)
([=] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 0)
([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 0)
(!! (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS))
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− PMT ID) 0)
;Access Control
([=] (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) (−V− EMP ID))
([=] (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) (−V− EMP ID))
)
)
(defvar S Cross Checked
(
&&
(−P− CROSS CHECKED)
(!! (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED))
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([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 0)
)
)
(defvar S Changes Required
(
&&
(!! (−P− CROSS CHECKED)) ;∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
(−P− CHANGES REQUIRED);∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− HR EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 0)
([=] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 0)
([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 0)
(!! (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS))
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− PMT ID) 0)
)
)
(defvar S Approved By Supervisor
(
&&
([>] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 0);∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) 0);∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
;Access Control
([=] (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID))
([!=] (−V− EMP ID) (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID))
)
)
(defvar S Approved By Sect34 Authority
(
&&
([>] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) 0);∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
([=] (−V− HR EMP ID) 0)
;Access Control
([=] (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID))
([!=] (−V− EMP ID) (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID))
([!=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID))
)
)
(defvar S Vacation Hours Calculated
(
&&
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([>] (−V− HR EMP ID) 0);∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
([=] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 0)
([>] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 0)
(!! (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED))
(!! (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS))
([=] (−V− PMT ID) 0)
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 0)
;Access Control
([=] (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) (−V− HR EMP ID))
)
)
(defvar S Cash Pay Calculated
(
&&
([>] (−V− HR EMP ID) 0);∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
([>] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 0)
([=] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 0)
(−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)
(!! (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS))
([=] (−V− PMT ID) 0)
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 0)
;Access Control
([=] (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) (−V− HR EMP ID))
)
)
(defvar S Hours Accrued
(
&&
(!! (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS))
([>] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 0)
([>] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 0)
;Access Control
([=] (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID))
)
)
(defvar S EXPORTED TO RPS
(
&&
(−P− EXPORTED TO RPS)
([>] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 0)
([>] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 0)
([=] (−V− PMT ID) 0)
;Access Control
([=] (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID))
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))
(defvar S PAYMENT MADE
(
&&
([>] (−V− PMT ID) 0)
)
)
(defvar S Rejected
(
&&
(−P− PHI)
)
)
(defvar model guards and invariants
(
&&
(;S Self Filled
alwf
(
−>
S Self Filled
(
&&
;Future Invariants
(alwf ([=] (−V− GC179 ID) (futr (−V− GC179 ID) 1)))
(alwf ([=] (−V− EMP ID) (futr (−V− EMP ID) 1)))
(alwf ([=] (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) (futr (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) 1)))
)
)
)
(;S Cross Checked
alwf
(
−>
S Cross Checked
(
&&
;Guarded Variables
([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) (past (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID)
1))
([=] (−V− HR EMP ID) (past (−V− HR EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) (past (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 1)
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)([=] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) (past (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 1))
([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) (past (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 1))
(|| (&& (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)) (&& (!! (−
P− EXPORTED TO RPS)) (!! (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)) (!! (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1))))
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) (past (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− PMT ID) (past (−V− PMT ID) 1))
)
)
)
(;S Filled By Designate
alwf
(
−>
S Filled By Designate
(
&&
;Future Invariants
(alwf ([=] (−V− GC179 ID) (futr (−V− GC179 ID) 1)))
(alwf ([=] (−V− EMP ID) (futr (−V− EMP ID) 1)))
(alwf ([=] (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) (futr (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) 1)))
)
)
)
(;S Approved By Supervisor
alwf
(
−>
S Approved By Supervisor
(
&&
;Guarded Variables
(|| (&& (−P− CROSS CHECKED) (past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1)) (&& (!! (−P−
CROSS CHECKED)) (!! (past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED)) (!! (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1))))
([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) (past (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID)
1))
([=] (−V− HR EMP ID) (past (−V− HR EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) (past (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 1)
)
([=] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) (past (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 1))
([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) (past (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 1))
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(|| (&& (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)) (&& (!! (−
P− EXPORTED TO RPS)) (!! (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)) (!! (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1))))
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) (past (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− PMT ID) (past (−V− PMT ID) 1))
)
)
)
(;S Approved By Sect34 Authority
alwf
(
−>
S Approved By Sect34 Authority
(
&&
;Guarded Variables
(|| (&& (−P− CROSS CHECKED) (past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1)) (&& (!! (−P−
CROSS CHECKED)) (!! (past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED)) (!! (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1))))
([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) (past (−V−
APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− HR EMP ID) (past (−V− HR EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) (past (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 1)
)
([=] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) (past (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 1))
([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) (past (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 1))
(|| (&& (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)) (&& (!! (−
P− EXPORTED TO RPS)) (!! (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)) (!! (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1))))
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) (past (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− PMT ID) (past (−V− PMT ID) 1))
)
)
)
(;S Vacation Hours Calculated
alwf
(
−>
S Vacation Hours Calculated
(
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&&
;Guarded Variables
(|| (&& (−P− CROSS CHECKED) (past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1)) (&& (!! (−P−
CROSS CHECKED)) (!! (past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED)) (!! (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1))))
([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) (past (−V−
APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) (past (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID)
1))
([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) (past (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 1))
(|| (&& (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)) (!! (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)) (&& (!! (−
P− EXPORTED TO RPS)) (!! (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1))))
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) (past (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− PMT ID) (past (−V− PMT ID) 1))
;Future Invariants
(alwf (|| (&& (−P− CROSS CHECKED) (futr (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1)) (&& (!! (−
P− CROSS CHECKED)) (!! (futr (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1)))))
(alwf (|| (&& (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) (futr (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1))
(&& (!! (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED)) (!! (futr (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED)
1)))))
(alwf ([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) (futr (−V−
APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 1)))
(alwf ([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) (futr (−V−
SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) 1)))
(alwf (|| (&& (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) (futr (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1))
(&& (!! (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)) (!! (futr (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)
1)))))
(alwf ([=] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) (futr (−V−
CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 1)))
(alwf ([=] (−V− PMT ID) (futr (−V− PMT ID) 1)))
)
)
)
(;S Cash Pay Calculated
alwf
(
−>
S Cash Pay Calculated
(
&&
;Guarded Variables
(|| (&& (−P− CROSS CHECKED) (past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1)) (&& (!! (−P−
CROSS CHECKED)) (!! (past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1)) (&&
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(!! (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED)) (!! (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1))))
([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) (past (−V−
APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) (past (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID)
1))
([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) (past (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 1))
(|| (&& (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)) (!! (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)) (&& (!! (−
P− EXPORTED TO RPS)) (!! (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1))))
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) (past (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− PMT ID) (past (−V− PMT ID) 1))
;Future Invariants
(alwf (|| (&& (−P− CROSS CHECKED) (futr (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1)) (&& (!! (−
P− CROSS CHECKED)) (!! (futr (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1)))))
(alwf (|| (&& (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) (futr (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1))
(&& (!! (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED)) (!! (futr (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED)
1)))))
(alwf ([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) (futr (−V−
APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 1)))
(alwf ([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) (futr (−V−
SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) 1)))
(alwf (|| (&& (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) (futr (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1))
(&& (!! (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)) (!! (futr (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED)
1)))))
(alwf ([=] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) (futr (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 1)))
)
)
)
(;S Hours Accrued
alwf
(
−>
S Hours Accrued
(
&&
;Future Invariants
(alwf (|| (&& (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) (futr (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS)) (!! (futr (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)))))
(alwf ([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) (futr (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 1)))
(alwf ([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) (futr (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 1)
))
)
)
)
(;S EXPORTED TO RPS
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alwf
(
−>
S EXPORTED TO RPS
(
&&
;Future Invariants
(alwf (|| (&& (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) (futr (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)) (&&
(!! (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS)) (!! (futr (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)))))
(alwf ([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) (futr (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 1)))
(alwf ([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) (futr (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 1)
))
)
)
)
(;S PAYMENT MADE
alwf
(
−>
S PAYMENT MADE
(
&&
;Future Invariants
(alwf ([=] (−V− PMT ID) (futr (−V− PMT ID) 1)))
)
)
)
)
)
(defvar Instantiation Constraints
( &&
(!! (−P− PHI)) ;Lifecycle not terminated and
(|| S Self Filled S Filled By Designate); Must be in at least one of the starting states
)
)
(defvar Termination Constraints
(&&
;Previously PHI implies currently PHI
(alw ;Always or Globally
(
−>
(past (−P− PHI) 1) ;Previously PHI
(−P− PHI); Currently PHI
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))
;PHI implies all attributes retain previous values
(alw
(
−>
(−P− PHI)
(&&
([=] (−V− GC179 ID) (past (−V− GC179 ID) 1))
([=] (−V− EMP ID) (past (−V− EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) (past (−V− FILLED BY EMP ID) 1))
(|| (&& (−P− CROSS CHECKED) (past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1)) (&& (!! (−P− CROSS CHECKED)) (!!
(past (−P− CROSS CHECKED) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1)) (&& (!! (−P−
CHANGES REQUIRED)) (!! (past (−P− CHANGES REQUIRED) 1))))
([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) (past (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) (past (−V− SEC34 AUTHORITY EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− HR EMP ID) (past (−V− HR EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) (past (−V− HR−PAYROLL TXN ID) 1))
([=] (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) (past (−V− HOURS ACCRUED) 1))
([=] (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) (past (−V− CASH PAYMENT AMOUNT) 1))
(|| (&& (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1)) (&& (!! (−P−
PAYOUT REQUESTED)) (!! (past (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) 1))))
(|| (&& (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1)) (&& (!! (−P−
EXPORTED TO RPS)) (!! (past (−P− EXPORTED TO RPS) 1))))
([=] (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) (past (−V− COMPTROLLER EMP ID) 1))
([=] (−V− PMT ID) (past (−V− PMT ID) 1))
([=] (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) (past (−V− LASTUPDATE EMP ID) 1))
)
)
)
)
)
(defvar modelconstraints
(
&&
(; Constraint 2
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(past S Filled By Designate 1)
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(!! S Filled By Designate)
)
(|| S Cross Checked S Changes Required S Rejected)
)
)
(; Constraint 3
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(past S Changes Required 1)
(!! S Changes Required)
)
(|| S Filled By Designate S Self Filled S Rejected)
)
)
(; Constraint 4
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(!! (past S Approved By Supervisor 1))
S Approved By Supervisor
)
(past S Cross Checked 1)
)
)
(; Constraint 5
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(past S Approved By Supervisor 1)
(!! S Approved By Supervisor)
)
(|| S Approved By Sect34 Authority S Rejected S Changes Required)
)
)
(; Constraint 6
alwf
(
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−>
(
&&
(!! (past S Approved By Sect34 Authority 1))
S Approved By Sect34 Authority
)
(past S Approved By Supervisor 1)
)
)
(; Constraint 7
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(past S Approved By Sect34 Authority 1)
(!! S Approved By Sect34 Authority)
)
(|| S Vacation Hours Calculated S Cash Pay Calculated S Rejected S Changes Required)
)
)
(; Constraint 8
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(!! (past S Vacation Hours Calculated 1))
S Vacation Hours Calculated
)
(past S Approved By Sect34 Authority 1)
)
)
(; Constraint 9
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(!! (past S Cash Pay Calculated 1))
S Cash Pay Calculated
)
(past S Approved By Sect34 Authority 1)
)
)
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(; Constraint 10
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(!! (past S Hours Accrued 1))
S Hours Accrued
)
(past S Vacation Hours Calculated 1)
)
)
(; Constraint 11
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(past S Vacation Hours Calculated 1)
(!! S Vacation Hours Calculated)
)
(|| S Hours Accrued)
)
)
(; Constraint 12
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(!! (past S EXPORTED TO RPS 1))
S EXPORTED TO RPS
)
(past S Cash Pay Calculated 1)
)
)
(; Constraint 13
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(past S Cash Pay Calculated 1)
(!! S Cash Pay Calculated)
)
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(|| S EXPORTED TO RPS)
)
)
(; Constraint 13
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(!! (past S PAYMENT MADE 1))
S PAYMENT MADE
)
(past S EXPORTED TO RPS 1)
)
)
(; Constraint 14
alwf
(
−>
(
&&
(past S EXPORTED TO RPS 1)
(!! S EXPORTED TO RPS)
)
(|| S PAYMENT MADE)
)
)
)
)
(ae2zot:zot 10
(
&&
Instantiation Constraints
Termination Constraints
modelconstraints
model guards and invariants
;Check conditions described in Section 7.3.4
;(somf (&& S Hours Accrued (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) )); −− Check 1
;(somf (&& (−P− PAYOUT REQUESTED) (somf S Hours Accrued) )); −− Check 2
;(somf (&& S Cash Pay Calculated (futr (−P− PHI) 1)) ); −− Check 3
;(somf (&& S Changes Required (somf (&& (!! S Changes Required) (somf S Changes Required)) ))); −−
Check 4
;(|| (somf (&& S Cash Pay Calculated (somf S Changes Required)) ) (somf (&&
S Vacation Hours Calculated (somf S Changes Required)) )) ;−− Check 5
207
;(somf (&& S PAYMENT MADE ([=] (−V− APPROVAL SUPERVISOR EMP ID) 0))) ;−− Check 6
;(somf (&& ([=] (−V− HR EMP ID) (−V− EMP ID)) ([>] (−V− HR EMP ID) 0) ))−− Check 7
)
:logic :QF UFLIA
)
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